

# THE KOSOVO SETTLEMENT: DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

*by*

The Honorable Frank G. Wisner  
*Special Envoy, Kosovo Final Status Talks*



THE SIXTH  
ANGIER BIDDLE DUKE LECTURE

June 16, 2008

## *Our Mission*

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and others. It is a nonprofit activist organization dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Toward that end, the National Committee identifies, articulates, and helps advance American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism.

American foreign policy interests include

preserving and strengthening national security;

supporting countries committed to the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism;

improving U.S. relations with the developed and developing worlds;

advancing human rights;

encouraging realistic arms-control agreements;

curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons;

promoting an open and global economy.

Believing that an informed public is vital to a democratic society, the National Committee offers educational programs that address security challenges facing the United States and publishes a variety of publications, including its bimonthly journal, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, that present keen analyses of all aspects of American foreign policy.



DR. GEORGE D. SCHWAB  
President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

## WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

Ambassador Wisner, Ambassador Duke, Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Good Evening.

On behalf of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, I am privileged to welcome Ambassador Frank Wisner who, on the occasion of the resumption of the Angier Biddle Duke Lecture Series, will speak on “The Kosovo Settlement: Diplomacy in the Balkans.” His credentials to do so are impeccable: He was intimately involved in resolving the Kosovo crisis in his capacity as the U.S. special representative to the Kosovo status talks.

I used the word *resumption* because it identifies what we will do here tonight: continue a series that epitomized a special interest of Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, an esteemed president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Following Ambassador Duke’s tragic death, the National Committee succeeded in raising money to host elegant dinner briefings that accorded with Angie’s predilection for combining style with substance. Over the years we were addressed by luminaries such as H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, and Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke, Winston Lord, and Tom Pickering.

Because we encroached into capital, we eventually ran out of money and had to interrupt the series. That bothered me very much, for Angie and I had often discussed the idea of establishing a series of lectures focused on the special insights gleaned by ambassadors into foreign policymaking. Angie promised to launch the series.

The realization that we had made a mistake in funding the series made me even more determined to create Angie’s special forum by reestablishing at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy an Angier Biddle Duke Endowment Fund from which we would spend only the interest and leave the capital intact. One day not so long ago I had lunch with Robin whose enthusiasm convinced me that she was gung ho about the idea.

Those who immediately responded to my appeal and whose contributions will, of course, be acknowledged in every publication emanating from the series deserve to be acknowledged now: Sheila Johnson Robbins, Muriel (Mickie) Siebert, Harriette and Noel Levine, Ambassador John Loeb, and Maurice Sonnenberg. I too made a contribution to the fund. Emboldened by my overall success and undeterred by some disappointments, I will continue to knock at doors. My ambition is to raise a plentiful supply of greenbacks for the Duke Endowment Fund.

It is now my privilege to introduce Robin Chandler Duke. As many of you know, Robin is no shrinking violet. Wherever she is and in whatever capacity she serves, her presence is felt, as it was when she was ambassador to Norway; director of the U.S.–Japan Foundation and the United Nations Association of the United States; chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the 21st Session of the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization held in Belgrade; vice chairman of the Institute of International Education; a delegate at the first UN Conference on Population in Beijing; as well as a delegate at the First Conference on Population in the Arab world in Tunisia; and a lifelong fighter to maintain women’s right to choose by keeping abortion legal. In other words, Robin expanded on the work that she did abroad when Angie was ambassador to Spain, Denmark, and Morocco and in Washington where he was chief of protocol for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

For her work Robin has been decorated by the governments of Spain and Luxembourg, and in 1991 she received the Albert and Mary Lasker Award for Public Service.

Ladies and gentlemen, Robin Chandler Duke. . . .



## AMBASSADOR ROBIN CHANDLER DUKE INTRODUCTION

**T**hank you, George. The presence of Ambassador Wisner is a special honor as he is one of the best and longest-serving Foreign Service officers the United States has. Frank was a good friend of my late husband, Angier Biddle Duke. Both distinguished

themselves through their diplomatic careers.

