Roundtable: U.S.-Japan-R.O.K.

"THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ROK RELATIONS"

CO-SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (NCAFP), THE KOREA SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE OF KOREA (IPSIKOR)

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CONFERENCE REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The NCAFP and The Korea Society co-hosted a conference on the future of U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations with the International Policy Studies Institute of Korea (IpsiKor) in New York City on November 7-8, 2007. Officials and former officials, as well as academics, from both countries attended. (See the appendix for the list of participants.)

The participants reached a consensus that the U.S.-ROK alliance is in much better shape than most of them might have anticipated two or three years ago. But there was also a shared view that the two allies had lost some trust in each other over the past four or five years ? principally because of conflicting policies towards North Korea ? and that there is much room for improvement in bilateral ties. The next South Korean president, who is to be elected in December 2007, and the next U.S. president, who is to be elected in November 2008, will need to do a much better job of coordinating their respective policies towards North Korea and China and other important global and regional issues, and in strengthening the foundation of this important bilateral partnership if the alliance is to reach its potential.

The year-long gap between the ROK and U.S. elections can be exploited to develop a common approach to stronger relations. The new ROK president should work with the Bush Administration in its final year in order to build on the favorable trends now evident in U.S.-ROK relations and in the Six-Party Talks designed to denuclearize North Korea and develop a new peace process on the Korean peninsula.

No one knows for certain whether North Korea will scrap its nuclear weapons program in an effort to reap the benefits being proffered in Six-Party Talks and to join the international community. But, as one participant stated, it is up to the United States, South Korea and the other parties in the Six-Party Talks (i.e., China, Japan and Russia) to create the conditions under which the North Koreans will have no other rational choice.

The conference participants also agreed that the two allies should work together towards developing a Joint Vision statement for their alliance partnership which would stress their
common values and shared interests and spell out a clear rationale for the future of their relationship. In addition, it is imperative for the new leaders of both countries to explain to their respective legislatures and publics why the alliance will remain so vital to peace on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region generally.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The U.S.-ROK alliance is in much better shape than many of the participants might have anticipated two or three years ago, when military base-related issues, policy differences between Seoul and Washington over North Korea, and anti-American sentiment in the ROK created serious strains in the alliance relationship. The improvement seen in bilateral ties is borne out by opinion polls in both countries and the renewed confidence with which both governments are approaching previously divisive challenges with respect to North Korea and China. The major turnaround in Bush Administration policy towards North Korea, with Washington's new willingness to pursue bilateral dialogue with the DPRK, the ongoing shift of politics towards the center in South Korea, the largely successful efforts by Washington and Seoul to resolve military base-related problems, and the early moves by the DPRK towards disabling its nuclear program have all contributed to this encouraging trend. However, the U.S.-ROK relationship is certainly not the same as it was 10 or 15 years ago, and it could certainly be better. There is a need to rebuild mutual trust and confidence, develop a clear and more popularly accepted rationale for the relationship, and prepare the relationship to deal with future challenges.

2. The next president of the ROK should work closely with the Bush Administration in its final year to develop a common strategy towards North Korea and other challenges now facing the two allies. The next U.S. president should ensure that the U.S. seamlessly picks up this task and continues to work on it. The disjuncture between U.S. and ROK policies towards North Korea during the first five years of the Bush Administration did an enormous amount of damage both to our respective North Korea policies and to the U.S.-ROK alliance. It is imperative that the next ROK president and the next U.S. president not repeat these costly mistakes.

3. The two allies need to build on the vision of the alliance set out by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations during past summits with ROK leaders. The U.S.-ROK alliance is:
   o an alliance based on common values of liberal democracy, the rule of law, transparency, human dignity, open societies, free press, an open international trading system, and counter-terrorism.
   o an alliance based on common interests in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, normalizing relations with the DPRK, helping to bring North Korea into the
international community, and securing peace, stability and development in Northeast Asia.

- an alliance that is increasingly global in its scope, as evidenced by the ROK troop commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq and by its commitment to the peace process in Lebanon.
- an alliance supported by strong and growing common economic interests between the world's largest economy and the world's tenth largest economy.

