ROUND TABLE ON ANTI-AMERICANISM IN EUROPE:
SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

May 10, 2004
Our Mission

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and others. It is a nonprofit, activist organization dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Toward that end, the National Committee identifies, articulates, and helps advance American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism.

American foreign policy interests include

- preserving and strengthening national security;
- supporting countries committed to the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism;
- improving U.S. relations with the developed and developing worlds;
- advancing human rights;
- encouraging realistic arms-control agreements;
- curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons;
- promoting an open and global economy.

Believing that an informed public is vital to a democratic society, the National Committee offers educational programs that address security challenges facing the United States and publishes a variety of publications, including its bimonthly journal, American Foreign Policy Interests, that present keen analyses of all aspects of American foreign policy.
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FOREWORD

The May 2004 Roundtable on Anti-Americanism in Europe is part of a long-term series of conferences sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. These roundtables include policy analysts, academics, and former and current diplomats from both the United States and Europe.

The series began in May 2002 when three members of the National Committee met with five European researchers who agreed to participate. A first roundtable on Reinventing the Transatlantic Partnership met in New York in October 2002, followed by a second in Geneva in June 2003. We are grateful to Dr. Julian Lindley-French, formerly director of transatlantic relations at the Institute of Security Studies of the European Union in Paris and subsequently faculty member of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, who coordinated efforts on the European side. The accounts of our preliminary meeting in Brussels in May 2002, the first roundtable in New York in October 2002, and the second in Geneva in June 2003 have been published as booklets (available on request from the National Committee) and on our Web site (www.NCAFP.org). We thank the European Commission and Mutual of America for their generous support of those roundtables.

We have continued our examination of the transatlantic relationship in a series of meetings in which members of the European diplomatic community in New York have participated. In this roundtable on Anti-Americanism in Europe, we experimented with a new format. The organizers of the roundtable prepared beforehand “A Framework for Discussion” offering a preliminary analysis of the topic and setting four questions for participants to discuss. Several members of the roundtable volunteered to prepare brief and pointed answers to those questions, sharing with the group their own personal experience as diplomats, scholars, and business people. The presenters are identified in this report. In order to encourage a free and frank exchange of views, participants in the ensuing discussion and those serving currently in official positions have not been named. The policy recommendations following the report are those only of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

Special thanks go to Professor Bernard E. Brown, the National Committee’s project director on transatlantic relations and the author of the framework for discussion and this report. Thanks also to Professor Joseph LaPalombara, who shared responsibility for selecting participants and organizing the conference. It is a pleasure to acknowledge Mutual of America Life Insurance Company’s continuing support for this project.

George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Anti-Americanism in Europe is hardly new. But most observers agree that it is now resurgent, carrying with it serious consequences for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. Any number of journalists and researchers may be cited who report that anti-American sentiment among Europeans has never been as intense and as deep since World War II. (The United States was hardly admired in Germany during the war or in France under Vichy.) On all sides we hear that Europeans are not only critical of U.S. policies but also of the American model of politics, economy, society, and culture. According to the latest opinion survey sponsored by the Pew Research Center, released on March 16, 2004, between the summer of 2002 and March 2004, U.S. favorability ratings went down in France from 63 to 37 percent, in Germany from 61 to 38 percent, and even in Britain from 75 to 58 percent. Favorable views of Americans, as distinguished from the American nation, also hit new lows: 53 percent in France (down from 71 percent in 2002) and 68 percent in Germany, though remaining relatively high at 83 percent in Britain. As one indication of policy implications, support for an independent European foreign policy has gone up to 75 percent of the public in France (from 60 percent in 2002), 63 percent in Germany (up from 51 percent), and even 56 percent in Britain (formerly 47 percent).

Another recent survey commissioned by the European Commission and released in November 2003 indicates that many Europeans are now hostile to and even fearful of the United States and its policies. When asked which countries represent the greatest menace to world peace, Europeans ranked the United States in sixth place, just after such obvious candidates as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The country considered by Europeans to be public enemy number one (by 55 percent in France, 65 percent in Austria, and 74 percent in the Netherlands) is Israel. Ceci explique cela. I am aware that public opinion surveys are subject to error (in the case of the Pew survey, an admitted margin of up to 5 percent), that responses are affected by the way in which questions are phrased, and that governments should not simply follow the polls. But let us take opinion surveys as at least partial evidence of a trend: that anti-Americanism in Europe now runs deep. Perhaps the first question that we should address, then, is how deep and how significant is it?

Assuming that we are dealing with a real phenomenon, the next step is to appraise its causes. For many, the cause is the Bush administration, whose policies and style have alienated Europeans. French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie declared in the run-up to the war in Iraq: Europeans have no problems with the American people but rather with this administration, in particular the “neo-conservatives” and “radical neo-liberals.” But former French Foreign Minister Hubert
Védrine scoffs at the notion that the source of all evil is the Bush administration. Since the disappearance of the common enemy, he declared in an essay in *Le Monde* (December 24, 2003), such a belief is a way of avoiding the issue that confronts Europeans and the rest of the world: how to confront a “Gulliver-U.S.” resolved not to allow itself to be tied down by the “Lilliputians of multilateralism” in a tough and conflicted world where the United Nations is powerless. Even with another president, argues Védrine, the United States will protect its sovereignty and act unilaterally. British political scientist Christopher Croker likewise states: “Nothing is more naïve than the claim that the rifts are likely to end if Bush fails to be reelected in 2004 or if the Schroeder government loses power” (cited by Robert Kagan, *Of Power and Paradise*, p. 106). Let us proceed on the assumption that even if George Bush is voted out of office, there is a need to hold this roundtable. Had Prince Hamlet killed King Claudius in Act I, Scene I, there would have been no play, and the groundlings would have demanded their money back. What are the underlying reasons for the flare-up of anti-Americanism in Europe? Let me suggest some possibilities that may serve as a basis for discussion.