It may be of interest for you to know that my late husband originally accepted what he thought to be an unimportant position at the State Department. But because of his dedication to serve the country, he made important contributions to American foreign policy as ambassador to Mexico, El Salvador, Spain, Denmark, and Morocco and as chief of protocol to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Frank, a native New Yorker who was educated at Princeton, became a career ambassador. As ambassador to India, Zambia, Egypt, and the Philippines; as undersecretary of defense for policy; and undersecretary of state for international security affairs, Frank contributed to the shaping of our country's foreign policy. He has also been at the forefront of conflict resolutions in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. In the most recent past, Frank played a leading role as the U.S. representative among the troika of negotiators in the Kosovo Final Status Talks.

It is a pleasure to welcome Frank Wisner to the National Committee.



THE HONORABLE FRANK G. WISNER  
Special Envoy, Kosovo Final Status Talks

**THE KOSOVO SETTLEMENT:  
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS**

**I**t is an honor to have been invited to address the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The subject that you have selected is important to the United States; for the better part of the last two years, I served as the special representative of the secretary of state to the Kosovo Final Status Talks. During that time I came to appreciate the importance of the Balkans to the future of our relationship with Europe and Russia. I believe Kosovo's independence was an important achievement for U.S. diplomacy and one that will serve us well in the time ahead.

I am particularly honored to deliver the Angier Biddle Duke Lecture. I knew and respected the ambassador, a great American diplomat. I also admire Ambassador Robin Duke, his widow, for her many

accomplishments, including her stint in diplomacy and for her extraordinary and generous support of institutions important to her many accomplishments, including her stint in diplomacy and for her extraordinary and generous support of institutions important to American foreign policy. No one has understood more deeply the imperatives of good policy nor acted on her convictions than Mrs. Duke.

Mrs. Duke also believes that the United States must act as a peacemaker and as a good ally, which points me to the subject of my remarks—Kosovo. We made a critical foreign policy choice in the late 1990s when the United States and our NATO allies intervened to stop the brutal ethnic cleansing of the majority population in that small land. We made a fresh decision in 2005 to resolve the long-running Kosovar dispute and seek final status for the territory. Having helped Kosovo achieve its independence, the United States, together with Europe, now carries the responsibility of standing by Kosovo while it builds its institutions, security forces, and economy and lays conditions for its long-term success within Europe and in the international community.

Let me repeat this assertion for emphasis: Despite Kosovo's independence, America's responsibility has not ended. Of course, the EU bears the larger share of responsibility, but Europe alone, without the United States, cannot see Kosovo through to its emergence as a fully successful state and member of the international community. Nor will the Balkans be peaceful and secure and maintain ties to Europe without close European–American collaboration. The obstacles remain daunting.

A brief look at the past is the starting point in understanding American policy in southeastern Europe and toward Kosovo. History has dealt the Balkans a bad hand of cards. Crowded in southeastern Europe's narrow peninsula are a cluster of nationalities, religions, and ethnicities. They lived together sometimes in peace and sometimes in conflict. Tensions among them were exacerbated as various empires advanced and receded over the millennia. The ethnic conflicts of the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, had their origins in the wave of nationalism that swept Europe in the 19th century. The idea of national identity rekindled divisions among the peoples of the Balkans, and opportunistic political and criminal greed poured fat on the fire.

Kosovo, with its Albanian majority and its Serbian, Turkish, Roma, Bosnian, and other minorities, is the Balkans in miniature. The

Kosovar Albanians and Serbs especially have strongly felt national identities and long national traditions, myths, culture, and literature. Sorting out Kosovo would never have been easy, even had goodwill and tolerance been prevalent. Of course, they were not.

### A Word of History

To understand what happened in Kosovo, we need to take into account the clash of two principles—sovereignty and majority rule. Kosovo was once part of Serbia and was recognized as such. The territory was attached to the Kingdom of Serbia quite recently—in the early part of the last century, as a result of Serbia’s military victory over the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Kosovo was deeply embedded in Serbia’s history. The great monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church are to be found there and bear witness to Serbia’s long-standing ties to Kosovo. Serbia’s epic battle with the Ottomans was fought in Kosovo in 1389, a fact remembered by every Serb. Kosovo was internationally recognized as part of the Kingdom of Serbia, separated from it only briefly during World War II. At the same time and by the 20th century, Kosovars in their vast majority were Albanians and that majority has continued to grow.

