The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations Between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation

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On July 9, 1999, Lee Teng-hui announced his “two-states theory,” destroying the foundation for the dialogue and consultations authorized by the two sides, causing the planned visit to Taiwan in the fall of 1999 by Chairman Wang Daohan of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to be aborted, and once again—as occurred after Lee’s 1995 visit to the United States—stalemating Cross-Strait relations. On March 18, 2000, candidate Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive party (DPP) was elected the new leader of the ruling regime in Taiwan. Because of the DPP’s stance in favor of Taiwan independence and Chen’s personal advocacy of Taiwan independence, not only did the political deadlock intensify but a serious crisis developed in the relationship between the two sides. In spite of this, through its study and assessment of the environment around Taiwan, its ability, and its confidence in its ability to control the overall situation regarding the Taiwan issue, China’s mainland adopted a policy toward Taiwan’s new leaders of “listening to their words and watching their deeds”; it warned the Taiwan independence forces against taking any extreme measures, thereby stabilizing the situation in the Straits region and leaving both time and space for a reversal of the deadlock between the two sides. In adopting this policy, the mainland displayed and reinforced its consistent stance of trying its utmost to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. With the same objective in mind, this article explores possible avenues for breaking the current political deadlock between the two sides.

The One-China Principle Is the Basis for Breaking the Deadlock

The one-China principle is the cornerstone of the Chinese government’s policy toward Taiwan. It is only on the basis of the one-China principle that any breakthrough in the political deadlock between the two sides will be possible. Looking back at the history of Cross-Strait relations since 1949, we can clearly see that most of the time, despite a military confrontation and numerous serious clashes between the two sides, both sides have always maintained a one-China stance; the struggle revolved around the question of who represented China and was in effect the continuation of China’s civil war. Taiwan did not enact a law stating that China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity had been split, that Taiwan was no longer part of China, that there existed two Chinas. On this common political ground the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) reached a consensus in 1992, whereby each side orally expressed the joint understanding that it adhered to the one-China principle. This swept away the major ob-
ostacles that had been encountered since both parties began contacts and discussions, allowed both sides to reach agreements quickly on the Cross-Strait use of notarized documents and on the tracing of and compensation for lost Cross-Strait registered mail, and paved the way for the historic talks in 1993 between Chairman Wang Daohan of the ARATS and Chairman Koo Chen-fu of the SEF.

Yet as Lee Teng-hui began to implement his secessionist line more openly, the regime in Taiwan gradually altered and deviated from the 1992 consensus, unilaterally and simplistically referring to “one China, separately expressed,” hoping thereby to compel the mainland to accept an “open” interpretation of one China and thus allowing Lee Teng-hui to play up “legally” and openly his separatist proposals as if both sides were “two equal political entities,” were engaged in “a two-China phase,” and subscribed to a “two-state theory.” Disregarding the facts, the new leaders of Taiwan’s ruling regime publicly denied the 1992 consensus, saying that what had been achieved in 1992 was “a consensus without consensus.”

Although the 1992 consensus between the two organizations was twisted and transformed by Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s new authorities into a dispute between the two sides, the contribution made by the 1992 consensus toward promoting the development of Cross-Strait relations is there for all to see. It did not come easily; it was a compromise acceptable to both sides within the framework of one China reached after the ARATS, prompted by an earnest desire to solve the problem, negotiated with the SEF and brought about concessions. As far as the stances on reunification and independence taken by the various parties in Taiwan were concerned, apart from the DPP, the 1992 consensus was acceptable to all the major political parties and to mainstream public opinion in Taiwan forever. Hence through a review and an analysis of how both organizations reached a consensus in 1992, this article seeks to show the necessity of returning to this consensus and to explore the possibility that both sides will do so.

A Review of the 1992 Consultations Between the Two Organizations

The Taiwan Straits Exchange Foundation was established on November 21, 1992, and on March 9 of the following year, it opened its doors and commenced operations. The Taiwan authorities established this “nongovernment intermediary organization” to deal with many problems that were associated with the proliferation of contacts between the two sides that began when family visits were permitted on November 2, 1987. Because the Taiwan authorities could not immediately abandon their “Three No’s Policy” (no contacts, no talks, no compromises), they created this nongovernmental unit to resolve issues that they could not handle directly in their own name. On December 16, 1991, the mainland established the ARATS, whose mission was to promote ties between the two sides, develop Cross-Strait relations, and bring about the peaceful reunification of the motherland. The ARATS regarded the resolution of concrete problems related to Cross-Strait ties to be “one of the important tasks it was authorized to engage in.”

The Beijing Talks

Acting out of their common purpose, the two organizations held their first functional talks in Beijing during the latter part of March 1992 and conducted working talks on two topics: the “Cross-Strait use of notarized documents” and the “tracing of and compensation for lost Cross-Strait registered mail.”
The 1992 Consensus

Once the two sides had begun contacts and discussions about issues that occurred in exchanges, they discovered that, although they were discussing functional questions, an important matter would have to be clarified before any issue could be resolved smoothly—that is, the acknowledgment that functional issues between the two sides were the domestic issues of one country. Hence the one-China principle was involved.

On April 4, 1991, then Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the SEF Chen Chang-wen headed the Foundation’s first delegation to visit the mainland. On April 29, during a meeting with Chen Chang-wen, Deputy Director of the State Council’s Office of Taiwan Affairs Tang Shubei was authorized to list five principles that should be observed in the handling of concrete issues arising from contacts between the two sides. The second of these principles stated, “In dealing with affairs relating to contacts between the two sides, we should adhere to the one-China principle and oppose any form of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ and oppose ‘one country, two governments’ and other similar proposals or behavior.” From November 3 through November 7, Chen Chang-wen again led a delegation to Beijing and entered into procedural talks about cooperation in attacking crimes such as maritime smuggling and robbery in the Taiwan Straits. During the talks, Tang Shubei again expressed the hope that the SEF would adopt an attitude of adhering to the one-China principle and would strive for a consensus. For the first time, both parties discussed adherence to the one-China principle during functional talks, but a consensus was not reached.6

