



National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Where Leaders Meet

Transatlantic Relations

National Committee on American Foreign Policy's Project on Reinventing NATO

Report and Policy Recommendations by NCAFP Study Group on NATO

July 1999

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. To commemorate and celebrate the occasion, the annual NATO summit was held in Washington April 23-25, 1999. In 1998 the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) decided to create a study group to review the evolution of the Alliance, including relations between the United States and Europe in general and NATO in particular, for the purpose of fortifying and enriching the data base that we draw on as we articulate U.S. foreign policy interests in the context of Europe and NATO, identifying challenges facing the Alliance, and recommending steps to take in the continuing process of creating an effective security structure for Europe.

The NCAFP Study Group (consisting of Professor Howard L. Adelson, Dr. Giuseppe Ammendola, Professor Bernard E. Brown [the director of the NCAFP's project on Reinventing NATO], Professor Michael Curtis, Viola Drath, William J. Flynn [NCAFP chairman], Professor George E. Gruen, Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda, Ann Phillips [vice president], Ambassador Maxwell Rabb, Donald S. Rice, Esq. [senior vice president], William M. Rudolf [executive vice president], Professor George D. Schwab [president], and Professor Donald S. Zagoria [trustee]) as a group or individually met with leading authorities and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic. They included Alyson J. K. Bailes, political director of the Western European Union, Brussels; Valdis Birkavs, foreign minister of Latvia, Riga; Robert Bradtke, minister, American embassy, London; Lawrence A. Chalmer, director and NATO staff officer at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.; William Thomas Harris III, political minister counselor at the US. Mission to NATO, Brussels; John Holmes, private secretary to Prime Minister Tony Blair, London; John M. Jones, deputy director for political affairs, Office of European Political and Security Affairs at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.; Ambassador George F. Kennan, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.; Guido Lenzi, director, Institute of Security Studies of the Western European Union, Paris;



Ambassador Jack Matlock, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.; Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (ret.), director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan Powell, chief of staff of Prime Minister Tony Blair, London; Christopher Prentice, head, Near East and North African Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; Robert Simmons, deputy director, European Security and Political Affairs at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.; Stanley R. Sloan, senior specialist in International Security Policy, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; and Adam Thomson, head, Security Policy Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

The National Committee expresses its deepest appreciation to all those we consulted in Europe and the United States. It goes without saying that none of them is responsible for the report and the policy recommendations made by the NCAFP's Study Group on NATO.

In addition to the NCAFP research activities that culminated in an all-day workshop on March 25, 1999, a number of articles on how the Alliance reinvented itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union were published in the NCAFP bimonthly *American Foreign Policy Interests*.^{*} In fact, the Report and Policy Recommendations of the NCAFP's Study Group on NATO, which was originally published in the August 1999 issue of *American Foreign Policy Interests*, has been published in this format in response to demands for the text.

On behalf of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, I thank members of the NCAFP Study Group for their help in shaping the Report and Policy Recommendations. Special thanks go to Professor Bernard E. Brown for researching the topic in the United States and Europe and for directing the NATO project for the NCAFP.

George D. Schwab
President

^{*}William E. Odom, "Challenges Facing an Expanding NATO," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, vol. 20, no. 6 (December 1998): 1-11; and Bernard E. Brown, "Reinventing NATO," *ibid.*, vol. 21, no. 1 (February 1999):1-14. See also the National Committee's policy statement, **For the Record**, "NATO Enlargement, The Next Step," *ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A stable, prosperous, and democratic postcold war Europe is of paramount importance to the United States.

1. To ensure a peaceful Europe, which is in the U.S. national interest, the United States must
 - (a) remain an active member of NATO,
 - (b) work with its allies to expand and deepen Euro-Atlantic relations, and
 - (c) work with its allies to enlarge NATO gradually.
2. The United States must work with its allies to strengthen the Partnership for Peace but not at the expense of or in competition with NATO, which is the cornerstone of US. security policy in Europe.
3. The United States must work with its allies to broaden the scope of NATO's strategic doctrine to include security threats caused by turmoil at the periphery of NATO's boundaries. In exceptional



circumstances NATO should project its power to regions bordering the Alliance. But before such operations commence, clear goals must be formulated and announced.