**The End of the Cold War**

In the course of two roundtables sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in October 2002 and June 2003, American and European participants disagreed sharply on virtually every international issue. But all agreed quickly on the reason for the worsening transatlantic relationship: There is no longer a threat of a sudden, massive attack from the Soviet Union. Europe could not allow its alliance with the United States to be put at risk when Soviet armored divisions were massed only 25 miles from Hamburg. The United States also had a vital interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating or intimidating Western Europe. It was all for one and one for all. With the collapse of European communism, Americans and West Europeans no longer need each other as desperately as they once did. Europeans do not have to take orders from the Big Boss, and Americans see no need to accept directives or lectures on morality from quarrelsome allies turning into rivals. Each side sees the other as arrogant. Europe is now secure from invasion from the East or any other direction. Perhaps its good fortune is due to America’s commitment to defend Western Europe through NATO during the cold war. But political leaders act on the basis of perceived national interests, not out of gratitude for past favors. The very success of NATO has enabled Europeans to resist American leadership, letting loose nationalist sentiment that previously had been bottled up.
The increasing integration of Europe is a revolutionary event that has already changed the structure of power in the world. The European Union (EU) now has a population 50 percent greater than that of the United States and a comparable standard of living. There is no longer a sense of inferiority, as in the period immediately after World War II. A natural consequence of identifying with one's community is to consider that community superior to its neighbors (usually for illusory reasons). A growing European nationalism supplements the nationalism of individual member states. As they looked around the world half a century after the end of World War II, Europeans took justified pride in their relative prosperity and in the kinds of political systems and welfare states they had created. Many believed that their way of life was actually superior to that of Americans in that they had established a better balance between states and markets, the common good, and individual rights. “There is a European art of living,” went a typical statement by then French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (full text in Le Monde, May 29, 2001). “Europe is the space on the planet,” he continued, “where the rule of law is best achieved. It is the only political grouping within which the death penalty no longer exists. It is the land where respect for the human person is pushed to its highest point.”

At the European summit meeting in Lisbon in 2000, the assembled heads of government pledged to create within a decade “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs.” They added, in a swipe at the United States, that the goal included “greater social cohesion.” In addition, European leaders reaffirmed their intention to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and eventually a common defense to back it up. The member states of the EU have more troops under arms than the United States. Why not combine them into a force as powerful as that wielded by the United States? The Americans had learned more than two centuries ago that in unity there is strength and independence from foreign domination. The Europeans were at last learning the same lesson. The new European goals are an echo of the slogan proclaimed for the Soviet Union in the 1930s by Joseph Stalin: “Catch up to and surpass America.”

Feeding this burgeoning European nationalism is profound resentment that so much global power is concentrated in and wielded by the United States. That the United States is the only superpower is a constant theme in European political discourse. Well before the election of George W. Bush, Hubert Védrine coined the term “hyperpower” (hyperpuissance) to denote the massive economic, social, cultural, and political, as well as military power enjoyed by the United States. Never before in history, he declared,
have the subjects of an empire been so thoroughly and willingly
dominated. His intention was to denounce, not to celebrate,
American power. It is not healthy for the world order that so
much power is wielded by one nation, he said, even if that nation
is relatively beneficent. Were France the superpower, he freely
admitted, it probably would be resented even more. The diffusion
of power is a central theme in American political culture and is
at the root of its constitutional system. Hence out of respect for
the accomplishments of the American founders, Europeans (and
everyone else, for that matter), suggested Védrine, should create
independent centers of power.

But Europeans Are Frustrated

The EU remains and will remain in the foreseeable future a hybrid.
In the domain of economic and social policy, decisions are made by
qualified majorities and on the initiative of a supranational agency,
the Commission. But as regards foreign and security policy, the power
centers are the states. Giscard d’Estaing, president of the European
Convention, in presenting a draft constitution to the public in June
2003, reminded critics that the European Union is “an organization,
not a political identity.” His use of the term “political identity” called
attention to the importance of a sense of political community, which
does not now exist in Europe sufficiently to sustain a state. To put it
bluntly, the EU is not a state. President Giscard thus affirmed
previous declarations of British Prime Minister Blair and French
President Chirac that the EU is a “federation of nation-states.”
Although a function of policy coordination is vested in a high
representative of the CFSP (currently Javier Solana), all matters
relating to foreign and security policy now and under the proposed
constitution require the unanimous consent of the heads of member
governments. The contrast between the relative success of Europeans
in forging economic unity and their inescapable failure to create
unity in foreign and security policy has led to frustration and feelings
of powerlessness in dealing with the United States. As a result anti-
American rhetoric frequently is tinged with rage.

The Middle East Conflict

The perceived interests of individual European states and of the
United States are divergent in the Middle East. Europe has a
more direct economic stake than the United States in North Africa
and the greater Middle East. France and Germany in particular
had substantial economic and political ties with Iraq. These
differences between European and American interests are normal
and more or less manageable. Disagreement over the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict is more difficult to resolve. Europeans are more
sympathetic to the Palestinians and view the United States as
partial to Israel. It is significant that the poll commissioned by
the EU cited Israel as the country posing the greatest threat to
world peace and placed the United States in sixth place. Anti-
Americanism in Europe is colored by hostility to Israel and perhaps by historic currents of anti-Semitism.

**Domestic Factors**

Antipathy to American culture, society, economy, and politics has always been a strong current in Europe particularly on the extreme left and the extreme right and as part of home-grown nationalism. Anti-Americanism in France, to take one example, is normal. Pro-Americanism is aberrant and has to be explained. The hard core of anti-American sentiment in France amounts to about one-third of the population as measured by votes for parties hostile to the United States, to which may be added probably another one-third that looks down on all other nations, including the United States. On the first ballot in the presidential election of April 2002, the two Trotskyite candidates together received about 10 percent of the vote and the Communist candidate almost 4 percent. These candidates and their supporters retain a Marxist view of the world adjusted somewhat to place the blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union on an unfortunate Stalinist distortion. In their view capitalism remains evil and is responsible for the exploitation of workers and the oppression of masses everywhere. The United States for them is the global center of capitalism and imperialism. Before the failure of orthodox communism in Europe, the French Communist party averaged between 15 and 20 percent of the vote, ranging up to 28 percent shortly after the Liberation.

The candidate of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, received almost 17 percent of the vote on the first ballot in 2002, putting him ahead of the Socialist candidate and in the runoff. The extreme right has always been significant in France. Its roots extend to the Old Regime and the Catholic church before the Revolution, Bonapartist rule and monarchist restoration in the 19th century, fascism (including the Vichy regime) in the 20th century, and the perennial defense of traditional groups threatened by modernization. For the extreme right, the United States represents all that is wrong with the modern world: lack of respect for hierarchy and the well-born, a mass culture in which money dominates and drives out quality, plutocracy masquerading as democracy, dehumanizing rationality, and ruthless modernization. The American model of capitalism in particular is under attack from both the worker-oriented left and a paternalistic right. Add to the extreme left and the extreme right general distrust of any foreign nation, in particular one that is wealthy and powerful, and there is ample fertile ground for suspicion of and hostility toward the United States whenever perceived national interests are divergent.