That majority never embraced the Serbian nation; it maintained its culture, language, aspirations, and institutions. Whatever the merits of formal sovereignty, governments carry a responsibility for the protection and welfare of their minorities. Serbia failed to discharge that responsibility. On the rock of that failure, the unity of Serbia crashed.

Kosovo might have survived as a part of Serbia had it not been for the ambitions of Slobodan Milosevic. The Serbian firebrand figured he could dominate Serbia’s politics if he could stir up and then personify Serbian nationalism. It was Milosevic who annulled Kosovo’s autonomy and began a decade of repressive rule. His actions and the reactions of Albanian Kosovars led to more violent repression. Tensions were also fed by the violence in the rest of the former Yugoslavia that followed in the wake of the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation.

The Kosovo crisis reached its climax in 1998 when Serbian authorities tried to expel half of the Albanian population from the territory. Tens of thousands of lives were lost and properties destroyed. As a result of Serbian brutality, the United States led NATO in a military offensive against Serbia’s repression. NATO prevailed and Milosevic agreed in 1999 to withdraw his forces and

administration from Kosovo, turning the territory over to the United Nations. The UN mandate was contained in a Security Council resolution—UNSCR 1244. That document also left in the hands of the international community the responsibility to pursue the final status of Kosovo. The resolution remains in force today and will be operative for sometime. Russia has made it clear that it will not accept its repeal. One of the challenges the new Kosovo faces is a multiplicity of international mandates—1244 for openers and now the international civilian presence called for in the Ahtisaari proposal and accepted by the new multiethnic Kosovar state.

In retrospect, it was an interesting twist of fate that Martti Ahtisaari became the architect of Kosovo's independence. In the late 1990s the then president of Finland, backed by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot of the United States and former Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin of Russia, negotiated Serbia's withdrawal from Kosovo. I doubt Ahtisaari knew he would one day return to Kosovo. But he did because he is a committed international public servant who knows the call of duty when he hears it. For our part, we needed someone of Ahtisaari's standing. Without a great negotiator, we would not have been able to define our choices. The parties could not have found a way forward without international intervention.

Serbia's leaders have not tried to accommodate the Kosovo reality. Serbia has respected its undertakings under UNSCR 1244 according to the letter of the law but not its spirit. Serbia's politicians have persistently meddled in Kosovo and Kosovo Serb politics, limiting the community's ability to participate in the building of a multiethnic and fully integrated Kosovo. Serbian secret police have infiltrated many areas of Kosovo; Serbian ministries have engaged in civil programs with scant regard to Kosovar Albanian provisional authorities. Moreover, not once in the past nine years have Belgrade's democrats reached out to Kosovo Albanian leaders and offered a hand of reconciliation. In hindsight there was not a chance that Serbia would accept an outcome for Kosovo that did not provide for Serbian sovereignty. Nor was there any possibility that Kosovo's Albanians would accept Serbian suzerainty.

### Untying the Gordian Knot

Back to 1999: Having instructed the United Nations to take charge of Kosovo and prepare the territory for multiethnic self-government,

Western members of the Security Council and Russia moved on to other issues and let Kosovo slip off their radar screens. Rather than take on the sticky task of settling the territory's future, the international community left the job of developing Kosovo and its institutions in the UN's hands and took no action to define final status. As the months turned into years, tensions rose in Kosovo between the Albanian majority and the Serbian community and between the political leaders of the Albanian community and the UN's administrators.

In the spring of 2004, violence broke out between the Albanian majority and the Serbian communities. By the time the violence subsided, many Serbs had fled Kosovo; churches and monasteries were heavily damaged; homes lay in ruins. There was no way to escape the fact that the Security Council had to address Kosovo's future if peace was to be restored and maintained. That was done in five steps.