4. The United States must work with its allies whenever possible to secure wide support for out-of-area operations from the world community, including the Security Council of the United Nations.

5. The United States must encourage European members of NATO to coordinate their defense policies and assume increased responsibility for meeting the defense goals of the Alliance, as the British and French governments agreed to do at St. Malo in December 1998. Europeanization must develop within, not outside of, the Alliance; it must not duplicate efforts or lead to cumbersome decision-making procedures.

6. The United States must urge the creation of a "Committee of the Wise" ("comité des sages") similar to the Martino, Pearson, and Lange Committee in 1956 and the Harmel Committee in 1967 to consider what the Alliance should look like in the foreseeable future. Among the issues: Is there a natural limit to the size of the Alliance? Can an Alliance of twenty-eight (the existing nineteen plus the nine aspirants) function effectively without institutional changes? Are there conditions under which Russia could or should enter the Alliance? What relations should exist between NATO and the European Union, which are both based in Brussels but now worlds apart? Can the Alliance be Europeanized without endangering the transatlantic link? Will it be possible to maintain the unity of NATO without further strengthening and deepening transatlantic institutions?

REINVENTING NATO: REPORT

The old NATO, as it existed before July 1990, could not have conducted the kind of intervention that has taken place in Bosnia and Kosovo. Such action was not envisaged, indeed was not even conceived of, when NATO was created. The heart of the Washington Treaty is Article 5, which stipulates that an attack on one of the parties shall be considered an attack on them all; each party will then take such action "as it deems necessary." The Alliance worked; no attack on a NATO member was made by the Soviet Union; therefore, Article 5 was never invoked. NATO forces first fired in anger in 1994 in enforcing the "no-fly" zone in Bosnia, which is not a member of NATO and is not covered by Article 5. The Alliance subsequently dispatched sixty thousand troops to Bosnia to implement and then stabilize the Dayton accord.

The experience in Bosnia is a dramatic illustration of the way in which NATO has changed in the past decade and a harbinger of things to come. Instead of preparing for a defensive war on its own territory, NATO created a coalition that includes non-NATO members in order to deploy troops out of area at the request of the United Nations. Self-defense was replaced by crisis management and peacekeeping.

FROM THE OLD NATO TO THE NEW NATO

The new NATO came into existence in July 1990 as part of the intricate negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union over the unification of Germany and its continued membership in the NATO Alliance. Secretary of State James A. Baker, in a critical meeting with President Gorbachev in the Kremlin on February 9, 1990, asked directly whether a united Germany, which would be the most powerful country on the Continent, should be an independent power capable of playing off East against West. Or, he continued, should Germany be tied to the European Community and particularly NATO, which it could not dominate. For the first time a Soviet leader did not automatically denounce NATO. Gorbachev said he would "think about the German issue." In the course of the next three months leading up to the summit meeting between President Bush and



President Gorbachev in Washington at the end of May, the Soviet leadership reexamined and finally scrapped the assumptions of the cold war. The lessons of the past, Gorbachev said to Baker (even before holding a seminar), tell us that "Germany must stay within European structures" and that American forces can be a stabilizing influence. At a summit meeting of the American and Soviet presidents that ended on June 1, 1990, in Washington, Gorbachev finally agreed that a united Germany could remain a member of NATO, within which it would be constrained by the other European states and the United States; but, he added, NATO "must change."¹

NATO was reinvented in the three weeks between the end of the Washington summit between Bush and Gorbachev on June 1, 1990, and the beginning of the NATO summit at the end of that month. The Americans presented to the heads of state a farreaching proposal: Create a more political, less military Alliance; emphasize the threat from instability rather than a hostile military force; involve former enemies directly in NATO's deliberations and activities; invite East Europeans to establish a formal liaison with NATO; reorganize NATO forces, converting from sectors of national corps to multinational corps under integrated military command; and declare that nuclear forces would be used only as a "last resort."

With the support of Chancellor Kohl, the Americans were able to overcome British and French resistance and secure the adoption of a new strategic doctrine. It began with a dramatic assertion: The threat of a massive attack against Western Europe had diminished and no longer provides "the focus for allied strategy." The major security threat instead was identified as coming from economic, social, and political difficulties in East and Central Europe. The first set of NATO functions mentioned was encouragement of the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful solution of disputes. NATO's second function was to serve as a "transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern." The way was now wide open for political dialogue.

