



National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Where Leaders Meet

Northeast Asia Projects

CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: BREAKING THE IMPASSE

An Interim Report (with Policy Recommendations) on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations by Donald S. Zagoria - October 2000

A National Committee on American Foreign Policy Project

Contents

- [Dedication and Foreword](#)
- [Introduction](#)
- [The Roots of the PRC-Taiwan Impasse](#)
- [Is There an American National Consensus on the U.S. Role in the China-Taiwan Relationship?](#)
- [The Current Impasse in China-Taiwan Relations: Dangers and Opportunities](#)
- [Economic Relations](#)
- [U.S. Policy Options](#)
- [NCAFP Policy Recommendations](#)
- [Appendix](#)

Dedication

In memory of A. Doak Barnett, a key figure in organizing the NCAFP Project on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations

Foreword

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) is a private, nongovernmental organization dedicated to articulating American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective and within the framework of political realism. The NCAFP publishes and disseminates its policy reports and policy recommendations to a continually growing audience of foreign policymakers, specialists, and practitioners in the United States and abroad.

Because relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are inextricably linked to U.S.-China policy and because the NCAFP perceived that the two sides of the Strait were on a collision course that threatened U.S. interests, we undertook an in-depth study of U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations in 1996. This Interim Report summarizes and presents conclusions derived from the proceedings of eight off-the-record and closed door Roundtables on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-



Strait Relations held at the NCAFP's headquarters in New York City on a biannual basis since 1997. The eight Roundtables, each held for two days, included policy analysts, former government officials, and scholars from the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan. In addition to the Roundtables, since 1996 the NCAFP has sponsored one inclusive and two small group visits to the PRC and Taiwan that were undertaken to develop an understanding of the perspectives of both sides.

The NCAFP expresses its gratitude to the government officials, scholars, and policy analysts who have taken time from their busy work schedules to confer with us. A list of names is included in the appendix.

I also thank NCAFP Chairman William J. Flynn, Executive Vice President William M. Rudolf, and Senior Vice President Donald S. Rice, Esq., for their unstinting support and participation.

Special thanks goes to Professor Donald S. Zagoria, the NCAFP's project director of the Roundtables on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations and the author of this report. Without his knowledge, determination, and camaraderie this project would never have developed into what is generally recognized as the foremost track-two dialogue on Cross-Strait relations undertaken anywhere in the world.

The NCAFP is also very grateful to the Smith-Richardson Foundation and to Mutual of America Life Insurance Company for their generous support.

The views expressed in this report are the views only of the NCAFP.

George D. Schwab, President
National Committee on American Foreign Policy

CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: BREAKING THE IMPASSE

An Interim Report (with Policy Recommendations) on U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations

Donald S. Zagoria

Introduction

The single most important threat to American national security interests that is now clearly visible is the unstable and potentially explosive relationship between China and Taiwan. A military conflict between China and Taiwan, no matter how it started, would inevitably draw in the United States. No American administration could acquiesce in a Chinese effort to take the island by force. If it did, the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the entire U.S. forward military presence in East Asia, and the global credibility of the United States would suffer a fatal blow. But the People's Republic of China (PRC) refuses to eliminate from its vocabulary of possible sanctions the use of force against Taiwan. It considers Taiwan a part of China, and it is concerned about the growth of separatism on the island—even more so now that a former independence-advocate, Chen Shui-bian, has been elected president of Taiwan. Despite Chen's conciliatory posture toward the PRC since becoming president



in May 2000, the PRC regards his stance as tactical and believes that once Chen consolidates his power, he will move more forcefully toward an independent position.

At the time of this writing (August 2000) no official talks are occurring between the PRC and Taiwan. A political impasse exists between the two sides, and there are no signs of compromise. The PRC insists that Taiwanese authorities must accept the principle of "one China," which includes Taiwan as a part of that China, before official talks can be resumed. Taiwan, under President Chen, asserts that although "one China" can be on the agenda for discussion with the PRC, no prior conditions for dialogue should be set.

The absence of mutual trust adds to the problem. Although Beijing's leaders say that they are willing to give Chen time, to listen to his words, and to watch his deeds, they have very little confidence in Chen or in the Democratic Progressive party (DPP). The DPP's history of advocating independence for Taiwan is well known on the mainland. Similarly, Taiwan's new leaders, despite soft and conciliatory language, have not altered their suspicions that the PRC is determined to absorb Taiwan, and they, like the majority of Taiwan's people, have no interest in unification with a Communist-led mainland in the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, as China increases the number of its missiles stationed opposite Taiwan and continues to modernize its air and naval forces and Taiwan continues to obtain advanced weapons from the United States and France and talks about increasing its military budget, an arms race is developing. Taiwan may also seek missile defense systems from the United States, a move that would almost certainly be seen by the PRC as the beginning of a new U.S.-Taiwan alliance designed to separate Taiwan permanently from the mainland.