In addition, about 15 million Muslims are now permanent residents of Western Europe, creating new political pressures within democratic political processes. It is inevitable that political parties will seek support from this group, which is overwhelmingly
hostile to Israel and its presumed protector, the United States. A fiercely anti-American force is now embedded in the structure of European politics.

What Is to Be Done?

It is tempting to believe that anti-Americanism is a result of ignorance or prejudice and can be eliminated by giving people more accurate information. But tackling anti-Americanism directly may well be fruitless. The hostility of many Europeans to Americans is an expression of European nationalism and a reflection of domestic partisan cultures. Whether or not anti-Americanism increases or decreases depends on larger geopolitical trends. On the bright side is the increasing integration of North American and European economies, which is changing the political equation. As the economist Joseph Quinlan points out, the transatlantic relationship is by far the most important intercontinental relationship in the world. The pace of European investment in America and of American investment in Europe has been four to six times greater since the end of the cold war than in the four preceding decades. Through direct investment and mergers a transatlantic economy has emerged that is now about one fourth the size of either the American or the European economy. Disputes regarding antitrust policy and subsidies are serious; but they affect perhaps 2 percent of total transatlantic commerce and can be negotiated through agreed-on structures.

A dense network of links between American and European universities and research institutes is also contributing to deeper understanding. NATO has fostered the development of a transatlantic community among diplomats and political leaders as well as the military. Above all, there is a sense among the political classes in the United States and Europe that they face common threats from instability in the greater Middle East and from international terrorism and that their common adversaries are exploiting political and policy differences.

The best way to deal with resurgent anti-Americanism in Europe probably is to identify common interests and bridge policy differences. But it will not be easy for an underlying structural reason: The United States is a state, and the European Union is a federation of states (or an “organization,” to use Giscard’s term). Transatlantic relations will always be asymmetrical until that distant day (if ever) when a transformed European Union becomes a single “power.”
The purpose of this framework for discussion is to enable members of the roundtable to deal with the issue of anti-Americanism in Europe and its ramifications and to help the group offer suggestions for better managing the current crisis. A number of questions may be posed for consideration by the roundtable. The following list is intended to be suggestive; it is neither exhaustive nor limitative.

(a) Drawing on personal experience, how deep and how significant do you think anti-Americanism is in Europe? To what extent is anti-Americanism caused by the policies and style of the Bush administration? Does anti-Americanism vary according to class or status (masses versus elites, business people, intellectuals, bureaucrats, et al.)?

(b) Are the United States and Europe evolving as different models of democracy, economy, society, and culture? Are they drifting apart to the extent that a “clash of civilizations” is eroding the transatlantic community? Or are differences stylistic and insubstantial? How important is it that America “skipped the stage of feudalism” (as argued by S. M. Lipset, Samuel P. Huntington, Louis Hartz, et al., drawing on Tocqueville). Inasmuch as the images and feelings of one people toward another are a two-way street, is it worthwhile to consider the sources of anti-Europeanism in America?

(c) Are American and European approaches to international issues different and possibly incompatible? Reference should be made to unilateralism versus multilateralism, the use of force (particularly in dealing with genocide, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction [WMD], failed states, etc.), and attitudes toward international law and the United Nations.

(d) Is anti-Americanism due to structural causes—most important, the status of the United States as a superpower and of Europe as a federation of nation-states?

(e) In the light of our discussions, what is to be done?

In order to focus attention on and provide structure to the proceedings, some participants volunteered to offer brief and pointed “prepared answers” to questions of special interest to them, followed by free-ranging discussion. Here is a summary of statements by presenters and comments by discussants.

**SUMMARY OF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS**

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS**

**QUESTION 1.** Drawing on personal experience, how deep and how significant do you think anti-Americanism is in Europe? To what extent is it caused by the policies and style of the Bush administration?
Herman J. Cohen, Presenter.

Emphasizing European approaches to problems of security, the speaker made six major points.

(1) Europeans believe that the United States has retreated from multilateralism. In their view, the multilateral approach to security problems has been useful, notably in Bosnia and Kosovo. Multilateralist approaches by Africans, for example, help greatly in dealing with the problems of that continent. Europeans welcomed George H. Bush’s speech to the United Nations toward the end of his term in which he said that multilateralism would be the key to American policy. He ordered a reluctant Defense Department to gear up for a role in peacekeeping. When peacekeeping failed in Somalia, Americans readily blamed the UN. As secretary of state, Madeleine Albright barely concealed her disdain for UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Distrust of the UN has persisted under George W. Bush.

(2) Europeans are critical of the United States for diluting international conventions. They point in particular to its denunciation of the antiballistic missile treaty and circumvention of the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners at Guantanamo. The United States also holds the record for not ratifying treaties already signed.

(3) The United States is seen as riding roughshod over reciprocity in attempting to impose penalties on foreign companies violating American laws regarding trade with Libya, Cuba, and other rogue states. Europeans would like to engage with Iran through cultural exchange, trade, and investment, but U.S. laws (even when not applied) have a chilling effect on the private sector.

(4) Europeans believe that the United States is trying to reinvent the wheel on terrorism. In their view, the United States discovered nonstate terrorism only on 9/11, whereas they have experienced terrorism since at least the 1970s (Irish Republican Army, Action Directe, Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, Basques, Corsicans, as well as Islamic militants). Americans did not ponder the lessons the Europeans learned the hard way, notably the hijacking of a civilian airliner by Islamic militants who intended to fly it into the Eiffel Tower.

(5) Europeans fault the United States for not consulting them sufficiently. For example, the United States made all the decisions in NATO, which were accepted by them because the United States had the deterrent. Since the end of the cold war, the Europeans have been less tolerant of the American tendency not to consult them. Examples of
nonconsultation are Warren Christopher’s handling of the Bosnia problem, which he simply turned over to the Europeans, and the American assumption of command in Iraq.

(6) Europeans believe that the United States does not know its own strength, which it uses without adequate consideration for others; at the same time it is not aware of its own weakness. When Hubert Védrine called the United States a hyperpower, he was implying not only great power but also erratic behavior. Europeans believe that they can keep some control over American policy as it relates to Europe but that outside of Europe the United States frequently does not know what to do. The U.S. experience in Iraq indicates that the superpower is less super than it thought it was.

The speaker observed, in conclusion, that in his opinion much of the European criticism of the United States is valid.