The invitation to former enemies to attend the North Atlantic Council met with an enthusiastic response, leading to an expansion of contacts between NATO and the East European states. A "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) was proposed by President Clinton in October 1993; virtually all the states of Central and Eastern Europe hastened to join. Most striking is membership initiated by the neutrals. Austria, Finland, and Sweden (all members of the European Union) entered the PfP, as did Switzerland. The PfP involves members in a program of action, not merely dialogue, that has transformed relations between NATO and the rest of Europe. Each partner must submit to NATO a proposal concerning its military and political participation in the program, indicating the specific joint efforts in which it is interested. NATO establishes a menu of programs, including reform of military establishments and officer training; cooperation on environmental and ecological problems, crime and drugs; joint military exercises; and joint participation in both intervention and stabilization forces in the Balkans. It is up to each member to choose from that menu. Countries that want to be considered for eventual membership participate in a wide range of study groups and joint efforts.

In May 1997 (barely three years after the PfP was launched), NATO created an upgraded or "enhanced" PfP and replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Most partners (Russia is the main exception) are more cooperative than some of the full members. The enhanced PfP, capped by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, is changing the terms of debate about the future of the Alliance.

NATO'S Impressive Successes



The leaders of the Western nations and officials of NATO are to be congratulated on the way in which they have converted NATO from an organization devoted exclusively to collective self-defense into a pan-Euro-Atlantic collective security system. The emphasis has shifted from defense against an attack from the East to crisis management and the promotion of democratic stability and prosperity. Although the National Committee on American Foreign Policy supports NATO's intervention in Kosovo, it has serious reservations concerning the way in which NATO has responded to two major challenges: ethnic conflict in the Balkans and the deepening of transatlantic institutions (which will be dealt with below). Let us begin with initiatives that the National Committee applauds and whose further development it wishes to encourage.

The Partnership for Peace

The Partnership for Peace has been even more successful than its founders could have hoped in 1993. The National Committee strongly recommends that the PfP be enhanced further; it is rapidly becoming a "virtual" NATO, preparing the way for full membership of former members of the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic States, and the neutrals. But care must be taken not to weaken the Alliance as it expands.

The experience of Hungary is a model for those members of the PfP who aspire to full membership. The Hungarians were keenly disappointed in 1992 when an invitation for membership was not extended by NATO. Looking back, the Hungarians now see that an invitation would have been premature. NATO was not ready for it, and neither was Hungary. "We still needed to develop a firm basis for our evolving democratic institutions and economic and financial structures," recently stated the Hungarian ambassador to NATO, "as well as for the reform of our armed forces." Hungary prepared itself for full membership by participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (and its successor, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) to appreciate the political dimension and especially "the depth of the transatlantic link." The Hungarian experience is a model for future members: participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, enhanced status in the PfP, and becoming a member in everything but name before formal admission.²

Enlargement

The process of enlargement cannot be limited to the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. "The enlargement of NATO eastward has been inevitable since the Alliance adopted its new strategic doctrine in 1990. Engaging in a political dialogue with the new democracies led to joint activities organized within the Partnership for Peace. The security of all of Europe now passes through NATO, and the Eastern democracies cannot be excluded. The question is not whether to enlarge but when and how.

Most of the candidates for admission, especially those due south and west of Russia (notably, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and eventually Ukraine), do not now meet the NATO criteria of political and economic stability and military professionalism. Extending NATO's security guarantee to the Baltic States would be premature, providing a hostile reaction from Russia. But calling a halt to enlargement would send the wrong signal. A reasonable step would be to extend an invitation to at least one country to make the point that the door is open while the Alliance takes time out to digest the admission of the three new members. The most likely candidate for immediate entry into NATO is Slovenia, which has made solid progress toward democratization. It would also provide a land connection between Hungary and the rest of NATO.