The more serious risks are probably not in the short run. Both sides are now seeking to gather American and international support for their positions. The PRC is seeking to apply political pressure on Chen by holding dialogues with the opposition parties of Taiwan, several of whom advocate a more conciliatory policy toward the mainland. But if the impasse drags on, Beijing's threat to act if Taiwan rejects its overtures "indefinitely" will put pressure on the PRC leadership to take more militant steps. China's President Jiang Zemin was reportedly criticized by military hard-liners at a recent gathering of top officials in Beidaihe for being too conciliatory to Taiwan. And Chinese nationalism, now substituting for Marxism-Leninism as the force used in seeking loyalty and support for the government, will underwrite the demand for "unification of the motherland." According to analysts in the PRC, the reunification of Taiwan is a matter of leadership legitimacy, regime legitimacy, and national unity. PRC analysts say that because China has lost so much territory since 1840 and endured what it regards as "150 years of national humiliation," no leadership can continue in power without making the "territorial integrity" of China a fundamental issue. Moreover, if Taiwan were allowed to "leave" China, other minority groups such as Tibetans and Muslims in Central Asia would also want to leave.

At the same time there is increasing momentum on Taiwan toward a separate identity. Moreover, the flowering of democracy on Taiwan and its economic success have made the people less inclined to get closer to the authoritarian system on the mainland. Beijing senses this trend and feels a growing sense of urgency.

In sum, relations between China and Taiwan are structurally unstable and potentially explosive. Few international problems pose greater dilemmas for the United States given the history of U.S. involvement over the past fifty years and the divisions within American society over our respective relations with the PRC and Taiwan. If a military conflict between China and Taiwan were to erupt and the United States became involved, as it almost certainly would, all three sides—the United



States, China, and Taiwan—would lose no matter what would be the short-term outcome of the conflict. So would others, including Japan. The long-term result of such a conflict would likely be a new cold war between the United States and China that would repolarize East Asia, force a drastic increase in American defense spending, and destabilize the whole region.

In the national security area, a new American administration should have high on its list of priorities a review of American policy toward China and toward the Cross-Strait issue in particular. It should also seek to work with the other political party and Congress to forge as much consensus as possible on a matter of such importance to the national interest.

This report, the product of a four-year effort sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, has been designed to aid in that process. It attempts to review the roots of the PRC-Taiwan impasse, to identify the components of an American national consensus on PRC-Taiwan relations, to analyze the current impasse between the PRC and Taiwan, and, finally, to offer policy recommendations for consideration by a new administration.

The Roots of the PRC- Taiwan Impasse*

In trying to ascertain what may be possible (and not possible) in an effort to determine what would be a viable long-term relationship between the PRC and Taiwan in the period ahead, it is essential to understand recent history.

Four years after being liberated from Japanese rule, which began in 1895 and ended in 1945, approximately two million Kuomintang (KMT) supporters fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan. After the Chinese Communists militarily defeated the KMT and established their new regime on the mainland in 1949, one of the highest priorities that they set was the recovery of Taiwan where Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT, his army, and many of his supporters had established their headquarters. Beijing's new leaders saw the fulfillment of this goal as essential to ending the civil war and completing the reunification of China. They prepared to invade Taiwan in 1950. After American leaders publicly declared in January 1950 that the United States would not intervene to prevent a Communist takeover of Taiwan, it was generally assumed that Communist forces would take the island within a few months.

Then, in June 1950, the North Korean attack on South Korea caused the United States not only to go to South Korea's defense but also to reverse its policy toward Taiwan. Even before China intervened on the side of North Korea later that year, Washington declared that the American Seventh Fleet would "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, thereby protecting the Nationalists from invasion, and stated that in the U.S. view, the status of Taiwan was still to be decided. The conflict between American and Chinese forces in the Korean War plus U.S. moves to protect Taiwan, along with the Sino-Soviet alliance signed in February 1950, were the fundamental causes of the hostile relationship between the United States and the PRC that continued long after the truce in Korea. In fact, it lasted for almost two decades. In that period the United States signed a military alliance with Taiwan, which it treated as the legitimate government of China, used its navy to patrol the Taiwan Strait, and mobilized diplomatic support for the Republic of China on Taiwan to retain the China seat in the United Nations.

Beijing was dismayed and angered by Washington's support of the Nationalists on Taiwan and twice, in 1954-1955 and in 1958, exerted strong military pressure on the small Nationalist-held offshore islands close to China's coast in the hope of demoralizing the Nationalists and persuading Washington to disengage from Taiwan. Neither campaign achieved Beijing's goals.



Starting in the mid-1950s, China and the United States, still lacking official relations, began ambassadorial-level talks first in Geneva and then in Warsaw, which continued for a decade and a half. Although the talks provided a channel for communication, they did not result in any significant progress toward normalizing U.S. relations with the PRC. The central issues throughout the prolonged process of negotiation focused on Taiwan. A basic Chinese aim was to persuade the United States to disengage from Taiwan, which from Beijing's viewpoint was the prerequisite for normalizing Sino-American relations. A basic U.S. aim was to persuade Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, which Beijing refused to do because it believed an announcement of that sort would undermine its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.