Stanton Burnett, Presenter.


The speaker pointed out that public opinion polls do indicate a general decline in esteem for the United States. Some of the increase in anti-Americanism in Eastern Europe, according to survey research, is caused by the rise of anti-Semitism. It is considered poor form to express anti-Semitic sentiments but legitimate to lambaste the United States for its presumed support of Israel.

Americans want to be loved, he continued. But that should not be a fundamental concern of either taxpayers or the government. Our goal should be to further American national interests. Opinion surveys, however, show a close relationship between some hard policy choices and overall feelings about the United States. We do best when these are addressed with precise calculations about which groups are salient for which policy issues.

Reliance on media products with the U.S. government label is less effective, especially in Europe, than civilized discourse involving U.S. officials and key European opinion leaders. Such contacts may be either informal or carefully structured. American officials should be sophisticated, have strong language skills, and be in contact on a regular basis with officials, journalists, scholars, and party leaders (including those in the opposition). Our messages should appear to emanate from them. With the end of the cold war, however, congressional support for training and paying competent Foreign Service officials collapsed. The speaker fears that our capacity to handle policy and consultations has been grievously
weakened. We are no longer as able to engage European officials at the middle as well as top levels in civilized discourse.

In the ensuing discussion, three American former diplomats who served in NATO stated that the United States did in fact consult with the allies. One said that the United States argued and had to argue its case vigorously but eventually was able to bring the allies around. For example, the Europeans objected when the United States declared that it would not tolerate the taking of hostages by Serbs in Bosnia; at the time the Europeans had troops on the ground and the United States did not. It was a serious dispute that had to be handled through negotiation. A second former U.S. diplomat also was emphatic that the United States consulted continuously with the allies in NATO. Sometimes one European delegation was on board at the beginning of the process and then swung into opposition and had to be persuaded all over again. A third former U.S. diplomat said that consultation at NATO varied with the issues and was more concrete at some times than at others. But policy was always better coming out of consultations than going in.

One European diplomat asserted that Europeans should stop complaining about multilateralism, but several of his colleagues disagreed. One European discussant argued that Bush's policies did not differ that much from Clinton's, but the style was different. People should be respected. Even if the substance of policy remains the same, style is important. Europeans are not against the United States, he said, but rather against the radical right in power. They would like things to be as they were in the past. Another European diplomat from a small country said that different policy choices by Europeans should not be viewed as anti-Americanism. Military might is not enough in itself. Everyone has something to contribute. In approaching issues we should acknowledge the need for mutual respect among allies. A former U.S. diplomat agreed. The effort to go it alone in Iraq, he said, has failed. We do not need to be loved; but we do need allies. Another former U.S. diplomat emphasized the need to engage with allies in dealing with current crises in Iran and North Korea.

An American academic discussant questioned whether the United Nations is part of the solution or part of the problem. He pointed out that the UN-supervised oil for food program in Iraq was thoroughly corrupt and that as an intergovernmental organization the UN is no better than its member states. Sudan has just been elected to the UN Commission on Human Rights. But it is a country in which slavery still exists and where a murderous ethnic conflict is raging. Multilateralism has to be judged by its results.

Another American academic disputed the notion that Hubert Védrine's characterization of the United States as a "hyperpower" was negative. Védrine used the term to designate the United States as a kind of megapower in its own right, set off from a group of
lesser powers. Védrine defended François Mitterrand’s vision of the world, which was not anti-American. For this discussant the real villain in the Franco-American crisis over Iraq was President Chirac. A former U.S. diplomat said that the United States is held to a higher standard. It stands for certain values and is looked to for moral leadership. However, the United States threw away this advantage when it imposed its views concerning the use of force in Iraq and when it went along with Sharon’s policy of fostering settlements at first in Gaza as well as the West Bank.

An American academic discussant returned to an observation made by Dr. Burnett concerning anti-Americanism as a polite form of anti-Semitism. He thought this to be the case, pointing to certain recurrent themes: that Americans and Jews consider themselves a chosen people, are powerful, and are at the head of a monstrous conspiracy to control or dominate the world.

In response to discussants, Ambassador Cohen said that Europeans really complain not about the lack of consultation but about the fact that decisions are made ahead of time. The United Nations has been a perfect instrument of American policy; Europeans cannot understand why the United States is moving away from cultivating multilateral institutions. Also, multilateralism is not confined to the UN. In Kosovo it was impossible to secure a specific mandate from the Security Council because of the Russian veto; multilateral action nonetheless took place through NATO. For Europeans, reciprocity is understood by the United States as a one-way street. As for terrorism, the most effective policy is to root out the cells. Here the European contribution is vital. In general, he tends to agree with the European criticism.

Dr. Burnett added, in conclusion, that human rights rather than democracy should be the touchstone of our relations with other countries. Jimmy Carter had it right.

**QUESTION 2.** Are the United States and Europe evolving as different models of democracy, economy, society, and culture? Are they drifting apart to the extent that a “clash of civilizations” is eroding the transatlantic community?

**Michael Curtis,** Presenter.  
Topic: “The Clash of Civilizations”

There has always been some rivalry between Europe and the United States, began the speaker, and differences in style. Examples of rivalry would include Airbus versus Boeing; differences in style are evident in the structure and policies of the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank, relative roles of the state and markets, and the significance of religion in each society. But differences may easily be magnified. On the role of religion, for example, Europeans may consider Americans to be too religious, whereas Muslims condemn
Americans as too secular. Also, with enlargement the new members are more pro-American than many of the existing members. We should also avoid excessive emphasis on murky literary terms like modern versus postmodern or hard power versus soft power to characterize differences.

Historically, going back even to the colonial period, there has been a great deal of anti-Americanism on the part of Europeans. European visitors castigated all aspects of American society and culture, including even animal life, as inferior. These nationalist prejudices persist in many forms. French extreme left intellectuals in particular have been vehement in condemning the United States, in calling for the destruction of American power, and even in proclaiming that the United States deserved the attack of 9/11. A milder version of anti-Americanism identifies the United States with unilateralism, Hobbes, and brute force, whereas Europe is linked to multilateralism, Kant, and the rule of law. European pretensions are also expressed in France’s mission civilisatrice and Harold Macmillan’s observation that the United Kingdom could play the role of Greece to the American Rome.