But enlargement should not be considered a numbers game or an automatic, mechanical process. It is an expression of the need to complete the new architecture of a Euro-Atlantic collective security



system. The nations most qualified, in terms of their political and economic stability and commitment to democratic values, are the neutrals: Finland, Sweden, and Austria, all members of the European Union and, more important, of NATO's Partnership for Peace. Within the framework of the PfP, Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic States, along with NATO members Denmark and Norway, are already engaged in programs of special interest to the Nordic region, including joint military exercises. Similarly, Austria is becoming more active in administering aid in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans and in the diplomacy of the region. That Switzerland has joined the PfP is another sign of underlying changes in European public opinion on security questions.

Nevertheless, the issue of whether there is a natural limit to NATO's size and whether institutional changes are needed to accommodate new members should be faced. A NATO of twenty-eight (the existing nineteen plus nine self-declared candidates for admission) may have to be organized in a different way.

The National Committee believes it was a mistake not to issue an invitation to Slovenia at the Washington summit. There is a danger of losing momentum. Consequently, the National Committee welcomes the new Member Action Plan, which permits aspirant nations to increase their participation in PfP programs and provides for the periodic review of progress in meeting NATO criteria. It is especially important to encourage the involvement of Finland, Sweden, and Austria in joint programs with fellow members of the PfP and NATO; they may well play a key role in the evolution of NATO as a pan-Euro-Atlantic collective security system. If the European Union absorbs the Western European Union (its now autonomous defense arm), the neutrals may even be required to join NATO as a condition of their participation in a European defense organization. Although enlargement is no longer the burning issue it was two years ago, preparing new countries for membership must remain an Alliance goal.

A New Strategic Doctrine

The new strategic doctrine adopted in 1990 has been overtaken by events. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the explosion of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, and the creation of an increasingly active Partnership for Peace, it is time for a clearer formulation of NATO's strategic doctrine.

The new Strategic Concept approved at the Washington Summit is a workmanlike updating of the Washington Treaty, broadening the security guarantee under Article 5 to reflect the new geopolitical functions of NATO. The new Strategic Concept retains the commitment to cooperate in case of an armed attack against the territorial integrity of any member state. Article 6 of the new concept goes on to state: "Based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so." The National Committee hopes that a preamble or declaration of principles will be adopted in the future that will enable the people of the Euro-Atlantic community to review and renew their commitment to the underlying rationale and purposes of the Alliance.

Russia

In adopting a new strategic doctrine in 1990 and the RussiaNATO Founding Act in 1997, the Alliance welcomed the Russian commitment to democracy, including respect for the rule of law, an open society, and a free market. Now that Russia is a democracy, the Western goal should be to make it an integral part of a new security architecture in Europe. But the road to democracy in Russia is rocky. The old demons of ethnic conflict, anti-Semitism, integral nationalism, and the continued influence of Communists may lead to the breakdown of Russian democracy. It would be the height of irresponsibility for Western leaders not to take necessary precautions. The West is



facing a three-pronged challenge: To encourage democratic and progressive forces, Russia should be welcomed into the Western family; yet an uncooperative Russia must be prevented from paralyzing the Alliance; and a hostile Russia must be contained.

NATO should continue its present energetic efforts to engage Russia in consultation, joint study groups and activities, and even military exercises. Russia now contributes to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, accepting American rather than NATO command, which can provide the foundation for providing assistance to Bosnia as well as logistical support for the Russian contingent. Russia is being involved (or is being invited to be involved) in a range of NATO and PfP programs that serve common European interests: dealing with ecological problems inherited from former Communist regimes; retraining officers and soldiers; converting arms industries and military terrains to civilian uses; and combating organized crime and terror. When the Russians take part in concrete programs, they are less polemical and more pragmatic. Increasing participation by Russia in PfP activities until interrupted by the Kosovo crisis was helping to bring about reconciliation between Russia and the rest of Europe.

Russia's decision to boycott NATO as a protest against intervention in Kosovo is regrettable. Under the terms of the agreement on Russian participation in the Kosovo international force, liaison will be reestablished between the Russian military and NATO. A testing time is ahead. The National Committee supports NATO's policy of urging Russia to remain a valued partner in the effort to bring peace to the Balkans.