4. The U.S.-ROK alliance requires strong, top-down interagency management. Establishing a ministerial-level forum comparable to the U.S.-Japan "Two plus Two" or the U.S.-Australia "AUSMIN" would allow the creation of a common narrative on the strategic importance of the alliance to be created and would ensure that all stakeholders are contributing to positive outcomes on major alliance issues such as strategic flexibility or changes to military command relationships and troop levels. Such a structure would also enhance planning and coordination on comprehensive foreign policy issues beyond the Korean peninsula.

5. The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral policy coordination process must be revitalized in order to ensure harmonization of policy approaches between the United States and its two key allies in Northeast Asia. This process should include trilateral defense talks as well as trilateral discussions of the North Korea nuclear issue.

6. The United States and South Korea should take the lead in strategic discussions on how they and the other members of the Six-Party Talks and the international community can create the conditions that would ensure a complete denuclearization of North Korea. These discussions should also deal with ways to help end North Korea's economic and political isolation in the event that it does agree to complete denuclearization.

7. The United States and the ROK should be careful not to premise future policies on the inevitability that North Korea will denuclearize. While this is the desired goal, its achievement is not a given. It is imperative that both governments not lose sight of the ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of North Korea as they pursue their respective policies towards Pyongyang. An incremental approach towards this denuclearization goal is unavoidable and should be pursued; but, in pursuing this end, both governments should be careful not to create a de facto acceptance of North Korean nuclear weapons by proceeding too quickly with economic aid, normalization, peace mechanisms or other elements in the diplomacy with Pyongyang.

8. The transfer of wartime operational control over ROK forces to South Korea comports with the wishes of the Korean people, the capabilities and strength of South Korean forces, and with the growing maturity of bilateral defense ties. The two governments should pursue this transfer as a common goal, but in the course of the transfer they should be prepared to review progress to ensure that they maintain joint capabilities and interoperability and that they deal fully and transparently with ROK concerns generated by new command relationships. The new command structure must be effective and engender confidence in both militaries and among both peoples.
9. The U.S. Congress and the ROK National Assembly should ratify the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) as soon as prudently possible in 2008. This agreement is an important symbol of U.S. leadership and the U.S. commitment to free trade. Equally important, it is a symbol of a broader U.S.-ROK partnership that transcends our common interests vis-à-vis North Korea; and, in that sense it represents a defining element of the future U.S.-ROK relationship. Once ratified, the new agreement will increase employment in both countries, provide a new strategic underpinning to the alliance, and help both Washington and Seoul ensure that future free trade agreements in the region support an open and inclusive trans-Pacific framework.

10. Leaders in the United States and the ROK should work to create a common narrative for both publics about the importance of their alliance and the shared interests and values that bind us. Leaders in both countries should place a major emphasis on explaining to their respective legislatures and publics why the alliance is so vital to peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region generally.

THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

The participants reached a consensus that the U.S.-ROK alliance is now in better shape than it has been in recent years. But both American and Korean participants struck a number of cautionary notes.

One American participant observed that the alliance had faced many strains in the post-9/11 era because the United States had developed a new set of security priorities— including concerns about terrorist threats to the homeland and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction— which often put Washington at odds with its allies, including the ROK. One result of this was that the United States came to see North Korea as a serious regional threat at the same time that Seoul, with its stress on active engagement, was putting its emphasis on reconciliation with North Korea. This put Washington and Seoul’s respective approaches to dealing with the DPRK on a collision course, seriously undermining bilateral ties.

But, he continued, thanks to efforts by both sides, the alliance overcame many serious difficulties. The United States was closing its base at Yongsan in downtown Seoul, transforming the role and location of its military forces in the ROK and their relationship to the host government, and beginning to take steps to transfer wartime operational control of the South Korean armed forces back to Seoul. The ROK, for its part, was committing troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, and this had a very positive impact on U.S. opinion. Thus, both sides were taking steps to strengthen their relations in the security area.

The United States and the ROK had also successfully negotiated the U.S.-Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), which, when passed, would have a major impact on both economies. This step, plus efforts to allow visa-waiver free travel for Koreans to the United States and a decision to revitalize the senior-level dialogue between Washington and Seoul had done much to improve the tone of the relationship and to restore the atmosphere of trust that had been damaged in earlier years.

