



The Cyprus Conundrum

Viola Drath

The collapse of the latest rounds of the exhaustive reunification talks on Cyprus without preconditions in early March 2003 stunned many in the international community, but for insiders the outcome of the torturous diplomatic contretemps did not come as a surprise. If one focused solely on the divisive “core” issues, chances for acceptance of the 192-page plan for the “Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” presented to the leadership of the Greek and Turkish communities of the divided island by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in December 1999, were remote at best.

Annan’s desperate effort to force a reunification agreement by a “yes” or “no” reply backfired. As he urged the leaders of the two communities to approve separate, simultaneous referenda to jump-start his bogged-down negotiation process, tied to the date of the Cyprus accession to the European Union, the proposal came to possess all the earmarks of an ultimatum. Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos of the Republic of Cyprus conditioned his acceptance by informing the secretary general that time was needed for a proper public campaign on the referendum. “The people have to know what they are being asked to vote on,” he stated. At the same time, he underlined the question of security as an indispensable prerequisite and reminded Annan of the importance of Greece’s and Turkey’s agreeing and committing to the vital security provisions of the settlement plan.

Rauf Denktash, the embattled leader of the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, was less circumspect when he raised his “fundamental objections to the plan” and asserted that further negotiations had to

begin with a new starting point and an agreement on “basic principles.” Furthermore, he advised Annan that the government of Turkey was not ready to sign the requested security guarantees because such an act would necessitate an authorization by parliament.¹

The United Cyprus Republic

There was no agreement on the vital core issues. In an unspoken accord, however, the name of the new unified state was virtually chosen. Responding to hard-line Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash’s refusal to tolerate the continuance of the Republic of Cyprus, a government that had not represented the whole population since the “forceful destruction of the partnership by the Greek Cypriots in 1963,” the leaders discussed the terminology and focused on a compromise. The name of the new partnership state, composed of two partner or constituent states, would be the United Cyprus Republic.²

In his report Annan disclosed that the budget for his effort amounted to \$3,148,500. The draft laws ran to approximately 6,000 pages, and, in an open competition, a total of 1,506 flag designs and 111 suggested anthems had been submitted. The secretary general was “disappointed.” Given the intractability and the variable geometry of the issues, he wrote, it is not far-fetched to describe the Cyprus problem as a “diplomatic Rubik’s Cube.” He ordered a detailed report to be prepared by his Cyprus negotiator, Alvara de Soto, and submitted to the Security Council. He also ordered the closing of his Cyprus offices. Nonetheless, he informed the people of Cyprus that his plan would remain on

the table and should a “realistic prospect” of finalizing negotiations with the full backing of their motherlands present itself, he would be ready to assist.

Three weeks after a stalemate developed in the UN-sponsored talks in the Hague, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash³—blamed by the secretary general, the EU, and Greek Cypriots for the breakdown—made his move. Under pressure from Ankara, which is vying for EU membership, he proposed the opening of a dialogue outside the United Nations. In a letter to President Tassos Papadopoulos, Denktash offered a six-point confidence-building plan.⁴ Pointing to the socio-psychological dimension of the “deep crisis of confidence” between the two communities, he asked that they form a working relationship to prepare the ground for a comprehensive settlement and, in essence, for the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot regime.

In return for territorial concessions, he requested the facilitation of freedom of movement and association between the two communities and the normalization of the flow of goods, overseas trade, and travel now impeded by economically damaging restrictions involving rules on the origin of products that the EU and the Republic of Cyprus have imposed on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Denktash also asked for the elimination of barriers on cultural and sporting activities. His offer of a separate dialogue was turned down by the UN, the EU, and Papadopoulos, who dismissed the “psychological dimension” as a “problem” and urged the Turkish Cypriot leader to “accept the Plan of the Secretary General as a basis for a further negotiation process.”

Free Movement

Determined to convince the international community of his willingness to cooperate, Denktash took the initiative. In a surprise move, he opened the dividing “Green Line” for daytime cross-border visits. It was the first time in nearly

30 years that free movement across the dividing line was allowed. Even before Turkish troops, in the wake of a failed Greek Cypriot coup backed by Greece, occupied northern Cyprus in 1974, UN peacekeeping forces guarded the 120-mile barbed-wired line to prevent violence. As expected, floods of Greek Cypriots made pilgrimages to the north to see relatives and friends and inspect their property while Turkish Cypriots visited the south.