Out of Area

An effective defense of democracy in Europe requires NATO to deal with threats to stability from the areas that border the Alliance. Among the immediate neighbors of NATO are Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Croatia, Romania, and Lithuania. In order to forestall threats to the NATO countries of Europe, NATO is compelled to adopt a forward strategy, that is, to engage neighboring countries in dialogue and joint activities and to be prepared to project power out of area if necessary. In February 1995 NATO began a "dialogue" with five Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia). Jordan became involved subsequently. Within the framework of the PfP, NATO together with "partner" and "dialogue" countries is exploring possibilities for cooperation in dealing with terrorism, organized crime, and the drug trade, which are threats to the stability of democratic institutions everywhere.

NATO intervened in Bosnia at the request of the UN Security Council, which in turn had acted at the urging of the European Union. In considering future operations out of area, it will be desirable for NATO to secure UN support for diplomatic initiatives. Russia, with some support from France, insists that NATO's military operations must always be authorized beforehand by the UN Security Council, which would give Russia a veto. The United States has been adamant that Russia cannot paralyze NATO through the Permanent Joint Council established under the NATO-Russia Founding Act and that Russia cannot be permitted a veto through the UN back door.

A prudent approach for NATO to take in considering future operations out of area would be to secure wide political support through any or all appropriate international organizations: the UN Security Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Contact Group for the Balkans in addition to NATO's North Atlantic Council and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Every operation should be handled on a case-by-case basis; a balance must be struck between securing a large political consensus and preventing paralysis.



The National Committee also urges that full use be made of NATO's structures in engaging in dialogue with countries of the Middle East and in fostering cooperation in dealing with international terrorism.

U.S.-European Relations Within NATO

The most important issue confronting NATO is whether (and how) to redefine relations between the United States and Europe within and outside of NATO. Americans want Europe to shoulder a larger part of the financial burden and to assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Many Europeans want Europe to be the acknowledged Alliance leader in all matters directly concerning the Continent. The most sweeping demand for the reform of structures has been put forward by the French, who argue for an equal partnership between the United States and Europe within NATO.

The National Committee believes that NATO should keep in mind several basic principles before it engages in any attempt to reform its structures:

- a. The United States, as the only superpower in the Alliance, tends to take the initiative; in fact, it has been criticized for not doing so in certain crises.
- b. It is hardly necessary for Europe as a whole to be accorded a veto over American proposals for a simple reason: Every member of the Alliance has a veto. The Alliance operates on the basis of consensus. In practice, members who have reservations about particular decisions generally permit the others to proceed. NATO has become a coalition of the willing and able. This flexibility is an asset and has permitted the Partnership for Peace to flourish.
- c. Europeans already constitute about two-thirds of the personnel at SHAPE, and by tradition the secretary general is a European. The United States is the leading power in NATO because of its capacity to act and the inability of Europeans to formulate a common foreign policy, not because it dominates command structures.

In order to meet the demand of Europeans for greater responsibility, much time and effort have been expended in creating a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. A European chain of command enables Europeans to use NATO's assets in carrying out their own policies in cases in which Americans agree to step aside. The ingenious arrangement has never been used. It is comforting for Europeans to know that the ESDI is in place; but making use of it would require greater unity of political purpose than is likely to emerge in the near future.

It would be inadvisable to base decision making in NATO on an equal partnership between the United States on one side and all European members on the other side. First, the conflict of interests among the Europeans would take too long to work out in emergency situations. A meaningful Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe will be difficult if not impossible to formulate through intergovernmental cooperation. Second, if there were a common European position and it conflicted with the American position, the result could be deadlock and the eventual abandonment of NATO as an instrument of policy.

One key to NATO's success has been flexibility in decision making. The National Committee recommends the continued development of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a way of adjusting American and European responsibilities in changing circumstances. The CJTF structure allows members to increase or decrease their share of the military burden as called for in individual cases. Drawing lessons from NATO operations in Bosnia, the intervention force in Kosovo is to be controlled by the staff of the Rapid Reaction Force based in Germany and under the command of a British general who reports to the American supreme commander. The French, who do not participate in the integrated military structure, will establish a liaison mission at the staff of the



Rapid Reaction Force, which is a sensible and pragmatic way of securing the participation of French forces without calling into question basic procedures.