On March 22, 1992, after the start of talks between the two organizations in Beijing, the SEF and its supervisory body, the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), insisted that the one-China principle was “unrelated to technical issues” under discussion, such as the use of documents.8 Moreover, the Taiwan side began to insist on using terms such as “the authentication of documents,” applying the procedure used between countries’ diplomatic missions to deal with the use of the mainland’s notarized documents in Taiwan. Regarding the tracing of and compensation for lost Cross-Strait registered mail, the wording initially used by the SEF was “making arrangements for tracing and compensating for indirect registered mail between the two sides,” applying the procedure used for mail between countries and insisting that the movement of Cross-Strait mail was “indirect” and that tracing and compensation should be handled by the SEF and the ARATS rather than directly by the postal authorities on both sides. Representing the SEF, Shi Hwei-yow (at the time chief of the Legal Services Department of the SEF) explained that the policy of the Taiwan authorities was one of “no official contacts” with the mainland and that “Cross-Strait developments had not yet reached the stage of direct postal links.” It is clear that the SEF’s actions and proposals were in violation of the one-China principle.

Tang Shubei, who was then executive vice chairman of the ARATS, stated the mainland’s position at a press conference on March 30 after the conclusion of the Beijing talks. He said:

The crux of the difference between the two sides lies in the way one China is presented. We feel that there are no problems with the usage of documents within a country, nor are there problems with tracing registered mail. At present, because the two sides have not been reunified, it is necessary to find some special solutions for business matters involving the Cross-Strait use of documents and for initiating tracing and compensation for Cross-Strait registered mail. On this matter we are willing to work together positively with the appropriate parties from Taiwan. However, because at present the two sides have not been reunified, we must first make it clear that what we are discussing or resolving are matters within one country. As everyone knows, both the Nationalist party and the Communist
party believe there is only one China; the documents that have been passed by the Taiwan side relating to reunification also acknowledge that there is only one China. Since there is a consensus on one China on both sides, why can’t both parties resolve concrete working issues in accordance with this principle? The one-China question should not become a problem bedeviling the talks between the two sides.

He also pointed out:

“We do not want to discuss political issues with the SEF; we just want to affirm one thing, namely, that there is only one China. As for the meaning of one China, we are not prepared nor do we plan to discuss that with the SEF. The two sides have not been reunified, but we are one country. We are unyielding on this principle. As for what form should be used to express this principle, we are willing to enter into discussions.”

Regarding the outcome of the Beijing talks, Ma Ying-jeou, then vice chairman of the Taiwan MAC, “felt extremely regretful” that the mainland insisted on the one-China principle and insisted that document use and matters regarding registered mail were Chinese domestic issues. And yet he reaffirmed that “our side has adhered all along to a ‘one-China’ policy,” and he stated that “after these discussions, the views of the two sides began gradually to come closer, which is helpful to the resolution of the problem.” Regarding next steps for the talks, he indicated that they would be in touch with the ARATS after internal consultations. For his part, Tang Shubei stated that the working talks “were productive and that both sides had achieved consensus in many areas. However, because time was relatively short, there were still some differences in the views of both sides on some questions, and this is natural. We look forward to conducting further talks at a time convenient to both sides.”

The Beijing talks between the ARATS and the SEF were the first formal talks held since the establishment of the two authorized nonofficial organizations. Although no agreement was reached, through direct face-to-face communications, each side was better able to understand the other’s position, and consensus was reached on some matters at a time when it was hard to resolve the differences. The essence of the differences lay in the issue of the one-China principle. Although the Taiwan side said that it adhered to a one-China policy, it emphasized the differences between the two sides about its meaning and proposed using a formula of “each speaking for itself” to explain the meaning of one China. The purpose of the Taiwan side in adopting such a stance was to highlight its “sovereignty” and “jurisdictional authority” and to seek the status of an “equal political entity.” The mainland side, on the other hand, insisted on the one-China principle and stated that the functional matters under discussion by the two sides were the internal affairs of one country, its purpose being the upholding of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet in light of the differences between the two sides on the meaning of one China, and particularly because those differences cannot be resolved quickly, in order to allow the talks to achieve progress, the mainland side proposed that, inasmuch as both sides were implementing a one-China policy, they could temporarily not discuss the meaning of one China. Because the Taiwan side insisted on “each speaking for itself,” the mainland side made clear its unswerving position on adhering to the one-China principle but affirmed its willingness to discuss the form in which this principle should be expressed.

After the Beijing talks, the ARATS summed up its position: The concrete issues in Cross-Strait ties are the internal affairs of China and should be resolved through discussions in accordance with the one-China principle; in functional talks, provided that the basic position of the one-China principle is stated, the political meaning of one China need not be discussed; the ways in which it could be expressed are open to full dis-
discussion, and the ARATS is willing to listen to the opinions of the SEF and all sectors in Taiwan. This consistent attitude was evident in all the efforts the Association made to resolve this problem.\(^\text{10}\)

The Beijing talks were not entirely successful, but based on the discussions between the two sides, the ARATS revised its draft agreement and gave the text to the SEF’s representatives in the hope that the other side would submit written revisions or a proposed draft; it had a positive outlook for the achievement of a final agreement. On the other side, in light of the policy objectives it had for the talks between the organizations, the Taiwan authorities also hoped that the talks could continue and would show progress. As analyzed in an article in *Lianhebao*, to begin by solving problems of unofficial exchanges was “the core of its (the Taiwan authorities’) mainland policy, hence the success or failure of the SEF in its (Beijing) trip would also indirectly test whether or not this construct of a mainland policy was effective”; and “(it) was more likely to shake the people’s confidence in the ‘government.’”\(^\text{11}\)

Therefore, “in keeping with the latest developments in the course of Cross-Straits negotiations,” the Taiwan authorities decided to act through the “National Unification Council” and “propose a policy interpretation of the concrete definition of ‘one China’ in a new and complete way and to use this as the basis for the arguments of the Taiwan representatives at the Cross-Strait negotiation table.”\(^\text{12}\) On August 1, 1992, the NUC adopted a “conclusions” document entitled “On the Meaning of ‘One China.’” In that document the meaning of one China was expressed as follows:

Both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the principle of “One China,” but the two sides attach different meanings to this. The Chinese Communist authorities regard “one China” to be “The People’s Republic of China,” and after unification, Taiwan would become a “Special Administrative Region” under its jurisdiction. Our side feels that “one China” should refer to the Republic of China, which was founded in 1912 and has continued to exist to the present; its sovereignty extends to the whole of China, but at present its governing power only extends to Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Quemoy and Matsu. Taiwan is indeed part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.\(^\text{13}\)

The ARATS subsequently responded to the Taiwan National Unification Council’s resolution of August 1. A responsible member of the ARATS told a reporter from the Xinhua News Agency,

With regard to the meaning of “one China” in the talks between the SEF and our Association on an agreement over functional matters, relevant parties in Taiwan stated their “conclusions” on August 1 and confirmed that “both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the principle of one China.” Our Association feels that making this point clear has great significance for the Cross-Strait talks on functional affairs. It demonstrates that adherence to the one-China principle in talks on functional affairs has now become the consensus on both sides of the Straits. Of course, our Association does not agree with the Taiwan side’s understanding of the meaning of “one China.” Our position of favoring “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” and opposing “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan” and “two equal political entities” has been consistent.

But this spokesperson also reaffirmed that “in talks on functional affairs, provided that the basic attitude of supporting the one-China principle is stated, the meaning of one China need not be discussed.”\(^\text{14}\)

From the positions of the two sides described above, we can see that although there were sig-
significant differences between them on the meaning of one China and although each had its own proposals on how to handle these differences, there was an important convergence and consensus on the essential question of adhering to the one-China principle. This laid the foundation for both sides to continue their talks and to reach some agreements. On September 17, 1992, Zou Zhekai, then vice chairman and secretary general of the ARATS, and Secretary General Chen Jung-chie of the SEF had a meeting in Xiamen and unofficially exchanged views on the matter of expressing the one-China principle. Zou Zhekai said to Chen Jung-chie and Shi Hwei-yow, who was also present:

The conclusion of the Taiwan side on the one-China principle shows that there is already a consensus on adhering to the one-China principle in discussions of functional matters between the two sides. However, we do not agree with the explanation of the meaning of one China by the relevant parties in Taiwan; nor can we discuss the meaning of one China with the SEF.

He suggested that the SEF seriously consider directly using the wording “both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle.” Subsequently, both organizations agreed to conduct working talks in Hong Kong. The SEF’s lead negotiator would be Shi Hwei-yow, and the ARATS’s would be Zhou Ning, deputy director of its Consultation Division. The dates were set for October 28–29, 1992.

**The Hong Kong Talks**

The actual main subject of the talks was how to eliminate the differences over the one-China principle between the two sides in talks on functional affairs. Both sides had been authorized to discuss this issue. It should be said that both parties displayed a certain degree of flexibility. The SEF no longer flatly refused to discuss the one-China principle; the ARATS agreed to discuss the wording with which the SEF would clearly indicate its adherence to the one-China principle. After the talks began, Zhou Ning of the ARATS presented five written formulas for expressing the statement that both sides of the Straits adhered to the one-China principle:

1. Document usage across the Straits is an internal affair of China.
2. Document usage across the Straits is a Chinese affair.
3. Document usage across the Straits is a Chinese affair. In light of the fact that different systems exist on both sides of the Straits (or because the country is not yet completely reunified), there are unique aspects to these functional matters. These can be suitably resolved through consultations on an equal basis between the ARATS, the Chinese Notaries Association, and the SEF.
4. As both sides of the Taiwan Straits make efforts toward national unification, they shall adhere to the one-China principle and shall suitably resolve the Cross-Strait usage of notarized documents (or other functional matters).
5. Based on the consensus that both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle, the ARATS, the Chinese Notaries Association, and the SEF shall, through consultations on an equal basis, suitably resolve the question of the Cross-Strait usage of notarized documents.

With formal authorization from the MAC, Shi Hwei-yow proposed five written formulas and three oral ones. The five written formulas he proposed are these:
1. Both sides shall proceed from the principle of “one China, two equal political entities.”

2. Both sides shall proceed from the principle of “seeking a democratic, free, equally wealthy, and unified China; Cross-Strait affairs are the affairs of the people of China.”

3. Given that both sides of the Straits have been in a prolonged state of separation and in recognition of the fact that both are seeking to unify the country through their common efforts, they feel it necessary to resolve the verification of documents (or other matters under discussion) in a suitable way.

4. Both sides shall proceed from the principle of “seeking a peacefully and democratically unified China.”

5. Both sides shall proceed from the principle of “seeking the peaceful and democratic unification of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.”

No formula was agreed to after both sides proposed their five written formulas. Based on authorization from the MAC, the SEF proposed three oral formulas:

1. Given that China is still in a temporary state of division, both sides are seeking to unify the country through their common efforts, and unofficial Cross-Strait contacts have been steadily increasing; in order to protect the interests of the people on both sides of the Straits, the verification of documents should be suitably resolved.

2. The verification of documents on both sides of the Taiwan Straits is a matter between the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits.

3. Although both sides seek to unify the country through their common efforts and adhere to the one-China principle, they acknowledge that they differ over the meaning of one China. In light of steadily increasing unofficial Cross-Strait contacts, however, and in order to protect the interests of the people on both sides of the Straits, the verification of documents should be suitably resolved.