The American participant argued that the most important key to the improvement in U.S.-ROK relations has been the turnabout in American policy towards North Korea. The Bush
Administration is now willing to engage the DPRK in bilateral as well as multilateral dialogue, and it is emphasizing the need for a negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. This has greatly enhanced confidence between Washington and Seoul, quieted concerns in South Korea that Washington was undermining a fundamental element of Seoul's policy towards the North, and greatly diminished anti-American sentiment in South Korea. The United States and the ROK are now generally on the same page with regard to Pyongyang.

Another factor that contributed to the improvement of alliance relations is a move back to the center in ROK politics. The radical edge in South Korean politics is dissipating.

Over the longer run, the United States and the ROK need to rebuild trust and confidence. They need to engage in a frank dialogue on wartime control of the ROK forces; to move forward on ratifying the Free Trade Agreement and implementing the visa-waiver program; and to implement the agreements on denuclearization of North Korea reached at the Six-Party Talks. The speaker said that it is vitally important that the two allies revitalize trilateral cooperation with Japan. Finally, in light of real progress being made in the Six-Party Talks, the United States and the ROK need to discuss what kind of long-term relationship they both want with North Korea if the disabling and dismantling of its nuclear program are successful.

Another American participant argued that the U.S.-ROK alliance is now on very solid ground. Secretary of Defense Gates was just in Seoul after visiting China, and he had good talks with his South Korean counterparts. This was the second round of the Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (SCAP) talks between the ROK and U.S. militaries. These talks, moreover, now range over global issues - Iraq, Iran, Burma, etc.

This participant also observed that the United States and the ROK are now in lock step on policy towards North Korea; and the ROK is very supportive of U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Finally, he said, the United States has been very impressed with the resilience of South Korea's democracy. There have now been four orderly and peaceful transfers of power since 1987, and the fifth is soon to take place.

A third American participant generally agreed with the thrust of the remarks made by the first two. There had been a traumatic transition on Korea policy from the Clinton to the Bush Administration, but the next transition, he contended, will emphasize continuity. He argued that the two allies had experienced the worst possible outcome with inexperienced presidents in both countries. But the alliance had come through this bad patch. He said we should now build on recent achievements.

This speaker was cautiously optimistic about the state of Korean politics. The younger generation in South Korea, he said, supports the alliance. The basics of the alliance remain strong - democracy, free markets, growing economic ties. There is also a strong geopolitical tie. The Koreans are coming back to the idea that the Korean peninsula, sandwiched between a rising China, a powerful Japan and an authoritarian, nationalistic Russia, can use a friend from afar.
However, the alliance faces several challenges. Both allies need to do a better job of reaching out to their respective publics in an effort to explain the importance of the alliance. They must give serious thought to a Joint Vision statement modeled on the 1996 U.S.-Japan Declaration. Both militaries need to be open to a new dialogue on the operational control of ROK forces during wartime. The American government will need to explain to the American public why it is important to keep American forces in Korea for a long time to come. It will be vital for economic and strategic reasons to ratify the Free Trade Agreement. Finally, the two allies will need to sustain their present cooperation on North Korea policy. Still, this participant concluded, the alliance is in better shape than it was two years ago, and the presidential transitions offer an opportunity to rebuild trust.

A South Korean participant also welcomed the progress now evident in rebuilding the U.S.-ROK alliance. But he urged the participants not to be Pollyannaish, warning that both sides will need to do a better job of coordinating policies on key issues in coming years.

He identified three views in South Korea on the current state of U.S.-Korea relations ranging from bad to good. The first is that the relationship is still in bad shape. There is no trust between the two governments. They have different views on key issues ranging from how to deal with North Korea, to how to build a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and to how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The two top leaders do not trust each other. The two countries are waiting for internal political change before any real improvement can be made in the alliance relationship.