The decision to strengthen cooperation on defense matters by the United Kingdom and France at the December 1998 meeting between Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac in St. Malo is a welcome development. Europeans should assume greater responsibility for the common defense, particularly for modernizing their armed forces, making them more mobile by improving logistical and lift capabilities and coordinating efforts more effectively. The integration of the Western European Union into the structure of the European Union may facilitate that task.

Through the CJTF structure, Europeans can assume as much responsibility for individual operations as they wish under European command (as in Kosovo) by making use of NATO assets under the supervision of the supreme commander. This is an excellent solution to the problem and may also pave the way for French reintegration into common military structures without destroying NATO's ability to act.

RETHINKING NATO

Members of the National Committee's Study Group have come away from their discussions with NATO officials with appreciation for the difficulties they confront in adapting the Alliance to changing circumstances. There are two major issues, however, that we believe require more thought and new initiatives: NATO's role in the Balkans and the deepening of transatlantic institutions.

Role in the Balkans

We have an interesting time ahead of us in studying the lessons of the Kosovo crisis, said Secretary of State Madeleine Albright after the UN Security Council approved the June 10 resolution. It is not our intention to second-guess or criticize those who had to make tough decisions under pressure. Instead, we wish to contribute to the ongoing reassessment of the diplomacy of the Kosovo crisis and rethinking NATO in light of the most important operation of its fifty-year history.

NATO's new strategic doctrine (formally approved by the heads of government at the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November 1992) contains the following provision concerning ethnic conflicts and the security interests of the Alliance (*italics added*): "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, *including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes*, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises *inimical to European stability* and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the *security of the Alliance*."

Serbia's massive repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo did involve outside powers, threatened European stability, spilled over into NATO countries, and affected the security of the Alliance; hence it clearly called for diplomatic action. As a member of the Contact Group on Yugoslavia (along with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia), the United States participated in the Rambouillet Conference chaired by Robin Cook (United Kingdom) and Hubert Védrine (France). When the Serbs refused to sign the accord proposed by the Contact Group, NATO decided, despite the opposition of the Russians, to use force. In the specific circumstances of the Kosovo



crisis, we conclude that Serbia's defiance of the international community constituted a threat to European stability and to the security of the Alliance as defined in NATO's strategic doctrine.

What lessons can be learned from studying the diplomacy pursued at Rambouillet and the means used by NATO to implement that diplomacy? In retrospect, it is apparent that Western diplomacy and NATO's tactics were based on setting up a false equation between Bosnia and Kosovo. Bosnia was not a part of Serbia, whereas Kosovo was a province of Serbia. BosniaHerzegovina had received international recognition as a sovereign state, whereas the West accepted Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo in principle. Formidable Bosnian Muslim and Croatian armed forces were on the ground in Bosnia, whereas the Kosovo Liberation Army was no match for the Serbian Army and police and was not supported by the West. The allies underestimated the attachment of the Serbs to Kosovo and its importance in Serb historical memory. Western diplomats and NATO military leaders did not anticipate the ferocity of the Serbian repression of ethnic Albanians, which created a massive refugee problem; nor did they expect the Serbs to hold out so long against air attacks.

Here are some issues and suggestions for further reflection.