In an exchange of views, although their positions had drawn closer, the two sides did not reach any agreement. At the request of the SEF, the ARATS agreed to extend the talks by a half day until October 30, but they were still unable to reach agreement. Yet the ARATS gave a positive assessment of the Hong Kong talks by stating that “these working talks have not only made considerable progress on concrete business matters; they have also made progress on the expression of the one-China principle in talks between the two sides on functional affairs.” Hence the ARATS wrote twice (on October 29 and November 4) to the SEF, suggesting an assessment of the results of the talks, proposing further talks on related questions in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy, and suggesting that responsible persons from the two organizations sign an agreement. On November 1, a representative of the SEF issued a written statement saying that regarding the expression of the one-China principle in talks between the two sides on functional affairs, “we suggest that within a mutually acceptable range, each side state its position orally.” The ARATS examined the SEF’s third oral formula and said that it expressed the SEF’s attitude of seeking unification and adhering to the one-China principle. Although it argued that “it is acknowledged that they differ” over the meaning of one China, the ARATS proposed that “in
discussions of routine affairs, as long as the position of adhering to the one-China principle is stated, the political meaning of one China (need) not be discussed.” Therefore, it stated that it was considering whether a position of adhering to the one-China principle together with the SEF and using the method in which each would make its own oral statement would be acceptable. The ARATS hoped that the SEF could confirm that this was the official view of the Taiwan side.\textsuperscript{21}

On November 3, the SEF wrote to the ARATS, formally notifying it that it was “using the format of an oral statement to express” the one-China principle. That day the Association’s deputy secretary general, Sun Yafu, notified the Foundation’s secretary general, Chen Jung-chie, by telephone that the working talks between the two organizations conducted in Hong Kong on October 28–30 had been concluded. He suggested that further talks on related issues be held in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy, and that responsible persons from the two organizations sign an agreement at one of those four sites. Sun Yafu also notified Chen Jung-chie by telephone that the ARATS fully respected and accepted the SEF’s suggestion of expressing the one-China principle through oral statements. He proposed consultations over the specific contents of the oral statements.\textsuperscript{22} On November 3, the SEF issued a press release confirming that the ARATS had indicated it respected and accepted “the suggestion previously made by our SEF that both sides each express the ‘one-China’ principle through an oral statement.” It noted that “our Foundation has already obtained the consent of our supervisory body that it is acceptable for each side to express itself through an oral statement. Regarding the specific content of the oral statements, our side will express itself on the basis of the ‘National Unification Guidelines’ and the National Unification Council’s resolution of last August 1 on the meaning of ‘one China.’”\textsuperscript{23}

The Foundation’s letter of November 3 to the ARATS and Sun Yafu’s phone call on the same day to Chen Jung-chie led to a “breakthrough development”\textsuperscript{24} in the talks between the two organizations on document usage and the tracing of and compensation for lost registered mail. On November 16 and 30, the ARATS wrote twice to the SEF, giving a written statement of its position. In its letter of November 16, the ARATS said,

During these working talks, your representative suggested that in the context of mutual understanding, we use the format of having each of our organizations make an oral statement expressing the one-China principle and propose specific contents to be expressed (see the appendixes). This would include making clear that both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle, and this content has subsequently appeared in Taiwan publications.

The letter formally notified the SEF that the key points of the Association’s oral statement would be that “Both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the one-China principle and are making efforts toward national reunification. However, the political meaning of ‘one China’ will not be involved in the discussions of functional affairs between the two sides.” The content of the oral declaration contained in the letter to the SEF was the third formula for oral declarations proposed by the SEF in Hong Kong on the afternoon of October 30, that is, “As both sides seek to unify the country through their common efforts, although they both adhere to the one-China principle, [they acknowledge] that they differ over the meaning of one China.”\textsuperscript{25} On December 3, the SEF replied to the ARATS letters of November 16 and 30. The letter welcomed the ARATS’s “willingness to show a positive attitude and sign an agreement, which would enable the problem to be fully resolved.” It also reiterated the SEF’s stance on orally expressing the one-China principle that had been published in the press release of November 3, that is, it would be stated on the basis of the
“August 1 resolution” of the “National Unification Council” and the “National Unification Guidelines.” The ARATS suggested that the two organizations set a time to release the specific contents of their oral declarations simultaneously. Lee Ching-ping, then the Foundation’s deputy secretary general, said, “This will require further study.”

From the description given of the talks between the two organizations, we can see that as a result of more than a year of efforts and engaging in the working talks in Hong Kong, both sides had finally overcome the principal obstacle that had emerged in discussions of routine affairs and were able to affirm through oral declarations that they adhered to the one-China principle, and that differences over the political meaning of one China would not be raised in discussions of functional affairs. This was the true course of events surrounding the 1992 consensus.

## An Assessment of the 1992 Consensus

The 1992 consensus was the result of serious consultations and mutual compromises between the ARATS and SEF, which both earnestly desired to resolve problems “in the context of mutual understanding” and for which both had received full authorization from their respective supervisory bodies. Any distortion and denial of the consensus would be a distortion and denial of the facts as well as an insult to the efforts made by both parties. Looking back at how the two organizations achieved a consensus, we can see that it did not come easily and should be cherished.

The matters discussed by the two organizations showed that adhering to the one-China principle was an unavoidable issue in the talks on functional affairs between the two sides. From the beginning the ARATS had put its finger on the crux of the problem, pointing out that the one-China principle could not be ignored either in promoting Cross-Strait exchanges or in dealing with specific problems that emerged while handling contacts and in talks on functional affairs. Provided that both sides came to an understanding and consensus on this matter, other problems could be resolved as they cropped up. For its part, the SEF insisted that “talks between the two sides on functional affairs are unrelated to political topics” and emphasized that “it is acknowledged that they differ” over the political meaning of one China. Hence during the Beijing talks, the SEF had not yet been authorized to discuss its position on stating the one-China principle, and it therefore adopted a stance of avoidance or even rejection. Because of the stalemate over this fundamental question, when the two sides began to discuss specific matters such as document usage and the tracing of and compensation for lost registered mail, obvious divergences began to emerge in areas ranging from the choice of words to ways of handling issues. This is illustrated in the chart on page 130.