It was a positive gesture, signaling that the Turkish Cypriot leadership intended to demonstrate that the issue of reunification had not collapsed with the UN’s proposed settlement plan. Denktash’s conciliatory act was lauded by the Greek Cypriot daily *Alithia* as a “basis on which the reunification of the island will be built by the people.”⁵

On the surface, there was nothing objectionable about the UN’s Comprehensive Settlement Plan concept. It called for an affirmation that Cyprus was the common home of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, both cofounders of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, and a statement affirming that the “tragic events of the past shall never be repeated.” The threat of force or of domination was to be renounced, and the distinct identity of each side—meaning a relationship of political equality, not one of majority and minority—was to be enshrined in a new partnership. This partnership was to commit itself to respect democratic principles, individual human rights, and fundamental freedoms as well as to respect each other’s cultural, religious, political, social, and linguistic identities. Previous treaties—above all, the security Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, assigning Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom roles as guarantor states—were to remain in force. Furthermore, the status and structure of the state of Cyprus were to be modeled on Switzerland, its federal government, and its cantons. As an independent state possessing a single international legal personality and sovereignty in the form of an “indissoluble” partnership, Cyprus, it was proposed, would have a “common state” government exercising the powers specified in the constitution, which would ensure that Cyprus could

speak with one voice internationally and in the EU, with two equal “constituent” or “component states,” one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot voice. Both would sovereignly take up all powers not vested in the federal government and organize themselves freely under their own constitutions. Taking a lesson from the past, the plan expressly prohibited partition or secession. This concept was close to Denktash’s resolution favoring a “good partnership” but never the surrender of “our sovereignty and state.”

The Gordian Knot

In order to understand such reasoning, it is advisable to look to the past. Annan referred to a “Gordian knot” of conceptual issues⁶: “Born of bitter experiences and recurring nightmares,” they are psychological and practical in nature and relate to the “legal and political interpretations of the past” that divide the parties. Having slowly but systematically been deprived of the political equality promised them during the short existence of the partnership in the Republic of Cyprus, the “component states” have sought assurances that they will be granted “equal status,” which has emerged as the most important component of any agreement on the future of the new state of affairs.

Problems with the Foundation Agreement surfaced in discussions of the vital details. Suspicious Turkish Cypriots welcome neither a revival or survival of the old Republic nor the political implications arising from the context of the dissolution of the partnership state, which the Greek Cypriots associate with the Turkish military invasion of 1974 and the Turkish minority associate with President-Archbishop Makarios’s aborted pursuit of the union (*enosis*) with Greece in 1963 and its bloody aftermath. Other disagreements involve complex core issues concerning territorial claims, refugees and resettlement, property rights and just compensation, and governance, as well as demilitarization and security.

Given that the majority of Greek Cypriots favor some kind of a settlement and the determination of many Turkish Cypriots to break out of their political isolation by rallying around the EU option that would be in their grasp should a settlement be signed before the Republic of Cyprus becomes a member of the EU in May 2004, it is predictable that the world will witness yet another set of reunification talks.

Between the Great Powers

Failed diplomatic efforts to end the division of Cyprus—created by the dramatic events of 1974, when an attempted coup by the “Greek Colonels” was countered by the massive invasion of 40,000 Turkish troops occupying Northern Cyprus, amounting to 37 percent of the country—can be traced over the last three decades. Supported by the continued engagement of U.S. administrations and the United Nations, the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem has not come to an end with the often-revised, unwieldy Annan plan or Denktash’s freedom of movement initiative, which presents the best hope to establish the trust and confidence that were missing in previous deliberations. Located just 40 miles from the coast of Turkey, at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and Asia, linking north and south, the island is of strategic importance to the United States in the context of implementing policy initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, including military action in Iraq. Although its “peace-loving” cabinet turned down the U.S. request for the use of airports on the east side of the island, Cyprus has granted access to its airspace as well as humanitarian aid.

The strategic position of the island of Aphrodite in the Levant has sealed its fate. On his way to Jerusalem, Richard the Lionheart made a quick conquest. Throughout the centuries, Cyprus, a state smaller than Connecticut, was a colony serving various masters. There still are two British bases on the island that once

served the empire by safeguarding its control over the Suez Canal as well as Jordan and Iraq. More recently, Cyprus has become the focus and a political punching bag in the bitter power struggles between Turkey and Greece over control of the Aegean. Exacerbated by the bipolarity of the cold war that led to the formation of two conflicting power blocs, hostilities between these powerful military motherlands created a negative climate that is still reflected in the attitudes and actions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Many historians have come to the conclusion that the island's troubles were brought on by meddling outsiders, not by its ethnically divided inhabitants who, notwithstanding their unequal numbers, have been living side by side for many centuries.