First, Kai Ede, a veteran Norwegian diplomat, was given the task of assessing Kosovo's situation and recommending next steps. He concluded that while Kosovo's institutions remained deficient in many aspects, there would be no way to achieve serious progress in improving governance, economy, or community relations absent clarity about the territory's political future.

Second, and in order to frame a negotiation, the Contact Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia) set out guiding principles for Martti Ahtisaari's negotiations. Those principles were predicated on respect for the will of the people of Kosovo and no return to the status quo ante, no change in Kosovo's boundaries or in those of its neighbors, and no merging of Kosovo with Albania.

Third, at the end of 2005, Ahtisaari formally launched his negotiations, consulting Serbia's government and Kosovo's provisional authorities and keeping the Contact Group posted. I was privileged to have been named as the special representative of the secretary of state to the Kosovo Final Status Talks and charged with working with and supporting Ahtisaari's negotiations. The EU also named a representative to the negotiations. Russia did not.

Early on the former Finnish president realized that Kosovo's independence would be the only viable outcome. The UN could not continue its role; no Kosovar would live under Serbian rule; and no

international force would compel Kosovo's return to Serbian sovereignty. Ahtisaari was never a man to hide the truth. More important, he realized that his best hope lay in convincing Serbia to give up Kosovo and in return secure the rights of Serbs in Kosovo, as well as establish new relationships with the West. Ahtisaari proceeded to make his conclusion known to the Serbian authorities. We joined him in sending this message in hopes that Serbia's leadership would acknowledge that Belgrade had lost Kosovo and consequently would concentrate on working for the country's entry into the European Union and NATO. The gamble did not pay off. Serbia's leaders bitterly opposed the separation of Kosovo. Their opposition remains to this day. I regret that Serb leaders chose to stand their ground in a place that, in my view, is inconsistent with long-term Serbian interests and does not reflect the will of the majority of Serbian citizens who wish to move closer to the West. In maintaining a hard, rejectionist line, the self-styled defenders of Serbia have argued that maintaining Serbia's unity will serve the best interests of all Serbs—those living in Serbia and those living in Kosovo. I believe history will show that the Kosovar Serbs' best protectors were Ahtisaari and his colleagues.

Serbian resistance notwithstanding, during 2006 Ahtisaari patiently explored formulae that would ensure the security and well-being of Kosovo's minorities and democratic governance for the country as a whole. He sought approaches to the protection of Serbian communities and religious and cultural institutions that met the highest European standards for the treatment of minorities. By the end of 2006, he had developed a package that gave the Serbian community in Kosovo its own municipalities, churches, and cultural institutions. Those municipalities would be policed by Serbs; schools and health facilities would be run by Serbs. Dual nationality was conferred on Serbs. Serbian churches and monasteries were made protected zones and given legally defined boundaries. Serbs were granted roles in the central institutions in Pristina. NATO was invited to continue its security mission. To ensure implementation of his proposal, Ahtisaari recommended the establishment of an international civilian presence. That presence is to continue for a limited period of time and side by side with European oversight of Kosovo's police and judicial bodies.

Despite the onerous conditions that Ahtisaari placed on the new Kosovo, the leaders of the Albanian Kosovar political parties accepted his proposal. Serbian leaders rejected it because they knew Ahtisaari's proposal would lead to independence. They made it clear that they

set greater store by the principle of Kosovo's inclusion in the Serbian state than they did the protection of Serb citizens and churches in a Kosovar state.

Determined to finish the negotiation, in early 2007 Martti Ahtisaari took his proposal to New York and presented it to the secretary general and the Security Council.

Fourth, responsibility for Kosovo's future then fell to the Security Council. From late spring through the midsummer of 2007, the Security Council wrestled with the Ahtisaari proposal and Kosovo's future. Five Security Council draft resolutions were considered. Not one found favor with Russia. The Russians made it clear that they would veto any resolution that did not elicit Serbia's agreement. Yet Serbian politics were such that Belgrade could not accept any such proposal, even one with strong protections for Serb citizens, municipalities, and holy sites. With no solution possible within the Security Council, the Europeans and the United States had to look elsewhere. The status quo was not sustainable.