Although it would appear that many of the differences described in the chart are technical in nature, if traced to their roots, they involve adherence to the one-China principle—that is, it must first be affirmed that the issues being discussed by the two organizations are internal affairs of China; otherwise, both sides will go off in different directions and an agreement will be hard to reach. The mainland cannot make the slightest concession in its position on upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the Hong Kong talks, the SEF was authorized to discuss how to express the one-China principle, and it successively proposed eight such formulas, thereby displaying its spirit of “mutual understanding.” Out of an earnest desire to solve the problem, the ARATS immediately gave a positive response and made matching concessions, agreeing that both sides could express the one-China principle through oral declarations and confirming the specific contents of the oral declarations through letters. Because the Hong Kong talks allowed both sides to achieve a consensus on adherence to the one-China principle and overcome the main obstacle in their talks on routine
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>SEF Position</th>
<th>ARATS Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title of Agreement</td>
<td>Use “Agreement on Verification of Cross-Strait Documents.”</td>
<td>Use “Agreement on Verification (and) Usage of Cross-Strait Documents.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preamble to Agreement</td>
<td>Text relating to the “one-China Principle” has no bearing on this agreement and should be excised.</td>
<td>The two sides should stress the “one-China principle” in some part of the compact or sign the agreement on the basis of the principle that they [functional issues] are “internal affairs of China.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Strait Document Usage</td>
<td>Liaising bodies</td>
<td>Proposes that the two parties to the agreement be the liaising bodies or that the mainland side could designate an agency to engage in working contacts with the SEF.</td>
<td>The bodies on both sides, using notarized documents, could engage each other directly or through the assistance of the SEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of activities</td>
<td>All types of documents should be handled comprehensively.</td>
<td>Only those documents that are notarized are authorized for handling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items verified by providing mutual copies</td>
<td>Besides the three types of notarized documents proposed by the other side, school records, personal identity papers, birth certificates, and tax papers should be included in accordance with custom.</td>
<td>In principle, copies of notarized certificates of marriage, inheritance, and adoption should be provided jointly to facilitate verification by the bodies using them, which should be willing to discuss additional items.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verification time limit</td>
<td>In principle, thirty days</td>
<td>In principle, thirty days</td>
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Subject | Item | SEF Position | ARATS Position
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Verification fees | Need not be charged. | Should be charged. |
Tracing of and compensation for lost Cross-Strait registered mail | Does not approve of direct working contacts between postal departments of the two sides. Formal compensation and tracing as well as standards for computing postal charges remain to be discussed. | Tracing of and compensation for lost mail is not the work of the two organizations and should be dealt with by the postal departments on both sides as part of their professional duties. |

Based on Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], October 29, 1992.

affairs, Association Executive Vice Chairman Tang Shubei and SEF Vice Chairman Chiu Jinyi held preliminary discussions in Beijing from April 4 through April 10, 1993, about a meeting between Wang (Daohan) and Koo (Chenfu). They also reached consensus on eight issues regarding the meeting, including time, location, participants, topics, and other related questions. From April 27 through April 29 of that year, the Wang–Koo meeting was held in Singapore, and four agreements were signed: “Agreement on a System of Contacts and Talks Between the Two Organizations,” “Agreement on Verification of Cross-Strait Notarized Documents,” “Agreement on Tracing of and Compensation for [Lost] Cross-Strait Registered Mail,” and “Joint Agreement of the Wang–Koo Meeting.”

The regrettable thing is that, at a time when people on both sides of the Straits were hoping that Cross-Strait relations would continue to move toward the prospects opened up by the Wang–Koo meeting, Lee Teng-hui, leader of the Taiwan regime, moved in the opposite direction and stepped up the pace of dividing the country. The Taiwan regime unilaterally summed up the 1992 consensus as “one China, separately expressed by each side”; it avoided mentioning that it had confirmed the oral declaration of the one-China principle, the third oral formula proposed by the SEF on October 30, 1992, and the resolution of August 1, 1992, on the one-China question by the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines; it distorted the 1992 consensus as “each speaking for itself” and misled people into believing that the Taiwan regime could make an “open” interpretation of the one-China principle, thereby creating a basis for its advocacy of dividing the country. Thereafter, Lee Teng-hui’s “expressions” of one-China began to deviate more and more brazenly from the one-China principle.

On November 20, 1993, someone from the Taiwan regime attending the APEC conference in Seattle put forth a “Two-Chinas-Phase Policy.” On July 5, 1994, the Taiwan regime made public its “Statement on Relations Across the Taiwan Straits,” saying that “‘one China’ refers to the historical, geographical, cultural and genealogical China,” thereby overtly abandoning the advocacy of one China in the legal sense. The statement gave these explanations of the Taiwan regime’s claim that the two sides are “equal political entities”: “The meaning of a so-called ‘political entity’ is fairly broad. It might refer to a country, a government or a political organization”; “in dealing with Cross-Strait relations, the
relation between the two sides is not one between countries, and it also differs from the usual simple domestic affairs.” Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state relations” was by this time almost visible on paper. On April 8, 1995, in his speech at the “National Unification Council” (so-called Lee’s Six Points), Lee Teng-hui said that since 1949, “Taiwan and the mainland have been governed by two political entities, neither of which is subservient to the other, thus resulting in a situation whereby the two sides of the Straits are separated and separately governed.” In July 1996, the brief entitled “Participation of the Republic of China in the United Nations,” published by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even more revealingly stated that “China is a neutral historical, cultural and geographical term,” and “only after the two sides are unified will there truly be ‘One China.’” In February 1997, the Press Office of the Executive Yuan of Taiwan published a brief entitled “Looking at the Issue of ‘One China’” in which it began to use “a divided China” instead of one China. The brief stated, “Rather than say ‘One China,’ we should say ‘one divided China,’ such as Korea now and Germany or Vietnam in the past.” On July 9, 1999, Lee Teng-hui expressed the “Theory of Two States,” arguing that “Since the revision of the constitution in 1991, the Cross-Strait relationship has been established as one between states or at least as a special state-to-state relationship.”

The facts demonstrate that under the guise of “separately expressed by each side,” Lee Teng-hui abandoned the 1992 consensus, gradually moved away from a one-China policy, destroyed the basis for Cross-Strait dialogue and consultations, created tremendous difficulties for Cross-Strait relations, and brought about the Straits crisis of 1995–1996 and the Cross-Strait crisis and deadlock that have existed since July 1999. This is precisely why the mainland cannot agree to describe the 1992 consensus as “one China separately expressed by each side” or even “the meaning of one China separately expressed by each side.” Such a description both distorts the facts and harms Cross-Strait relations. The ARATS and SEF never engaged in discussions of the political meaning of one China, to say nothing of reaching a consensus that the political meaning of one China would be “separately expressed by each side.” In other words, the consensus was that each of the two sides would use the format of an oral declaration to show its position of adhering to the one-China principle, and because the meaning of one China was not discussed by the two sides, there was never any consensus on it. A unilateral misinterpretation of the 1992 consensus will inevitably damage Cross-Strait relations.