But the contrast is overdrawn. The United States has been compelled to act sometimes because Europeans were unable to act. American unilateralism has protected Europe. The notion of “soft power” is ambiguous. Furthermore, European foreign policy is largely regional due to a decline in its ability to project power. Weakness has led to envy and an obsession with the United States whose policies are blamed for whatever goes wrong in the world. Finally, the presenter called attention to the changing nature of European society due above all to the mass immigration of Muslims. Given continuing immigration and the galloping birthrate of Muslims compared to Europeans, he wonders whether France might become an Islamic state by 2050. This would lead to a real “clash of civilizations.”

Paolo Zannoni, Presenter.
Topic: “Differences Between American and European Economic Models”

There are significant differences between U.S. and European economic models on national levels, said the presenter, and also on the European Union level. The extent of state intervention in the economy is greater in Europe than in the United States. In Europe, some sectors of the economy are dominated by state companies. In the United States, government intervention is based on regulation. As regards antitrust action, in the United States the government looks at the effect of concentration on the consumer; in Europe governments and the EU Commission take into account the interests of producers and suppliers, as well as consumers and the role of national champions.
Government intervention in the United States is generally more limited, more focused on foreign trade, and sometimes affected by foreign policy considerations. In Europe, government intervenes more directly in the actions of producers and corporations; for example, the French government’s recent decisions regarding mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. European regulators are more likely to protect credit institutions rather than investors, as illustrated by the case of Parmalat. There are also stronger links in Europe between financial institutions and manufacturing interests, which can create fiscal problems. The European Central Bank is quite different from the Federal Reserve.

Joseph LaPalombara, Presenter.
Topic: “Anti-Americanism and the European World of Business and Finance”

In the introductory statement prepared for this conference, it is suggested that globalization—greater levels of economic, financial, and commercial interdependence among nations—may have the salutary effect of reducing anti-Americanism in Europe. Much as one might wish this were so, the presenter has his doubts. To be sure, one finds great respect and admiration for American products, for the firms that produce and market them, and for relations between the universities and the corporate world. American firms are not just the objects of admiration; some envy and backbiting about their success emerge as well. Although this should not be misinterpreted as anti-Americanism in the more virulent sense, it probably contributes to it in Europe as well as elsewhere.

But it is wishful thinking, he continued, to believe that increased trade, foreign direct investment, and joint ventures will bring about a decline in anti-Americanism. Global firms neither shed nor lose their basic nationality by reason of having become global—unless they are acquired by or merge with a much larger foreign firm. In these circumstances the small firm will over time assume the nationality of the other company. Persistent nationality tends to be reflected in corporate culture, corporate style, a particular way of doing business, or of organizing work or establishing relationships among managers internally or with customers and others. It is equally unlikely that the parent company of a global firm will lose its basic identification with the country in which it originated. There remain profound differences between European and American firms. They encompass everything from the organization of the international firm and relationships established between the parent company and its affiliates to the compensation packages of top executives and the propensity of the firm to engage in joint ventures.

Below the surface of politeness and cordiality in business affairs, feelings of antipathy between American and European managers run in both directions. European managers tend to view American
managers as both arrogant and lacking in culture. One reason is that Europeans are drawn from a much narrower and more elitist socioeconomic class, which tends to look down its nose at others not similarly privileged. To a degree unheard of in the United States, European managers come from the same educational matrices.

In the eyes of European corporate managers, American corporate behavior in the global economy tends to mirror that of the U.S. government in the international sphere: imperious, inclined to insist that America knows best, equally inclined to impose policies from the center, with only lip service to the recognition of autonomous expertise and input at the periphery or local level. These attitudes if left unattended, the presenter warned, will continue to aid and abet more virulent feelings of anti-Americanism.

In the discussion that followed, one American observer (a financier) said that in the 1990s American firms moved in and virtually took over merchant banking in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and other countries. It should occasion no surprise that American success did not endear us to the Europeans. An American academic participant stated that business scandals in America led to derision of the United States and fed feelings of European superiority. But Europeans do not expose their defects as readily; hence the superior attitude is hardly justified. Another American participant, a former diplomat, conceded that there are stylistic differences between American and European economic models but considered them relatively unimportant. During the cold war the United States and Europe were held together because they had a common enemy. Since then much of the glue has been the increasing importance of the transatlantic economy. The transatlantic partnership may be saved by economic developments that will give us an incentive to manage our political differences better.

The presenters then responded to comments made in the discussion of differences between American and European economic models. Mr. Zannoni agreed that European investment banks have been largely taken over by Americans. He also agreed that Americans are more likely to expose scandals and therefore be more subject to criticism. This is a paradox. Professor LaPalombara said that the tendency of European managers to condescend to Americans is not anti-Americanism but feeds it. A positive step would be to persuade American managers to refrain from preaching and to pay more attention to local cultures.

A European diplomat returned to the “clash of civilizations” theme. The United States is not as strong as it thinks, he observed. We won the cold war not just through military force but also through the force of ideas. Europeans and Americans share the same ideals; but reality does not always measure up to ideals anywhere. The gap between ideals and reality is greater
in the United States than in Europe. Democracy is more troubled in the United States; there is more influence of money in politics, less honesty in politics, a higher level of violence in the society, and more reliance on the penal system. Americans place greater value than do Europeans on the market economy, which has many imperfections (fewer personal contacts and the distortion of market transactions by politicians in power). Americans believe that human rights are not violated in the United States, but they are. Americans are more religious than Europeans, or so it is reported by opinion polls, and so perhaps they might be better approached with reference to religious values. Look how far we have drifted from Christian ideals. We should be inspired by the example of the Good Samaritan and show kindness to our neighbors and to those outside of our tribe.

**QUESTION 3.** What are the underlying or structural causes of anti-Americanism in Europe? Factors to be considered may include the end of the cold war, European domestic politics, the perceived divergence of national interests, and the asymmetry of relations between the United States and the European Union.