Wanted: Political Equality, 1963–1974

The question of reunifying Greek Cypriots with Turkish Cypriots, a minority of more than 20 percent of a population of 800,000 occupying more than one-third of the country, has always centered on true political equality and its safeguards. Distrustful Turkish Cypriots have not forgotten the unsuccessful experiment of power sharing in the turbulent past of the Republic of Cyprus, which gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. Well remembered by them is the bloody experience of December 1963, when President-Archbishop Makarios, an uncompromising partisan of *enosis*, supported by the Greek Cypriot militia, tried to force the union of the island with Greece and, by subtle, unilateral changes of basic articles of the constitution, sought to abrogate the rights, including minority veto power, granted Turkish Cypriots in the 1960 treaties.⁷

The crisis started when Turkish Cypriot members of parliament, protesting discriminatory tactics against their vested interests, declined to vote for a tax law. Makarios used their stand-off as a reason to declare the constitution unworkable. Assessments of this power play by Greek

Cypriots differ. They accuse the Turkish Cypriot leadership not only of strengthening their separate municipalities but also of deliberately withdrawing their representatives from parliament and government offices in preparation for a divisive showdown in pursuit of Turkey's policy of partitioning Cyprus.

This skirmish was followed by a succession of violent bicomunal conflicts, culminating in the confrontation of Greek and Turkish forces in 1974. The military coup d'état of the right-wing Greek Colonels to annex the island with the help of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the ruthless National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B) was dramatized by the ouster of the "red" Archbishop Makarios, suspected of being in league with the Soviet Union, and the subsequent installation of one of EOKA's radical rightist leaders named Nikos Sampson as president. But the Greek junta, secretly encouraged by Washington, which was fearful that Makarios would turn into a Mediterranean Castro, had miscalculated. Under the pretext of guarding against a Greek threat, Turkey deployed its troops and occupied Northern Cyprus. Ankara took the position that, as one of the guarantor powers, it had the right to military intervention to protect the Turkish minority and to fulfill its obligations.

The uneasy period between 1963 and 1974 was marked by the introduction of UN forces in March 1964 to help maintain order, stop the bloodshed, and establish the Green Line as a buffer zone. Cypriots endured the arrival of 10,000 Greek troops and their enforced removal by Ankara; the devastation of churches, mosques, and villages; blockades of Turkish enclaves; hostage taking and ethnic cleansing; the ramifications of not being able to find out what had happened to thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriot men who were missing; and, finally, the flight of approximately 160,000 Greek Cypriots to the south of the island and of about 40,000 Turkish Cypriots to the north. This meant that half of the displaced persons were Turkish Cypriots, and one-third were Greek Cypriots.

The civil strife ended in an unprecedented domestic upheaval, the separation of the two people along ethnic lines, a redrawn map, the dismemberment of the independent Republic of Cyprus as a bicomunal partnership state, and the emergence of a new political entity—the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—in 1983, after the proclamation by the Turkish Cypriot community in 1975 of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Seen in the regional context, the two peoples of Cyprus had become pawns in the Aegean power politics of Greece and Turkey, which severely taxed the already strained relations between these two NATO members.

No Help from the Guarantor States

As conditions deteriorated, help was asked of UN Secretary General U Thant in March 1968. He recommended inter-communal talks aimed at a unitary state with communal authority for Turkish Cypriots. The negotiators were Glafcos Clerides, then president of the Greek Cypriot-controlled House of Representatives, and the president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, Rauf Denktash. Calls for intervention by the guarantor states went nowhere. Interested in the stability of the southeastern flank of NATO and concerned about the encroachment by the Soviet Union, Great Britain opted for good relations with Turkey and stood aside. Moreover, because it was aware of Makarios's close contacts with Moscow, London exhibited little confidence in the archbishop's willingness to compromise. Washington recognized an explosive multinational dispute and recommended intercommunal talks to keep the peace. It was an approach that contrasted sharply with the Acheson Plan⁸ of 1964, advocating the island's partition and allowing the Greek-speaking part to be united with Greece. For balance, a Turkish military base—linking scattered, autonomous Turkish enclave-cantons in the Greek area, including those in the

capital of Nicosia—was to be established as a political canton in the north. Drafted by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, acting as President Lyndon Johnson's Cyprus adviser, the plan was swiftly rejected by Makarios, who held out for independence as a precursor to the whole island's *enosis* with Greece.