It must be pointed out that some people in Taiwan, particularly the leaders of the new regime, stubbornly deny that in 1992 both sides expressed a position of adherence to one China. Such a contention disregards the facts. By looking at reports in the Taiwan newspapers on the talks between the two organizations, one can readily understand that a responsible person representing the MAC and the SEF’s representatives in the negotiations indicated many times that “our side has always adhered to a ‘one-China’ policy.” On December 3, 1992, in issuing its statement on the Nationalist party’s version of the meaning of one China, the Standing Committee of the party’s Central Committee said, “Taiwan independence or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ are paths which will not work; they are paths which will bring about self-destruction.” An editorial in the Zhongguo Shibao (China Times) of October 29, 1992, also stated, “It must be said that on the position of ‘one China,’ there is no divergence between the two sides.” Another fact that must be pointed out is that, before the ARATS and SEF reached their consensus on one China, there was a case in Taiwan in which the Nationalist party punished a member of the Legislative Council who was a KMT member for violating the one-China principle. In the latter part of September, many members of the Legislative Council, who were also members of the “Meeting of Minds” (jisihui, a second-level organization of the Nationalist party) in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, questioned the one-China policy dur-
ing a general question session. Chen Zhe-nan advocated “one China, one Taiwan.” Hau Pei-tsun, who was then head of the Executive Yuan, “rebutted him in stern tones,” stressing that “a two-Chinas policy will lead Taiwan to a dead end.” “If a two-Chinas policy were adopted today, it would bring instant disaster to Taiwan.” “One China, one Taiwan is Taiwan independence,” and “if you don’t identify with one China, then don’t be a member of the Chinese Nationalist party.” Nationalist party spokesman Chu Chi-ying indicated that the party adhered to a one-China policy and opposed “one China, one Taiwan.” James Soong (Soong Chu-yu), the party’s secretary general, emphasized that the one-China policy of the party in power was very explicit. The Nationalist party’s Discipline Committee decided in that case to chastise party members who violated the one-China position with a serious warning. From the facts presented in this article there should be no question that in 1992 both sides and both organizations acknowledged adherence to a one-China position. At the time, preoccupied with consolidating his own power, Lee Teng-hui still needed to stabilize Cross-Strait relations and had neither the time nor the ability to challenge the one-China principle.

**Conclusion**

The consensus in which both sides of the Straits stated their adherence to the one-China principle was reached by the ARATS and SEF in 1992 as a result of authorization and mutual efforts. That was the basis, acceptable to both sides, for dialogue and consultations. Without this consensus, the nearly 20 rounds of talks between the two organizations would not have been possible, and the Wang–Koo meeting in Singapore and the four agreements would have been even less possible. After the Wang–Koo meeting, Lee Teng-hui was awed by the momentum that characterized the rapid development of Cross-Strait relations. He deliberately distorted and destroyed the 1992 consensus, causing the Cross-Strait relationship to become turbulent and filled with crises. Since the DPP, which advocates Taiwan independence, assumed control of power, the Cross-Strait relationship has been mired in an even more dangerous deadlock. In spite of this, the mainland has been making the greatest possible efforts to resolve the deadlock peacefully so that the relationship can take a turn for the better and move in a positive direction. Looking at the situation across the Strait, this writer thinks that the 1992 consensus is still the closest point of convergence that can revive dialogue and consultations between the two sides. It must be admitted that the key lies in the acceptance of the one-China principle. The objective existence of one China cannot be changed. In the world today, of the 180-plus member countries of the United Nations, more than 160 have a one-China policy, and this situation will develop further. There is no future for Taiwan independence, which can only bring disaster to our brethren in Taiwan. It is definitely not mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and is repugnant to the hopes of Chinese abroad. As the opening sentence of the “National Unification Guidelines” explicitly states, in seeking to build a strong, prosperous country and promote long-term development for the people, the Chinese both at home and abroad share the common hope that China will be unified. In light of the broad trends in world development today and as the overall strength of the mainland continues to grow, how will our brethren in Taiwan deal with the opportunities and challenges of the twenty-first century? It goes without saying that the joining of the two sides would be advantageous to both. During the past 50 years, Taiwan has, on the whole, carried out a one-China policy. What harm has that done to our brethren there? On May 15, 2000, Mr. Hau Pei-tsun wrote a piece in Lianhebao in which he stated, “Over the past 50-odd years, because we advocated one China, we survived, developed, flourished and grew. Why should we abandon that?” It is Taiwan independence, not the one-China principle, that prevents our brethren in Taiwan from being masters of their own house, threatens the security of Tai-
wan, and shrinks “Taiwan’s international survival space!”

“The wise man is the one who understands the times.” It would not hurt the leadership of the Taiwan regime to look from a higher vantage point, to take the present and long-term interests of our brethren in Taiwan to heart, and to respect and return to the 1992 consensus. If that were to happen, we could look forward to the resumption of dialogue and consultations between the two sides, which in turn would lead to the peaceful and stable development of Cross-Strait relations. That would be a blessing for the people of both sides.

Appendix 1

On the One-China Principle

Before reunification, in handling Cross-Strait affairs and particularly in Cross-Strait negotiations, adhering to the one-China principle means maintaining that there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is part of China, and that China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be divided.

—From Vice Premier Qian Quichen’s speech of January 26, 1998, at a symposium commemorating the third anniversary of President Jiang Zemin’s major speech “Continue to Fight to Complete the Great Endeavor of Promoting Our Homeland’s Unification”

There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is part of China; at present (China) is not yet unified; both sides should make joint efforts on the basis of the one-China principle to negotiate on equal footing and discuss reunification. A country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be divided, and Taiwan’s political status should be discussed in the context of one China.

—From Chairman Wang Daohan’s conversation with Mr. Koo Chen-fu in Shanghai on October 14, 1998

Regarding Cross-Strait relations, the one-China principle that we propose states: There is only one China in the world, the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China, and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity may not be divided.