**Joseph LaPalombara,** Presenter.

Topic: "How the End of the Cold War and the 'Death of Socialism' Have Affected Italian Attitudes Toward the United States"

With the end of the cold war, Italians were freed to express themselves more openly about the United States. Critics of the United States are now less liable to be accused of acting as agents of the Soviet Union. Anti-American feelings have deep roots in Italy, with three major sources: the extreme (Marxist) left, the extreme right, and Catholicism. It is important to recognize that widespread anti-Americanism in the Italian intelligentsia includes some members of the Catholic elite. Many democrats are proud that they lined up with the United States against communism. But many resent American intervention in Italian politics, linking with the Vatican to influence elections. In Italy, 9/11 elicited widespread sympathy for the United States. Italians have had their own experience of terrorism. But soon public opinion polls indicated an upsurge of anti-Americanism. These polls show that up to half of Italians have no sympathy for the United States. Many even believe the United States got what it deserved on 9/11. About one-third of respondents are die-hard anti-Americans, one-third are pro-American, and the rest make up their mind on the basis of the issues. There is a negative coalition of different groups who are anti-American for different reasons such as nationalism, populism, left-wing politics, and resistance to globalization. There is a deep-seated Catholic view that America is overwhelmingly materialistic. The Catholic press frequently criticizes the U.S. government and its foreign policy. Italians love Americans. They are enthusiastic about American products, culture, and globalization. But Italians do not love the American government.
In Iraq, thousands of people, including women and children, have been killed by American troops. News from Iraq feeds latent hostility to the United States in Italy, and the situation is destined or doomed to get worse. The United States also pays a price for its perceived one-sided support of the Israelis. Why should we expect the U.S. government, he asked, to be rewarded for its policies and actions by pro-American attitudes?

**Ronald Tiersky,** Presenter.
Topic: “Some Structural Causes of Anti-Americanism”

The presenter defined anti-Americanism as violent rejection of America in some form, whether society, government, or foreign policy. He offered a contrarian’s view, that anti-Americanism in Europe is fragile and will probably disappear. His argument has three parts: (1) Except for core groups, current anti-Americanism is subject to a pendulum movement. Large sectors of the European business community and military establishment are not anti-American. The recent assassination of the Chechen president will also bring Russia and the United States closer together. (2) Anti-Americanism spiked because of the Iraq war, which was a triggering event. (3) The deepest disagreement between Americans and Europeans is over the meaning of terrorism, particularly 9/11 in the United States and 3/11 in Spain.

Europe and the United States face a common threat of global terrorism. Immense damage can be inflicted by any country that can make use of weapons of mass destruction. The terrorism experienced by Europeans in the past (IRA, Basques, Corsicans, Red Brigade, et al.) is not the same as the global terrorism that threatens the entire West.

European and American interests are now intertwined, and Europeans are moving in the direction of American policy. This is indicated in the European Strategic Security Doctrine adopted by the Council in December 2003, recent declarations of the interior and foreign affairs ministers in Germany, and the simulation of an attack with WMDs on NATO headquarters in Brussels with predicted massive casualties. Javier Solana commented that such an attack would be catastrophic. Compared to the danger created by a possible linkup of WMDs and terrorist networks, European anti-Americanism is a minor phenomenon. The danger is all the greater because terrorism is turning into sheer nihilism. It is becoming blind rage for the past humiliation of Islam going back to the Crusades and the resentment of young Muslims for the perceived backwardness of their societies. In the Islamist war against the West, there is no longer any relationship between ends and means. Terrorists are fascinated by their own success and by the damage they can do. Whatever the outcome of the war in Iraq, global terrorism will continue.
There is still a fundamental difference, the presenter continued, between the American and European governments on the requirements of security in the new era. But the need for transatlantic cooperation is crystal clear. As Senator Nunn said recently, we are all in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Anti-Americanism is a new conformism but is already changing. We are one triggering event away from the collapse of anti-Americanism in Europe. The overriding danger today is global terrorism.

In the ensuing discussion a European diplomat said that Europeans have much admiration for the United States but not for its policies and particularly not for its foreign policy. There was mistrust of the United States during the cold war, but it was more shallow than today. There is a widespread belief that Americans are interested only in money. Europeans constantly criticize the death penalty, the lack of gun control, the addiction to big and wasteful cars, and so on. They believe that America is a violent society, though of course Europe is not without violence. Yet there are admiration and envy. Parents want to send their children to the United States for education or to launch careers. There is no movement to boycott American goods.

 Europeans, he declared, believe that President Bush has no concern for European interests or public opinion. After 9/11 there was a “golden moment” of good feeling toward the United States in European public opinion. But then the U.S. propensity for “going it alone” alienated Europeans. Regarding the war in Iraq, European governments were about equally divided. But public opinion was on the side of nonintervention. The Spanish government paid a high price for its support of the war.

Americans and Europeans disagree, continued this European diplomat, over the nature of the terrorist threat. In the United States, terrorism is considered an immediate danger; that is not the case in Europe. The United States considers it normal that it should lead the world. Europeans concede that the United States is the greatest power but mistrust the way it proceeds. There is a declining opinion in Europe that the United States should lead the world. A significant percentage of Europeans now even consider the United States a threat to world peace. There is also a basic disagreement over Middle East issues. Europeans perceive the United States as biased toward Israel.

The causes of the growth of distrust go beyond the personalities of American presidents, who generally have not been popular in Europe. Distrust of and even hostility toward American leadership preceded the Bush administration. The United States is not committed to consultation and multilateralism, as illustrated by its opposition to the Kyoto Treaty on environmental protection, the Ottawa Convention outlawing land mines, and the
International Criminal Court. The United States did not pay its dues to the United Nations, not even under Clinton. All this reflects a pattern of unilateralist behavior.

Distrust of American policy, said this European diplomat, goes deep. Historical memories of conflict with the United States persist in many European countries. In Spain, for example, there is still resentment over the War of 1898, particularly the way in which the war started, and how Spain was deprived of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Spanish democrats also resent the support accorded to Franco during the cold war. Franco had been a pariah, and the United States permitted him to be rehabilitated. Spaniards also criticize the way in which the United States treats Latin America and pressures its governments to isolate Cuba. Spaniards do not like Fidel Castro but want the United States to leave Cubans alone. On the other hand, this European diplomat does not believe that the European Union can replace the United States as a leader or become an equal partner with the United States. Divisions within the EU have led to a split over Iraq and the Middle East. Europeans also do not want to spend money on arms. Nor can the United Nations function effectively as long as the five permanent members of the Security Council enjoy a veto power. Something should be done about the Security Council veto, which vests too much power in Russia, China, and France.

Can the image of the United States be improved? Yes, by changing Middle East policy and engaging in more dialogue with Europe and the rest of the world. But this European diplomat concluded that no matter what the United States does, it will be resented and envied.

Another European diplomat stated that since the end of the cold war there has not been an automatic partnership between the United States and Europe. He urged us to get rid of the term “appeasement” when it comes to global terrorism. The battle for the Muslim mind is of the utmost importance. Europe and America are in this together.

A European discussant affirmed that Europeans are used to terrorism but disagree with the Bush administration on how to handle it. Terrorism in itself is not playing a role in anti-Americanism. A key factor is European opposition to U.S. foreign policy. He said he also believed that secular Europeans feel themselves increasingly distant from religious Americans.