The second view is that the relationship between the two current presidents started out badly but has improved somewhat over the past four to five years. The two governments have grown accustomed to dealing with each other. They have learned to live with each other. But there is much room for improvement. Often, one side or the other does or says something that the other side dislikes. But they have both now learned to grin and bear it rather than to flinch. Still, the relationship is certainly not as good as it was 10 or 15 years ago and could certainly be better.

The third view is the one officially expressed by the current Korean government. The relationship is in great shape and could not be better. South Korea has sent troops to Iraq; it now has the third largest contingent after the United States and Britain. The two governments agreed on the relocation of the U.S. troops in Korea. South Korea has accepted the principle of strategic flexibility for those troops. They have agreed on the transfer of the war-time operational control of the Korean armed forces by the year 2012. Even on how to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, on which the two governments had some disagreements before, there is now no real difference. They both agree with the Six-Party communiqué issued on February 13, 2007. The two countries are in such agreement that they have negotiated, concluded and signed a free trade agreement pending only the approval of the U.S. Congress and the ROK parliament.

The South Korean participant said he thought the reality was closer to the second view, that the relationship is not so bad but has much room for improvement. He went on to trace the historical roots of the alliance to put it into context. The alliance was born, he said, in 1953 in the aftermath of the Korean War at a time when the United States was waging a Cold War against the Soviet Union. Washington saw the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 as a war waged by
the Soviet Union against the United States through its North Korean proxy. The United States therefore wanted to ally with South Korea as part of its larger containment policy toward the USSR. On South Korea's part, the most important objective of allying with the United States was to deter North Korea's re-invasion and to secure a friend in its economic rehabilitation.

Now that the Cold War is over, the speaker said, and with South Korea's relations improving with the North, many question why and whether Seoul should continue the alliance. However, it is important to note that no one in either country is saying that we should do away with the U.S.-ROK alliance. An alliance can acquire new reasons, a new rationale and new life despite a change in the circumstances that brought it into being.

This said, the speaker continued, the U.S.-ROK alliance is an unusual one in that it was ostensibly directed against North Korea, an entity that, so far as South Koreans are concerned, is a part of the Korean nation as a whole. Hence, there are bound to be strains on the alliance when South-North Korean relations improve. This is the case especially when the United States takes a tougher stance towards North Korea than South Korea does, as it did after 2002. At that time, some in South Korea went so far as to conclude that, by threatening to use force against North Korea, the United States represented more of a threat to peace on the Korean peninsula than North Korea did.

Recently, the speaker observed, the U.S. has taken a position far closer to that of South Korea on how to deal with the North. Washington now conducts bilateral negotiations with the DPRK. There is no more talk of "no reward for bad behavior." The United States has even moved the goal posts so that it is easier for North Korea to try to enter the international community.

This new U.S. strategy, he said, seems to be working. North Korea is responding by doling out concessions. As to why the United States made the turnabout, there are five possible reasons: Iraq and Iran; the North Korean nuclear test; the retreat of the neo-conservatives; a new calculation; and an understanding with China.

But, he wondered, will the new American strategy succeed in denuclearizing North Korea any time soon? Is the present euphoria justified? Should we be satisfied with the "salami slices" that North Korea doles out? And will North Korea be allowed to keep its nuclear weapons and material so that its status as a nuclear weapons state is accepted, if not officially recognized. If the February 13th agreement is any indication, it will be a long time, if ever, before North Korea is denuclearized.

A second South Korean participant also offered a cautiously optimistic appraisal of the current state of the alliance. During the past five years, he said, mutual trust has eroded as a result of the failure of both sides to understand each others' position. In this period, the ROK and the United States have made some readjustments and reached some agreements, including the relocation of the Yongsan garrison, the restructuring and reduction of the U.S. forces in South Korea, transfer of certain military missions, a modification of the vision of the alliance, the transfer of wartime operational control and the creation of a new command system.
At the summit meeting held in November 2005 in Gyeongju, the ROK and the U.S. defined the alliance as a "comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial partnership." But each government has yet to spell out exactly what those adjectives stand for and what concrete measures will be taken to implement them.

They need to consider making a Joint Vision statement which confirms that the alliance is based both on common values and common interests. The allies also need to maintain close cooperation and coordination in building peace on the Korean peninsula. They need to work together towards a regional security arrangement for the stability of Northeast Asia.

**DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA**

Much of the discussion focused on the complexities of dealing with North Korea. An American participant observed that policy toward North Korea is central to the U.S.-ROK alliance. It is necessary to get our two North Korea policies right. Yet coordination is always difficult, and there is almost always a disconnect between the two sets of policies.

Moreover, a domestic political problem is looming. A Democratic president in the United States will likely be too timid in dealing with North Korea for fear of being criticized as too soft. A center-right government in the ROK will treat North Korea more conditionally than the center-left government has done in recent years. Meanwhile, North Korea is unlikely to tolerate slowdowns in the pace of accommodation.

The American participant went on to note four issues that will be critical in managing relations with North Korea: regional security, the peace process, economic engagement and the transfer of operational control of ROK forces.

On the first count, regional security, the participant argued that the ROK cannot rely solely on its alliance with the United States to be secure. It will also need to improve relations with both China and Japan. Also, the U.S-China accommodation will be the key to regional security. A U.S.-PRC confrontation would strain all the U.S. alliances, including the one with South Korea. Therefore, the U.S.-ROK alliance should be embedded in new regional security architecture.

A peace process on the Korean peninsula, the participant continued, must begin early next year. It could be kicked off by a Six-Party ministerial meeting. A Peace Treaty could come only at the end of the peace process. The peace process would need to ensure that North Korea is completely denuclearized. It would also involve a series of agreements on confidence-building measures, hot lines, etc.

The third element in dealing with North Korea is economic engagement. South Korea should deepen its economic engagement with North Korea in order to bring about change there. But at the end of the process, South Korea has to be willing to give up economic engagement if North Korea does not give up its nuclear weapons.

Finally, the U.S. will need to transfer operational control of the ROK forces in wartime back to Seoul. The current arrangement of placing ROK forces under U.N. control can be seen as a
symbol of U.S. occupation. The change will have to be made even if it is slower than now presently envisioned.

Another American participant outlined a number of general principles for dealing with North Korea. First is a stated commitment to resolve the issues peacefully through diplomacy rather than regime change in Pyongyang. We will need to deal with the North Korean regime as it is and not as we would like it to be. Second, we need a multilateral process that continues to involve China and other regional players. Third, we need intense diplomatic negotiations that will test North Korea's intentions as to whether it is prepared to completely scrap its nuclear program. There is much room for skepticism on this score, but we need to test North Korea's intentions. Fourth, we should aim for incremental agreements with real time lines and real metrics. In sum, we should begin a process of talking about peace and the normalization of relations, but North Korea needs to understand that neither peace nor normalization can occur without full denuclearization. By the end of 2007, we should get a disablement of some North Korean nuclear facilities and a declaration of all their programs. The end game in 2008 will be to get at their nuclear weapons. We will need powerful bargaining chips to deal with those weapons. Therefore, all economic assistance must be conditional.

Finally, both the United States and the ROK should recognize that China is central to resolving the North Korean issue. Both Washington and Seoul need to maintain good relations with China.

Another U.S. participant emphasized that the United States will insist on total dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program in an effort to transform the regional security environment. The next few months will be very important. The disablement process must continue and there should be a North Korean declaration by the end of the year. With regard to a peace treaty, the Bush Administration is very clear that it will involve four parties - U.S., China, DPRK and ROK. Discussions can begin on a peace treaty but such a treaty cannot be signed and completed without North Korea's full denuclearization.

The Bush Administration, like previous administrations, is serious about developing new regional security architecture and a successful conclusion of the Six-Party Talks will be a catalyst for this process. The United States also needs to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan-ROK triangle.

Finally, the participant emphasized that the main "takeaway" from the conference would be the conclusion that the U.S.-ROK alliance has been through a rough patch, is now improving, and that we are now in a period where the two allies need to develop broader public support for the alliance. An important part of this effort would be to bring North Korea in as a responsible member of the international community. This would be a challenge for all of us.