Expectations that the United Kingdom, one of the guarantor powers for Cyprus, or the United States would intervene and stop the Greek junta or the Turkish military assault in 1974 proved to be in error. It is no secret in Nicosia today that Greek Cypriots have never forgiven Henry Kissinger,⁹ at that time secretary of state, for his ambiguous “no action” stand or his Delphic diplomatic considerations. Stating that he thought it “most unlikely” that Turkey would tolerate the union of Cyprus with Greece, he went on to explain that it was “obvious” to him that Turkey was driving toward a “showdown.” At the same time, Kissinger argued that the United States could not, without cost, resist the Turkish invasion because that would be considered as objectively supporting the Greek junta. In Nicosia, many questioned this example of cool-headed realpolitik because it reminded Cypriots of the old divide-and-rule policy perfected by the British Empire in bygone centuries.

Two Views of the Dysfunction of the Republic's Partnership

Greek and Turkish Cypriots have decidedly differing interpretations of the timing of the island's de facto partition. Turkish Cypriots maintain that a functional unification of Cyprus only lasted from 1960 to 1963, when President Makarios's relentless pursuit of *enosis*, with its religious overtones, and his unwavering intransigence toward Turkish Cypriots ambushed the equal partnership concept on which the union of the two communities was founded. As president of Cyprus and archbishop of the Greek

Autocephalous Eastern Orthodox church, Makarios embodied the union of church and state. For the religious Greek Cypriot leader, *enosis* clearly meant a spiritual homecoming. To be sure, *enosis* was a process from which Turkish Muslims were automatically excluded. In anticipation of achieving this goal, the archbishop proceeded to formulate a policy of constitutional amendments and modifications that effectively revoked the equal political partnership negotiated during the settlement of the 1960 Foundation Agreement and Treaty of Guarantee.

“Setting the record straight,” the permanent representative of Cyprus to the United Nations stated that “far from it being President Makarios or his government who asserted that the Constitution was invalid and ‘dead and buried,’” it was Turkish Vice President Fazil Kucuk who on December 30, 1963, declared “the Cyprus Constitution is dead. There is no possibility of the Turkish Community living together with the Greek Community.”¹⁰

Based on their assessment of the tempestuous events, Greek Cypriots believed the turning point that culminated in the partition was by no means the quest for *enosis* under the patronage of President Makarios and its considerable collateral damage in 1963 but the brutal Turkish invasion of 1974.

The violent years of civil strife, 1963–1974, marked by human rights infractions on both sides, were followed by a period of tranquility and economic prosperity in the Republic of Cyprus, culminating in its application for membership in the European Community in 1990, which was supported at an EU summit in Corfu in 1994. The tranquility was temporarily marred by tension over a threatening massive Turkish military buildup. To check Turkish air superiority, Greek Cypriot President Clerides ordered 48 S-300 surface-to-air-missiles from Russia. The controversial decision, backed by Greece, caused Ankara to threaten military retaliation and forced Clerides to deploy a costly Russian anti-aircraft missile system, estimated at \$227 million, on the Greek island of Crete.¹¹

Neglecting Confidence-Building Measures

When seen in this historical context, one can point out fairly that crucial confidence- and security-building measures were never deployed to establish a climate of mutual trust between the two communities. The result is a profound lack of confidence on the part of each party in the other party’s goodwill and intentions. Proposals to rebuild an intercommunal relationship, severed three decades ago, were carelessly cast aside. There were no government-sponsored outreach initiatives to promote a better understanding between the island’s ethnically divided inhabitants. Although some moves in that direction were made and adopted by the UN Security Council in July 1994 (S 1994/785), there was little interest in youth exchanges or other means to foster cooperative efforts.

“Today, there exists no shared institution,” commented Ergun Olgun,¹² undersecretary of the “presidency” of the ostracized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Pointing to 30 years of on-and-off negotiations conducted by the same adversarial negotiators, Olgun expresses profound regrets about the “crisis of confidence” between the two parties. He maintains that the lack of dialogue has obstructed a “common vision that could act as a blueprint for the new partnership state,” even though the two sides have overarching common security and economic interests that could be instrumental in forging a new relationship. In view of the extended reunification talks, he challenges the continued imposition of the economically, politically, and socially crippling “embargo” on the TRNC as a hostile act. Export restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community are based on the contention that such goods are produced on “stolen” land and must be authorized by the Republic of Cyprus for export by a certificate of origin. The enactment of this process dates to 1977, when an agreement between the European Community and the Repub-

lic of Cyprus introduced preferential treatment for Cyprus products to be certified by the “customs authorities of the exporting State.” A UN Security Council resolution of 1983 made clear that it would not recognize the newly proclaimed TRNC, established as an independent state in November of that year. Pronouncing the attempt to set up such a state as “incompatible” with the 1960 treaty on the joint establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the Treaty of Guarantee, the Security Council ruled the TRNC to be “legally invalid.” In Resolution 550/1984, it condemned any secessionist activities and advised all states not to recognize the purported state of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and to refrain from direct illegal commerce because such an act would equal “recognition” of the break-away territory.