For an American former diplomat, Europeans believe that Americans are naïve and utopian concerning the prospects of democratization in Iraq and the larger Middle East. Europeans rather admire the Egyptians, who simply wiped out their terrorists. Europeans were not convinced that Iraq was the place to go. In his view, Americans and Europeans have not yet begun a meaningful dialogue on terrorism or the Middle East.
Another American former diplomat agreed that the bad blood between Americans and Europeans is terrible. However, we have no choice but to persevere in the Middle East. He warned that Americans should not lapse into anti-Europeanism. There is no reason for Europeans to spend more on arms, except for Special Forces, counterterrorism, and intelligence. The EU contributes more money to the stabilization program in the Balkans than we do. Transatlantic cooperation through NATO is real and valuable. NATO is now running the International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan and may take over in Iraq. The French have 200 Special Forces in Afghanistan under U.S. command. The European Union contribution in the Balkans and Afghanistan is just as relevant as that of the United States. He called for a stop to name-calling and for effective leadership on both sides of the Atlantic.

This same former U.S. diplomat believes that the Common Foreign and Security Policy will come to fruition only as the final act of European unification. It will be a healthy development if it leads Europeans to spend more on defense. There is no action by a European defense force that the United States would or should oppose. There is a bedrock reason for the United States and Europe to work together. In confronting the challenges of global insecurity and terrorism, we are all in this together. Those who opposed the use of force in Iraq thought it was a distraction from the war on terrorism. We still have time to get it right, though it must be done fast enough. He added that we also have to help the Russians get their fissionable material under control.

Another American participant said it is normal for the United States to follow its interests. He agreed that U.S. identification with Israel is a problem for Europeans. Another American discussant said that Israel is being made a scapegoat for the failure of the Arab world to modernize, as is made clear by the Arab Human Development Report of 2002 issued by the UN.

In response, the two presenters affirmed their previous statements. Professor LaPalombara said the Europeans have been dealing with terrorism longer than the Americans and are not prepared to follow the American lead as they did during the cold war. The real problem is the new U.S. foreign policy with respect to terrorism, the Middle East, and particularly Iraq. If the style of American policy does not change, the situation will remain disastrous. Anti-Americanism in Europe, he concluded, is not fragile.

Professor Tiersky emphasized again that a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction would be horribly different from the kind of terror that Europeans have known until now.
If such an awful event occurred, European attitudes about America will change.

QUESTION 4. What Is to Be Done?

In order to help bring together the many strands of this complex interchange and bring into focus the major themes sounded in the roundtable, presenters and discussants were asked to answer Lenin’s question, What is to be done? In the order roughly in which they spoke, here are their answers.

Herman J. Cohen said there should be a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that we are condemned to work together. As during the cold war, there is no other option. Americans should abandon their post-9/11 narcissism. Terrorism did not begin on that date. We can learn and profit from European experience. The United States must also accept the position that the use of overwhelming military power is not exclusively the way to deal with terrorism. Intelligence gathering is important, and Europeans have a lot to offer. This is not a leader-follower situation. On the European side there needs to be a greater understanding of U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Europeans should try to broaden their perspective. We need a real partnership.

For Stanton Burnett the revival of the United States Information Agency may be desirable but is not important in itself. The point is to recruit competent diplomats who can deal with large sectors of the European public, not only elites and masses but also those in between. We should encourage our diplomats to acquire regional expertise and secure the strong involvement of Congress in the process of recruitment and training.

Michael Curtis said that the rhetoric on both sides has to be lowered. Differences are legitimate and should be discussed and negotiated. We should attempt to communicate better with Europeans and correct misunderstandings. The Kyoto Treaty on environmental protection, the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines, and the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court were all controversial, involving interests that the United States considered vital. Automatic anti-Americanism is not justified because of a failure by Europeans and Americans to work out a compromise. Both sides should coordinate policy on immigration, the protection of oil resources, and the Middle East. Europeans should not assume that the Israelis are solely to blame for the problems of the Middle East.

Joseph LaPalombara said that we need a transatlantic working group, which must focus on how to improve images across the Atlantic, including study of the media. This is a high priority.

For Ronald Tiersky, we must make sure that the first preemptive
war is the last. There should be no more Iraqs. He also believes that transatlantic strategic talks should begin as soon as possible. We need a new transatlantic political culture fashioned out of the old common culture. We need political leaders who will educate public opinion. The Palestinian leadership, for example, has not educated its public on the consequences of a real peace. The temperature has to be lowered in civil society. European fixation on the death penalty and prison systems in the United States is exaggerated.

An American discussant stated that Europeans do not really sympathize with American feelings of vulnerability. The war against terrorism may go on forever. Americans and Europeans have to come to agreement on the character of terrorism and how to deal with it. They have to figure out how to help democrats and moderates in the civil war now going on in the Muslim world. We also have to get young Americans into public service.

A former U.S. diplomat acknowledged that transatlantic conversations, which used to be civil, are now full of terms of contempt. But debates are useful, both within the United States and the European Union and across the Atlantic. He believes that the United States and Europe are ready for a new partnership. There is an opportunity now for a leap forward. The partnership skidded off the rails over Iraq. Unilateralism has failed; we must share decisions. President Bush, in his view, is ready to get back on the path of multilateralism. Both candidates in the coming election are preparing for a change in attitude and a new transatlantic partnership.

The roundtable, which at times revealed deep differences between and among Americans and Europeans, thus ended on a rather hopeful note.

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THE DISCUSSION: AN OVERVIEW

The roundtable organizers wished to focus discussion on specific issues in order to explore and clarify disagreements, paving the way to proposals on a course of action. Deep discord among the participants was revealed from the outset, perhaps even more sharply among Americans than between Americans and Europeans. Divisions mirrored the passionate debate taking place outside our 34th floor meeting room as an American presidential campaign was gearing up.

A central issue throughout the session was unilateralism versus multilateralism. European participants generally criticized American policy, particularly under the Bush administration (but also before) as unilateral; they asked for a turn or a return to multilateralism. Some if not most American participants joined in the denunciation of an American propensity to “go it alone.” There was general agreement that consultation and dialogue are always useful and that multilateralism in principle is preferable to unilateralism. But how to apply the principle in crisis situations is not self-evident. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization no better than the member states that compose it. Perhaps half the members of the General Assembly have nondemocratic regimes; and Russia and China are among the permanent members of the Security Council with veto power. European states are unwilling to accord foreign and security policy to the European Union, much less the United Nations, though they largely share common political values.