—From Vice Premier Qian Quichen’s remarks of August 25, 2000, during a meeting with a visiting delegation from the Lianhebao Group of Taiwan

Appendix 2

“The National Unification Guidelines” (Excerpts)

1. Preface: In seeking to build a strong, prosperous country and [promote] long-term development for the people, the unification of China is the common hope of Chinese both at home and abroad. In a rational, peaceful, equal, and mutually beneficial context, both sides of the Taiwan Strait, after a suitable period of earnest exchanges, cooperation, and consultation, should develop a consensus on democracy, freedom, and joint prosperity and together rebuild a unified China.

3. Principles: (1) The mainland and Taiwan are both Chinese territory, and promoting national unification
is the common duty of Chinese people.

4. Course: (4) Both sides should put aside hostile stances and, under the one-China principle, solve all disputes through peaceful means.

—Passed at the third meeting of Taiwan’s National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, and at meeting #2223 of the Executive Yuan on March 14, 1991

Appendix 3

On the Meaning of “One China”
(Excerpts)

(1) Both sides of the Strait adhere to the principle of “one China,” but each side attaches a different meaning to it. The Chinese Communist regime regards “one China” to be “The People’s Republic of China” and [holds that] after unification, Taiwan would become a “Special Administrative Region” under its jurisdiction. Our side feels that “one China” should mean the Republic of China, which has existed from its founding in 1912 to the present day; its sovereignty extends to the whole of China, but its present governing power only extends to Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Quemoy, and Matsu. Taiwan is indeed part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.”

—Passed at the eighth meeting of Taiwan’s National Unification Council on August 1, 1992

Appendix 4

Responsible Member of the ARATS Suggests Continuing Talks with Responsible Members of the SEF

A Xinhua reporter learned from the ARATS that on November 3, its Deputy Secretary General Sun Yafu notified SEF Secretary General Chen Jung-chie that the working discussions between the two organizations on “Cross-Strait Usage of Notarized Documents,” which had been held in Hong Kong October 28–30, had concluded. He suggested that further talks on related issues be conducted in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy and that responsible members of the two organizations sign a related agreement in one of the aforementioned locations.

It is believed that these working talks in Hong Kong achieved great progress. During the two working discussions on “Cross-Strait Usage of Notarized Documents” and the “Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Cross-Straits Registered Mail,” which took place in Beijing during March of this year [2000], the Taiwan side deliberately distorted the ARATS adherence to the one-China principle in functional discussions and [in] its definition of problems arising from Cross-Strait contacts as Chinese matters rather than international matters, saying that these were “adding political topics”; subsequently the SEF unilaterally terminated the discussions. Since the working talks in March ended, responsible
members of the State Council’s Office of Taiwan Affairs and the ARATS have indicated on numerous occasions that the one-China principle should be expressed in Cross-Strait discussions of functional issues but that for now the political meaning of “one China” need not be raised and the means of expression could be fully discussed; this in fact meant that the means of expression could be either written or oral. During these working talks in Hong Kong, representatives of the SEF proposed a format in which each side would make its own oral declaration of the one-China principle; on November 3, the SEF again wrote to the ARATS, formally notifying it that “each side would express itself through an oral declaration.” The ARATS fully respected and accepted the Foundation’s proposal, and Deputy Secretary General Sun Yafu telephoned Secretary General Chen Jung-chie and suggested entering into discussions on the specific contents of the oral declarations. This reflects the Association’s consistent attitude of seeking mutual respect and truth from facts and not forcing its views on others as well as its sincerity in seeking to reach an accord on the Cross-Strait use of notarized documents.

Our correspondent has learned from sources in the ARATS that when the working meetings in Beijing ended in March, the ARATS promptly presented the Foundation’s representatives with a draft agreement that had been revised in accordance with the discussions between the two sides. Prior to the resumption of working talks in Hong Kong, the ARATS wrote to the SEF on September 30 in hopes that (the SEF) would provide written suggestions for changes or a draft as soon as possible, but the SEF did not do so. However, during this round of talks, the SEF raised new requirements regarding the mailing of copies of documents. The ARATS determined that this would take time for study and assessment as well as for consultations with relevant agencies; this (position) was eminently reasonable. Yet the SEF insisted on reaching an agreement in Hong Kong, which was clearly impractical.

As early as September 30 and October 16, the ARATS had written to the SEF, explicitly stating that it would enter into a round of working talks with the SEF in Hong Kong on October 28–29. At the repeated requests of the SEF, the ARATS agreed to extend this by a half day to continue discussions of related issues. During the talks, the ARATS recognized that great progress had been achieved by the Hong Kong talks but that solutions were still needed for some outstanding and some new problems. Therefore, it wrote again to the SEF on October 29, suggesting that after assessing the outcome of the talks, further discussions take place in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy and that responsible members of the two organizations sign an agreement. It appears that whether or not such talks take place soon will be the key to whether or not there will be complete success on Cross-Strait usage of notarized documents, and this bears close watching.

—Xinhua News Agency, November 4
Appendix 5

Press Release from the Straits Exchange Foundation, Legal Person (November 3, 1992)

A responsible member of the Chinese Communist ARATS indicated today (November 3) through the Xinhua News Agency that they [ARATS] are willing to “respect and accept” our Foundation’s earlier proposal in which each organization is to express the “one-China” principle through an oral declaration, but their Association also indicated that “the specific contents of the oral declarations will be separately discussed.”

Our Foundation thinks that

1. The talks on practical issues regarding “Document Authentication” and the “Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Cross-Strait Registered Mail” do not involve political subjects. It was only because the ARATS repeatedly insisted during these talks in Hong Kong that there be some “expression” of the “one-China” principle that we obtained the consent of our supervisory body and will accept [the proposition] that each side express itself through an oral declaration. As for the specific content of the oral declaration, our side’s expression will be based on the “National Unification Guidelines” and the resolution passed by the National Unification Council on August 1 of this year.