This divide was amply reflected in the attitude of the participants in the reunification talks. Without preparing ground for the resolution of the contentious “core”¹³ issues with the simultaneous introduction of small steps aimed at achieving a consensus on soft humanitarian issues of mutual interest, there was no fallback position when the talks began to stall. What was needed to keep the process going and to complement and advance the ongoing core negotiations was a dual-track approach. This perchance more promising kind of an integrated procedure was bypassed by hurried UN negotiators. The concept of “constructive parallelism”—meaning a two-track process within a framework that renders core issues and humanitarian issues codependent—was introduced by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)¹⁴ in January 2000 and presented to then President Glafcos Clerides and UN negotiator Alvara de Soto.

Cyprus and Turkey and the European Union

By now it has become an open question whether granting EU membership to the Repub-

lic of Cyprus, excluding Turkish Cypriots, prior to an overall settlement of the Cyprus issue has helped or hindered attempts to resolve differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus has become a political pawn in Turkey’s campaign to get a foothold in the EU. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots were quick to point out that the accession of Cyprus to the EU is illegal.¹⁵ Their claim is based on international treaties of 1960 that prohibit the membership of Cyprus in international organizations in which Turkey and Greece are not both members. Notwithstanding President Clerides’s declaration after the European Council’s summit meeting in Copenhagen in December 2002 that the Republic of Cyprus is now even more focused on using EU membership as a catalyst for reunification, it is argued (and not only in Turkish quarters) that the EU’s formal invitation to the Republic of Cyprus to join the 15-nation regional organization regardless of the outcome of the UN’s settlement talks did not improve the flexibility of the negotiators.

The collapse of the negotiations is widely interpreted as a major setback to Turkey’s aspirations for EU membership. This assessment was confirmed by the spokesman for the European Commission in Brussels, Jean-Christophe Filori,¹⁶ who indicated that it would, indeed, be “difficult” to imagine starting negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU without an agreement to reunite the Mediterranean island by May 2004, when the EU completes its enlargement process and takes in a dozen new members. The EU’s conclusion appears to be echoed by officials of the State Department, who just witnessed the defeat of their effort to help Turkey onto the EU track by an assertive Quai d’Orsay. It also has been noticed that in order to orchestrate an urgently needed diplomatic success for the overextended United Nations, the secretary general used the impending EU membership of Cyprus to pressure both sides to sign off on his apparently moribund settlement plan.

Contrary to prognostications, the political equation was not changed by the election of the self-assured Greek Cypriot President Tassos

Papadopoulos, Democratic opposition leader and veteran of the EOKA, which fought for independence from Great Britain in the 1950s and *enosis* in the 1960s. Occupied with its parliament's revolt against supporting a U.S.-led war against Iraq, Ankara's new leadership had different priorities and showed scant inclination to apply pressure on the reluctant Turkish Cypriot leader. As yet another deadline to end the division of Cyprus came and resulted in yet another deadlock, it became apparent that both sides harbored strong reservations not only about each other but also about the secretary general's high-handed attempt to short-circuit the negotiation process by calling for untimely referenda.

History Through Different Lenses

Notwithstanding growing multipolarity in the age of globalization, Cyprus remains divided. We have managed to reunite Germany. Why is it so difficult to reunify Cyprus? The question shows the frustration that exists among diplomats over the smoldering Cyprus issue. A closer look reveals that such comparisons are specious. Greek Cypriotes and Turkish Cypriots, a minority of about 160,000 people, share no language, no religion, and no culture. They fail to agree on ancient and recent history. Settled by Mycenaean and Achaean Greeks between the 13th and 11th centuries B.C., the island reflects their language and culture. Yet, according to the historic scenario of the Turkish Cypriots, the first settlers, dating to the Stone Age between 7000 and 3900 B.C., arrived from Anatolia and Syria. The parties almost agree on the end of the Hellenistic period, when Cyprus became part of the Roman Empire, and although Turkish Cypriots emphasize the inclusion of the Byzantine Empire, 330–1191, with reference to the foundation of Islam, Greek Cypriots dwell on Richard the Lionheart's conquest of Cyprus in 1191 and his handover of the island to his French vassal and counterpart, Guy de