A few participants considered the criticism of American policy excessive and misleading. They argued that the United States is continually consulting and negotiating with others, particularly European allies, in a range of multilateral institutions, notably NATO and the United Nations, as well as in direct contacts with individual states. At some point it is necessary to make decisions and take action. Multilateralism should not mean that European allies can veto American actions or that Americans must do whatever Europeans demand. As one European diplomat conceded, Europeans are themselves divided and are not organized to be able to take a leadership role. Indefinite paralysis or inaction could be catastrophic in dealing with the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist networks.

Another issue was the nature of the threat of terrorism. European participants with some exceptions thought that the Bush administration exaggerated the danger posed by the Iraqi regime and believe that Europe has greater experience of terrorism than the United States. Some American participants agreed and urged the U.S. government to take advantage of European experience...
in this area. They also said that more emphasis should be placed on economic assistance to the Arab world so that it could better cope with the challenges of modernization. Some Americans, however, expressed the belief that the new menace of global terrorism (the use of weapons of mass destruction by Islamic fundamentalists to create havoc) differs qualitatively from previous terrorism in Europe. Some European participants affirmed that “we are all in this together.” The fundamental question was whether or not the use of force was justified in Iraq.

Anti-Americanism as a phenomenon did not arouse much passion among these seasoned observers, American and European alike. A fixed level of anti-Americanism is fairly normal in Europe. According to American roundtable participants who are specialists on France and Italy, die-hard anti-Americans constitute up to one-third of the population (as measured by opinion polls and support for extreme left and extreme right parties), and home-grown nationalists who look down on all other nations, including the United States, may account for another one-third depending on the issues. One European participant claimed that American democracy is more troubled than European democracy. Other Europeans and some Americans said that Europeans liked Americans but did not like their government and its policies. One American participant considered this distinction untenable inasmuch as the government is elected and its policies must be sustained by Congress and public opinion. A European diplomat first sharply criticized the American government, all of its presidents (not just the incumbent), and its policies (especially in the Middle East). There were nods of approval when he added disarmingly that the United States, because of its wealth and power, is bound to be simultaneously admired, resented, and envied no matter what policies it adopts.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A fundamental cause of the deep crisis in transatlantic relations is the asymmetrical relationship between the United States as a single state and Europe as at best a federation of states that has little authority in foreign and security policy. As regards economic issues, the United States and the European Union are pretty much equals. But the United States is capable of deploying armed forces anywhere in the world. European states are regional powers. Whenever the United States decides to use its great military power, there is bound to be resentment and resistance by some and in the case of Iraq most Europeans. This asymmetry can be eliminated if the United States disarms unilaterally or if the European Union becomes a true “power”; neither development is likely. The transatlantic crisis must be managed if it is to be done at all within the existing geopolitical asymmetry. The
National Committee on American Foreign Policy makes the following recommendations, which take into account the structure of global power and are consistent with both American and European vital interests.

(1) Aim for neither love nor fear but for respect. Several American participants said that Americans want to be loved. It is better for the Prince to be feared than to be loved, Machiavelli said, for a relationship based on love depends on the subjects, whereas a relationship based on fear depends on the will of the Prince. The United States is not the Prince and Europeans are not subjects, but Machiavelli’s insight has some relevance to relations among sovereign states. Not only is it risky to depend on the love of other people but it is also unrealistic. Most people are attached to their own communities (through common culture, institutions, and memories) and consider themselves worthy if not superior to others. They are especially distrustful of the wealthy and powerful, who may dominate them. However, to base foreign policy on fear is also unsatisfactory. It creates widespread resentment and resistance between sovereign states as well as within them. Coercion always is an element in governance but by itself can produce the very instability Machiavelli sought to avoid. The U.S. government should strive to be respected, a difficult challenge that at least is accepted by others as a reasonable basis for relations among states.

(2) Increase consultation, dialogue, and communication with the allies. The most persistent complaint of European participants was that the U.S. government acts unilaterally, without bothering to consult them. Some American participants, particularly those who had served in or supported previous Democratic administrations, agreed. One American former diplomat said that Americans do not need to be loved, but they do need allies, and allies have to be consulted.

The notion of consultation is ambiguous. A case can be made that the U.S. government does indeed consult allies and negotiate with others. There was no lack of consultation between the United States and its allies within global conferences leading to the Ottawa Convention on land mines, the Kyoto Treaty on the emission of greenhouse gases, and the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. Many Europeans are unaware that the United States declined to sign these conventions for plausible reasons. The Ottawa Convention was hastily drawn, made no distinction between “smart” mines (which self-destruct) and “dumb” mines (which last forever and cause humanitarian problems), and did not outlaw European-style antitank mines; at Kyoto the Europeans refused concessions to the United States that they later made to other industrial nations in order to get
them on board; at Rome the American proposal that prosecution be on reference from the Security Council was not unreasonable. One American participant expressed the belief that better communication is needed concerning the rationale for American policies.

The almost universal sentiment among European allies that they are not consulted is troubling. Images are important. Something must be done to increase or institutionalize consultation and dialogue that safeguard interests on both sides of the Atlantic and avoid paralysis when compromise and multilateral action fail. Several participants in the roundtable called for the immediate creation of a high-level transatlantic working group with a view to forging a new partnership. The National Committee on American Foreign Policy endorses this call, which can help clear the air and possibly lead to more effective transatlantic political institutions to parallel the present regularized dialogue on economic and military affairs.

(3) Diplomacy, not media blitzes. Controversy over the use of force in Iraq and the proper way to meet the challenge of global terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism will not be resolved by media specialists. Vital national interests are at stake and need to be promoted through competent and comprehensive diplomacy. The National Committee on American Foreign Policy endorses the suggestion made by several American participants that our diplomatic arm be strengthened through the recruitment and training of regional specialists and adequate financing. American diplomats with appropriate language skills must be able to engage their European counterparts in a systematic process of policy coordination. Repairing the transatlantic alliance will require a massive and sustained effort; it cannot be done on the cheap.

(4) Bring civil society back in. This roundtable highlighted the utility of deliberation by Americans and Europeans, diplomats and specialists. The task before us calls for the mobilization of creative forces in civil society on both sides of the Atlantic. The National Committee will make its contribution by sponsoring roundtables that foster fruitful dialogue between Americans and Europeans involving the worlds of the university, diplomacy, the economy, and politics.
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