2. We hope that the Association’s staff will return to Hong Kong as soon

3. This evening (November 3), we instructed Department Director Shi Hwei-yow and others to remain in Hong Kong for one or two days and to prepare for the resumption of talks. We hope the ARATS will make a decision as soon as possible and will inform us before noon on November 5.

Appendix 6

Correspondence from the Talks on the Cross-Strait Authentication of Documents

To the Straits Exchange Foundation:

On October 28–30, our Association and representatives from the Chinese Notaries Association and from your Foundation conducted working talks on the Cross-Strait use of notarized documents; at the same time, they exchanged views on the tracing of and compensation for lost Cross-Strait registered mail. In addition to making considerable progress on specific business matters, these working talks also made progress on the question of expressing the one-China principle in Cross-Strait talks on functional issues. This is the result of joint efforts made by all the parties involved.

At the conclusion of the working talks in Beijing in March, we again indicated that specific issues in Cross-Strait contacts are Chinese affairs and should be
resolved through discussions in accordance with the one-China principle; in functional talks, as long as both sides demonstrate a basic position of adhering to the one-China principle, the political meaning of “one China” need not be discussed, the format for expressing the one-China principle in functional talks can be fully discussed, and we are willing to listen to the views of your Foundation and of all sectors in Taiwan.

During these working talks, in the context of mutual understanding, your representative adopted the format of having each of our organizations express the one-China principle through an oral declaration and suggested the specific contents to be expressed (see attachment); this included making it clear that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle, and this content subsequently appeared in various publications in Taiwan. We noted that on November 1, Mr. Shi Hwei-yow released a written statement expressing a position that is consistent with the above suggestion. On November 3, you wrote to notify us formally that you have already obtained the consent of relevant parties in Taiwan for “each side to express itself through an oral declaration.” We fully respect and accept your proposal and informed Mr. Chen Jung-chie of this by telephone on November 3.

In order for the talks on the Cross-Strait use of notarized documents to come to fruition as soon as possible, we will now inform you of the key points we intend to include in our oral statement: Both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle and are making efforts toward national reunification. However, the political meaning of “one China” is not involved in the Cross-Strait functional talks. Acting in this spirit, the Cross-Strait use of notarized documents (or other issues under discussion) should be suitably resolved.

We suggest that after we agree on a time to make our oral declarations simultaneously, we continue to discuss, in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy, some specific business matters relating to a draft agreement about which there are differences of opinion and have the agreement signed by responsible members of our two organizations.

(Signed) The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
November 16, 1992

Attachment: the formula for an oral declaration that you proposed on the afternoon of October 30:

“As both sides of the Strait make efforts toward national unification, although they both adhere to a one-China principle, it is understood that there are differences about the meaning of one China. In light of the increasing frequency of nonofficial contacts and in order to protect the rights of people on both sides of the Strait, the authentication of documents should be suitably resolved.”

Appendix 7

Letter from the SEF to the ARATS

To the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits:

We have received your letters of Novem-
ber 16 and 30 about the talks on “Cross-Strait Document Authentication.”

Regarding “Cross-Strait Documentation” and the “Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Cross-Strait Registered Mail” being issues between Chinese on both sides of the Strait, this question has been unsettled for a long time. It has not only affected the rights of people on both sides; it has also caused people to begin to question exchanges, which is truly regrettable. We very much welcome receiving the two aforementioned letters from you indicating that (you) “are willing to sign an agreement in a positive spirit” “to enable the matter to be fully resolved.”

We have always felt that the functional talks between the two sides should not be related to any political topics, [for] there are differences in how the two sides understand the meaning of “one China.” In seeking to find a solution to the problem, we proposed that each side make an oral declaration. As for the specific content of the oral declarations, we have already indicated in our press release of November 3 that we will express ourselves in accordance with the meaning of “one China” in the “National Unification Guidelines” and in the resolution passed by the National Unification Council on August 1 of this year. We have on many occasions stated and explained our position on this subject, and there has been extensive coverage by the media in the territories of Hong Kong, the mainland, and Taiwan on the positions and explanations of both sides.

The most pressing issue at present should be resolving actual problems of a functional nature. Based on the pre-

limentary consensus reached in the Hong Kong talks and taking your views fully into account, we have prepared a draft agreement and delivered it in person to your representatives at the Hong Kong talks. If you find that there are still “differences that have been omitted” in the two drafts on “Cross-Strait Documentation” and the “Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Cross-Strait Registered Mail,” please write to us as soon as possible so that we can study the matter.

We attach the greatest importance to the meeting in Singapore between Chairman Koo and Chairman Wang. As for ancillary matters related to the meeting, we will inform you by mail after giving this careful study.

With best wishes,

(Signed) The Straits Exchange Foundation, Legal Person
December 3

About the Author

Xu Shiquan, a member of the National Committee’s Roundtable on U.S.–China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations, is a journalist whose career has included assignments as a correspondent for the New China News Agency, Dar es Salaam; bureau chief, Guangming Daily, Beirut; bureau chief, Guangming Daily, London; director of the International Department, The People’s Daily; bureau chief, The People’s Daily, United Nations; and president, Institute of Taiwan Studies. His article “The One-China Principle: The Positions of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)” appeared in the December 2000 issue of American Foreign Policy Interests.
Notes

3. ARATS Executive Vice Chairman Tang Shubei’s speech at the panel discussion on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Association’s founding. See “The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: Compilation of Major Documents of 1992.”
4. Liu Mo, Shao Zhiguang, “Leaving a Fair Footnote to History,” in Cross-Strait Relations, no. 27 (September 1999).
10. See note 4.
12. Wang Mingyi, “The Cross-Strait Peace Talks” (Liang’an hetan), p. 120.
13. See Appendix 3.
14. Statement by a responsible person from the ARATS on the publication by the Taiwan regime of a document on the meaning of “one China” in the Cross-Strait talks on functional affairs. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, August 27, 1992.
15. See note 4.
17. Ibid., pp. 124–125.
20. See note 19.
22. See Appendix 4.
23. See Appendix 5.
25. See Appendix 6.
26. SEF, Haiwenlu (fa) Document # 81–1045F; see Appendix 7.
27. See note 4.
29. See Zhongguo Shibao (China Times), November 6, 1992.