Lusignans. Passed on to the Republic of Venice in 1489, Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans in 1571. In 1878, they leased Cyprus to Great Britain, which, by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1925, made it a crown colony and granted it independence in 1960, whereupon Cyprus joined the United Nations and the nonaligned movement. Disagreements over the breakdown of the partnership state of the Republic of Cyprus, 1963 in the Turkish Cypriot chronology versus 1974 according to Greek Cypriot history, remain unresolved.

Unresolved Core Issues

Also unresolved are a number of core issues. Starting with governance and endless disputes over a "federation" versus a "confederation," no agreement was reached on the question of whether a rotating copresidency, implemented by a Presidential Council consisting of six members, two of them Turkish Cypriots, would provide a fairer political balance than an elected president-vice president model. There was no consensus on property rights.¹⁷ Almost half of the population lost property as a result of intercommunal strife or military action between 1963 and 1974. Greek Cypriots advocated a solution based on full respect for property rights so that displaced persons from either community would have the right to have their property reinstated. Turkish Cypriots argued that property claims should be settled through liquidation by means of a global exchange and compensation scheme. Stating that those properties were redistributed to Turkish-speaking refugees and emigrants from Turkey long ago, Denktash called the UN plan "not acceptable to us because it envisages the removal of about 100,000 Turkish Cypriots" from their homes.

Three different maps were devised to settle the difficult territorial question. With 37 percent of the territory and 57 percent of the valuable coastline in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot minority, hard choices had to be made to find a

balance. Helped by the United Kingdom, which offered to give up less than half of its Sovereign Base Area, a proposal was made to allot 29 percent of the land and 45 percent of the coastline to the Turkish Cypriot state. Agreement was reached on security issues. Resolving that the old Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force, the parties agreed to permit 6,000 Greek and Turkish troops to be stationed in the prospective “constituent” states. On the economic front, it was decided that because of the glaring economic disparities between the two states, structural funds and a special fund of 200 million euros, provided by the EU, would be turned over to the Turkish Cypriot state along with compensation for Turkish settlers whose willingness to go back to their homeland would alter the demography.¹⁸

Secretary General Annan observed that one of the problems was that both sides perceived the negotiations to be a zero-sum game: One side’s gain was the other side’s loss. Notwithstanding current hesitations by the protagonists, the next act of the complex Cyprus drama, involving numerous powerful players, may surprise skeptics. Reflecting efforts to overcome its painful past, different languages, religions, and views of history, a reunited Cyprus with Christians and Muslims coexisting side by side could well become a model of cultural integration and bicomunalism, serve as an inspiration to a world riven by religious hatreds, and validate the utopian hopes of vulnerable ethnic minorities.

Hard-liners envision a less optimistic scenario. Not lured by economic sugar plums dangled by the EU for the price of compromises to gain reunification, the TRNC may prefer to wait for Turkey’s accession to the EU to reap the same benefits by clinging to the status quo.

About the Author

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Notes

1. Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus (S/2003/398, 56, 57).
2. *Ibid.*, 83–85.
3. *Ibid.*, 130.
4. Exchange of letters between Rauf Denktash and Tassos Papadopoulos, April 2, 2003.
5. Andrew Borowiec, *The Washington Times*, April 25, 2003.
6. Kofi Annan, *op. cit.*, 62–63.
7. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. XVI.
8. For the Acheson Plan, see Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus* (London and New York, 1997).
9. Henry Kissinger, *The Years of Upheaval* (New York, 1999).
10. Ambassador Sotos Zakheos, General Assembly Security Council, Agenda item 64, Question of Cyprus, February 13, 2001 (S/2001/135).
11. “Missile Crisis” (Reuters), *The Washington Post*, December 29, 1998.
12. Address, “Cyprus: Settlement and Membership,” Conference, European Parliament, June 3, 2002.
13. Viola Drath, *The Washington Times*, June 29, 2000.
14. Letters, personal presentations, January 4, 2000.
15. Kofi Annan, *op. cit.*, 30–32.
16. Press Conference, European Commission, March 11, 2003.
17. Kofi Annan, *op. cit.*, 107–124.
18. *Ibid.*, 123, 124.