Looking back to that time, nearly a year ago, when Russia's position became rock solid, I have asked myself what Russian interest was served by subordinating its policy to the whims of Belgrade's leaders. Did Russia really believe issues like Abkhazia and South Ossetia would become less tractable in the wake of a Kosovar settlement? I doubt it. Was a surge of pan-Slavic sentiment important to Putin as he nailed down his succession? I doubt that too. Did an alliance with Serbia give Russia a fresh purchase on events in the Balkans? It hardly seems likely. Did Russia, resurgent under Putin, want to make a point that no European issue could be settled without Moscow's leave and that Russian firmness would drive a wedge between the United States and Europe? Maybe. If so, I believe Russia miscalculated and that its miscalculation has consequences. In opposing Kosovo's independence, Russia has deeply angered Albanians, the region's second largest ethnic group. Moreover, by defying the European consensus over Kosovo, Russia told Europe it will not help Europe provide security to its southeast. Russia may also have made the point that it will have its "pound of flesh" whatever the merits.

Fifth, the map to the last stage of the Kosovar negotiations emerged from the June 2007 G8 summit in Germany. France's newly elected president, Nicolas Sarkozy, proposed an additional period of

negotiations to be led by the EU, the United States, and Russia. This final negotiating initiative under this troika would meet with the parties at their highest levels and consider all existing and prospective options for Kosovo's future. As a troika we did that, meeting in Austria, Belgium, Britain, New York, and in the region.

The United States accepted the proposal quickly. Russia did the same, seeing in it room for further delay in Kosovo's independence. So did Serbia and for the same reason. The Kosovo Albanians followed suit reluctantly, realizing there was no other way forward.

To us in the United States, the troika was an opportunity to intensify our cooperation with all of the member states of the EU, especially those that had not been party to the Contact Group. The troika also provided an occasion to demonstrate to any remaining doubting Thomases that there was only one realistic way forward—Kosovo's supervised independence. The task of bringing EU members along lay principally with a brilliant German diplomat and the EU's troika representative, Wolfgang Ischinger. He worked tirelessly with governments in Europe to make it clear that Europe had to stick together and make a choice. Kosovo's future could not be fudged.

On December 10 the troika finished its work; it left no stone unturned in examining the different outcomes for Kosovo partition: supervised independence; autonomy under Serb sovereignty; independence that would provide for a sharing of sovereignty. No conclusion was acceptable to both Serbia's political leaders and those of the Kosovar Albanians. Serbia insisted on autonomy and continued Serbian sovereignty. The Kosovars stood firm on independence. In the troika's report to the UN secretary general, we concluded that no common ground could be found and no further negotiations would produce a different outcome. Two months later, on February 17, 2008, the Kosovars declared independence.

### The Road Ahead

As we anticipated, the first months of Kosovo's independence have been difficult. That said, there has been virtually no interethnic conflict in Kosovo, as many feared. Serbia has not cut off electricity or water supplies to the new country. No Kosovo Serb families fled despite estimates that there would be anywhere from 10,000 to more than 50,000 new refugees. No fresh challenges to neighboring Bosnia's unity

and the Dayton Agreement have emerged. Russia has not explicitly pushed for breakaway action in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia—although its recent moves in Abkhazia send worrying signals. Serbia has not frontally attacked the new Kosovo.

But there has been violence. Embassies were burned in Belgrade. Serbs killed a Ukrainian policeman in UN service in northern Kosovo. Especially north of the Ibar River, Serbs have rejected Kosovo authority and refused to cooperate with the new government and the international community. The UN has found itself in a tough place—forced to continue its 1244 mandate; unable to withdraw without a Security Council decision; obliged to deal with an independent Kosovo.

Recognition of Kosovo by many of the world's leading nations has taken place, but more must do so if Kosovo is to be a fully accepted member of the international community. This is especially important given Russian opposition to Kosovo's independence. Because of Russian opposition, membership in the UN is not likely for some time. Funds must be mobilized to build Kosovo's economy, especially for infrastructure and education. Unless the young people of Kosovo find jobs, the promise of the new state will be stillborn.