- a. **Rambouillet.** The model of the Dayton Conference did not work at Rambouillet. There was little actual negotiation; the two sides remained apart physically while American, European Union, and Russian negotiators shuttled back and forth. There was no give and take and no exploration of alternatives. The Yugoslav side was presented with a virtual ultimatum at the end. Perhaps Serb intransigence could never have been overcome, but greater flexibility and patience would have made a more favorable impression on world opinion.
- b. **The United Nations.** In Bosnia the United Nations became involved at the request of the European Union, assumed responsibility for peacekeeping, and eventually asked for support by NATO. In Kosovo the Western powers, especially the United States, wanted to keep the UN out of the negotiating process in order to avoid the hesitations and confusion that had bedeviled operations in Bosnia. The lack of a UN mandate in Kosovo, however, turned out to be a liability. Inasmuch as Russia was a member of the Contact Group and supported the accord proposed at Rambouillet, it would have been possible to seek legitimation for that diplomatic initiative at the UN. Four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are members of the Contact Group and could have pushed for approval; it is unlikely that China would have stood in the way. Better use could have been made of the UN in gaining support for Western diplomatic efforts.
- c. **NATO Tactics.** NATO expected a fairly quick Yugoslav capitulation based on the precedent in Bosnia. But in Bosnia an air war worked because it was carried out in conjunction with ground forces (the Croatian and Bosnian armies). In Kosovo the Western nations with the exception of the United Kingdom did not want to send in their own troops and did not want to support the only other force on the ground, the Kosovo Liberation Army. By announcing at the outset of the air war that there would be no ground campaign, NATO strengthened the Serb resolve to resist. In carrying out the air war, NATO was hamstrung by the need to receive political clearance for tactical decisions extending down to specific daily targets. Political objectives should certainly be set only by political leaders; but the military should then be given authority to conduct operations with some degree of autonomy.
- d. **The Role of Russia.** The Western powers bent over backward to give Russia a role as mediator, hoping to apply pressure on the Serbs. The unilateral seizure of the Pristina airport by a small detachment of Russian troops, however, raised serious questions about the reliability of Russia as a partner. If Russia adopts a policy of unremitting hostility to NATO, then a reassessment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act will be unavoidable. Cooperative behavior by the Russians should be reciprocated by the West; hostile behavior should carry a price.



Deepening Transatlantic Institutions

The most serious problem concerning U.S.-European relations lies outside of NATO. It is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic that in principle a military alliance can endure only if it is part of a community of interests. NATO will not survive unless it is complemented by strong transatlantic institutions. Warning flags are flying: There are bitter disputes over bananas (grown neither by Americans nor Europeans), the dumping of steel, a ban on beef with hormones and genetically modified plants, and subsidies for Airbus. Europeans are discussing the creation of a European defense industry to rival that of the United States. Economic warfare reveals powerful impulses toward protectionism, corporatism, chauvinism, and even xenophobia on both sides of the Atlantic. If unchecked, antagonistic currents will cause a rift within the Western world. Americans and Europeans cannot go on indefinitely as close military allies and sworn economic enemies. The Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, the new Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, and the draft plan for a Transatlantic Economic Partnership are all steps in the right direction, but so far the results have been disappointing.

The creation of new transatlantic institutions calls for an immense political effort comparable to that required to reinvent NATO in the 1990s.³ The transatlantic community is sufficiently coherent to sustain NATO and to maintain the American commitment to the defense of Europe for the time being. Some strengthening of transatlantic links is taking place without political guidance through increasing investments by each side in the economy on the other side, business mergers, and cultural exchanges. We are muddling through. But the deepening of transatlantic institutions ultimately will be needed if NATO is to go forward, if the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe are to be integrated into the European and global economies, and if the United States and Europe together are to remain in the forefront of economic, scientific, and cultural development. Only a president of the United States is capable of placing this issue on the agenda, applying pressure at the level of heads of government, and making it a top priority.

For half a century NATO has been a vital element of American security and well-being. Europe (including the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the former republics of the Soviet Union) has two to three times the population of the United States. The domination of all Europe by one hostile power like Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia of the past would be a mortal threat to American interests. If Europe were to fall prey to totalitarian regimes again or to sink into internecine warfare, the United States inevitably would be endangered. To make all of Europe a zone of prosperity and democratic stability is perhaps the most important single goal of American foreign policy today. NATO has enabled Americans and Europeans to cooperate in preventing aggression and in creating appropriate conditions for economic advance and social progress. Adapting the Alliance to continually changing circumstances will continue to be a major challenge for the countries of North America and all of Europe.

Notes

1. This fascinating diplomatic episode, hardly known to the public at large, is described in Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), pp. 128, 181-183, 277; Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, 1993), pp. 163, 186, 220; and James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York, 1995), p. 235.
2. See Andras Simonyi, "Getting on Board the Moving Train of NATO," *NATO Review* (autumn 1998): 20-23.
3. See Anthony Lawrence Gardner, *A New Era in US.-EU Relations: The Clinton Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda* (Brookfield, 1997), especially pp. 113-



146. Also, David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (New York, 1997), Christoph Bertram, *Europe in the Balance* (Washington, D.C., 1995), pp. 94-100; and Philip R. Gordon, ed., *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, Md., 1997), pp. 12-137.