A South Korean participant then said that the ultimate objectives and direction of the ROK and U.S. policies toward North Korea are identical; they are reform and the opening of North Korea, peace and stability, and ultimate unification. Only differences in narratives and means have created misunderstanding.
The current North Korean regime, he concluded, will exist with serious challenges. But neither war nor collapse is desirable. The current six-party framework should be maintained, and coordination among the U.S., ROK and China is essential.

**THE CHINA FACTOR**

With regard to China, an American participant said that the two most important variables in the future of the international system are the battle for the heart of Islam and the rise of Chinese power and influence. Most Americans are focused on the former because of Iraq, but historians may look back on the latter as the more important of the two.

While it is critical to encourage broader U.S.-China cooperation and a larger role for China in the international system, the United States cannot predict whether China will ultimately contribute to the maintenance of the system or use its new position for mercantilist or nationalist objectives. For that reason U.S. strategy towards Beijing should not be built on an emerging bipolar concert of power with Beijing but should rather be embedded in a regional strategy.

At first glance, it appears that a number of Asian countries are getting on the bandwagon with China as Beijing's power rises. But upon further examination, it becomes quite clear that most of the region is also engaging in pronounced external balancing behavior against China. In this regard, the United States must pay particular attention to South Korea's strategic importance. Asia's pronounced but prudent balancing behavior will ensure that the United States has ample opportunity to build stronger partnerships in the region as long as the U.S. also recognizes that the entire region wants engagement and economic integration with China. In sum, U.S. strategy towards China needs to be built upon the dual principles of engagement and balancing.

The U.S. edge in Asia, however, lies not only in the region's balancing behavior but in the battle of ideas. Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan are all democracies, and even ASEAN has now produced a draft charter that highlights the active strengthening of democratic values and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The key for the United States is not to claim credit for these norms but rather to encourage their growing adoption among the diverse cultures and political systems within Asia. But while coordinating with other democracies in the region, Washington should not try to form an exclusive democratic bloc in Asia that appears aimed at containing China. Many in China recognize the need for better governance and rule of law and even more liberal political participation. The next U.S. president will therefore want to think now about a China policy based on hard-headed realism tempered by idealism.

A South Korean participant noted that ROK-China ties are expanding. Six thousand Korean students now study in China, and China has become the number-one trading partner for South Korea. Also, China's mediating role has blossomed during the current nuclear crisis. Political cooperation is being consolidated with active exchanges and contacts at the highest levels. Still, important factors limit the relationship between China and the ROK. Beijing’s growing competitiveness has an increasingly negative impact on Seoul's export industries. Regime type does matter. There are natural limits to how closely liberal democracies such as Korea can tie themselves to authoritarian states. Geographic realities also matter. South Korea, surrounded as it is by great powers, will continue to find its self-interest in allying with the biggest power that
is the furthest away. Recent public opinion polls confirm this trend. In one of those polls, 41% of the South Korean people saw the United States as the most important country diplomatically, twice as many as those who chose China.

Finally, Washington and Beijing are not competing in a zero-sum game. Beijing does not want a Korea dominated by the United States, but it does see the benefits of an American presence in the region even after Korean reunification to forestall proliferation and to act as a buffer against Japan. A great deal will depend on whether the current U.S. view of China as an ally in the war on terrorism rather than a strategic threat can be sustained. If the two big powers continue to find common ground, then the negative impact of a growing Chinese-Korean relationship on the ROK-U.S. alliance could be manageable. But if PRC-U.S. relations take a turn for the worse, this could create new strains in the ROK-U.S. alliance.

CONCLUSION

Although the U.S.-ROK alliance is in much better shape than many participants would have anticipated two or three years ago, developments over the next year will remain critical. The challenge for the two allies and others in the Six-Party Talks will be to convince the DPRK that Pyongyang must completely scrap its nuclear weapons program and that it will be more secure without nuclear weapons than with them. If Pyongyang does not agree to this during 2008, the last year of the Bush Administration, the chances of resolving this issue will be dim for a number of years. The next year will therefore be very important.

Finally, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been through a rough patch but is now improving. We are in a period when the two allies need to develop broader public support for the alliance. An important part of this effort will be to bring North Korea in as a responsible member of the international community. This cannot be done unless and until North Korea completely dismantles its nuclear program.

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PRESENT

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