In the long run, we in the international community must take on the task of ensuring a stable and prosperous future for Kosovo, Serbia, and the Balkans as a whole. At the end of the road is the region's integration into Europe and the West—into the EU specifically and into NATO. I do not underestimate the difficulties involved in reaching that goal and the dream of seeing the Balkans' quarrelsome nationalities submerged in a greater European whole.

Long and difficult as the road is, there is no reason to lose heart. Much good is occurring. Kosovo's new institutions are functioning smoothly. Its constitution has been formulated. Dozens of new laws have been adopted and a streamlined international civilian structure is in place. It will take months and years of hard work on all our parts to make certain that Kosovo is a success and to overcome Serbian resistance to the notion of a new, independent, multiethnic neighbor.

### The United States and the Balkans

Kosovo would not be independent today without strong American involvement. We were right to commit our national prestige and our

diplomacy to the achievement of that independence. It was the right thing to do. A question of principle lay at the core of our decision. Kosovars suffered horribly during the Milosevic period. Under subsequent UN tutelage, they earned the privilege to govern themselves. It was right for us to support their aspirations.

National interest plays its role as well. The Kosovo–Serbia dispute was the last major territorial question in the Balkans. Now that the borders are defined, the region can get on with building its future; at last Europe has a defined map for the Balkans and can undertake the painstaking work of bringing each of the Balkan states into greater harmony and cooperation and into the European family—objectives important to the United States as well as NATO. With Kosovo’s independence settled, NATO can look to an exit. It will not happen immediately, for the parties need a period of calm before they can convince themselves of the region’s security. Kosovo will require a new defense force, and NATO must train and equip that.

Kosovo’s independence serves American interests in other ways. The United States has a long and important relationship with Serbia. One must remember that Serbia was a Western ally in two world wars. But because of discord over the breakup of Yugoslavia, this relationship could not advance until Kosovo was settled. Controversy over Kosovo has kept Serbia from focusing on its own urgently needed reforms. Furthermore it will be hard to move the relationship significantly until Serbia gets used to the idea of an independent Kosovo and relaxes its policies of disruption. That said, for the first time in 20 years, we can see an opening and an opportunity to rebuild our ties. The sooner Serbia can catch up to its neighbors, already on their way to membership in NATO and the EU, the more stable and prosperous the whole of the Balkans will be.

Finally, there is the question of Russia. Russia overplayed its hand in Kosovo. It confronted important American interests, and it alienated European opinion. The real gains for Russia are hard to see. But we and the Europeans stood up to Russian pressure, and we stood together. We showed each other once again that shoulder to shoulder Europe and the United States can ensure the continent’s freedom and progress.

Furthermore I suggest that achieving Kosovo’s independence gave Europe and America a chance to redefine our common purpose and put it to work. We were successful in doing so. It is up to all of us

to make sure our partnership continues to work. America cannot have its way alone in today's world. We need allies, and among our more constant are the nations of Europe with which we share democratic principles, economic and cultural ties, and political and security interests.

There is an additional point that underscores the fact that the United Nations is an institution vital to a successful American foreign policy: In Kosovo the UN needed help. It had run out of gas. The Security Council dumped Kosovo in the secretary general's lap and left it there for nine years. The UN did its job of establishing multiethnic self-government in Kosovo, but it ran out of tasks and clout and had to move on. We were correct in insisting that final status needed to be achieved. It is clear that the UN should never be asked to manage open-ended mandates.

These days we hear arguments that America's best days are behind it. We are told that our leadership is no longer decisive. Looking over the months I devoted to Kosovo, I hold neither to be the case. Kosovo would not be independent today if the United States had not taken a stand, engaged the parties, and served as a promoter of European consensus and action. The Kosovo settlement was pursued in the best traditions of American diplomacy; a job begun by one president was finished by his successor of a different, opposing political party. Moreover our diplomacy enjoyed support on both sides of the aisle in Congress, and it faced no public opposition.

I leave the case of Kosovo with you and your future reflection. I would like to think that you, like me, will conclude that American diplomacy pursued the right goal in Kosovo and that we must remain engaged and build on success.

All of us should take a measure of satisfaction from the work of this country of ours.





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