The Taiwan issue entered a second phase in 1972 when the imperatives of the cold war overwhelmed decades of bitter U.S.-Beijing hostility and President Richard Nixon made his historic trip to China. Mutual concern about the Soviet Union brought Washington and Beijing into rapprochement, and rapprochement led step by step to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC in 1979 and to the severance of official ties between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan. In light of those developments, the Taiwan issue had to be redefined in the context of a new bilateral relationship between Washington and Beijing. This was artfully done in the Shanghai Communiqué that Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong issued in February 1972.

In the communiqué the United States "acknowledged" the Chinese position on Taiwan—that there is "one China" and Taiwan is part of it—and agreed not to challenge that position. With that statement Washington and Beijing succeeded in putting the issue of Taiwan's status on the back burner.

Two other Sino-American communiqués together with the Shanghai document make up the three bases on which the transformed U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship rests. The first, issued in December 1978 under the Carter administration, dealt with the normalization of relations and specified that the United States recognized the Beijing regime as the sole legitimate government of China and that the United States agreed to have only unofficial relationships with the people of Taiwan. In the second, agreed to in August 1982, the Reagan administration declared that it had no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity or of interfering in Chinese internal affairs or of pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The 1982 communiqué also specified that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed in qualitative or quantitative terms the level of those supplied since the establishment of diplomatic relations and that they would gradually be reduced, leading to "a final resolution."

Between the 1978 and 1982 communiqués, Congress (in 1979) enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), further defining the new trilateral relationship among the United States, China, and Taiwan. It declared that the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations rested on the expectation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means and that efforts to determine its future by other than peaceful means would constitute a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and would be of "grave concern" to the United States. It also stated that the United States would continue to supply Taiwan with "defensive" weapons.

All three members of the triangular relationship prospered under the framework established by the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act despite occasional squabbles and continuing U.S. arms sales that exceeded the terms of the 1982 communiqué. Taiwan enjoyed rapid economic growth while evolving from a one-party dictatorship to a democracy. China experienced record prosperity, transforming its economy and the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese. The United States greatly benefited from the resulting regional stability and the rapid increase in trade.



Several developments changed the dynamics of the triangular relationship in the 1990s and turned Taiwan once again into a flash point.

First, the events of Tiananmen Square in June 1989 brought the U.S.-China bilateral relationship into question once again. The televised clashes between soldiers and civilians resulting in the Tiananmen upheaval created an animosity among Americans toward the PRC's Communist leaders that was reinforced by subsequent acts involving the repression of dissidents in China. Adding to the impact of Tiananmen Square was the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which weakened strategic arguments for U.S.-PRC cooperation. And China's growing power and international assertiveness introduced new tensions in its relationship with the established superpower. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan beginning in the late 1980s and culminating in the March 2000 election, which ended half a century of Kuomintang party rule, served to heighten the political contrast between Taiwan and the PRC and to increase American sympathy for Taiwan.

Three recent developments in particular have inflamed emotions. The first was the 1995 visit of Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater, Cornell University, to give a speech. When the leaders of the PRC learned that Lee had been invited to visit the United States, their concern about what they regarded as the efforts of Taiwanese leaders to pursue a policy of creeping independence and to erode the concept of "one China" increased. In PRC eyes, the visit was a major breach of the understanding that Beijing's leaders believed existed with the United States—that it would not permit visits by top leaders from Taiwan. Adding to the problem was the fact that the visit was mishandled by all three parties. The U.S. government first assured the Chinese that the visit would not take place and later reneged after Congress voted overwhelmingly to invite Lee. President Lee, despite assurances to the contrary, gave a provocative political speech at Cornell, which exacerbated Beijing's response to the visit. Then the Chinese themselves overreacted crudely and heavyhandedly. The upshot was not only the Chinese staging of major military exercises in the Taiwan Strait but also the firing of missiles off Taiwan in March 1996. The U.S. reaction was to dispatch two aircraft carriers to the waters near Taiwan.

As a result of those developments and Beijing's analysis of the Gulf War, in which the United States demonstrated its technological prowess, the Chinese became even more aware of their comparative military inadequacies. Those events also rekindled both U.S. and Chinese awareness of the fragility of the Taiwan bargain as established in the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. Chinese military planners reportedly concluded that they would have to confront the United States in any Taiwan contingency and began to plan for that, including making a decision to procure more advanced weapons systems.

On the international front Beijing severely squeezed Taiwan, maintaining global pressures against its representation in world and regional organizations. This position stirred emotions on Taiwan whose people and leaders believed that a population of twenty-two million that had created a major economy deserved greater dignity and a higher profile.

The PRC's concerns about President Lee's intentions were further intensified in the summer of 1999 when Taiwan's leader issued a statement saying that relations between Taiwan and the mainland should take place on a "special state-to-state" basis. From the PRC's perspective, that pronouncement moved Taiwan significantly closer to the Chinese red line—a line that would be crossed if Taiwan declared independence, an intolerable proclamation that would force China to take military action.

Then, to make matters even worse from the PRC's point of view, in March 2000, the Kuomintang, which at least had nominally accepted the principle of "one China," was defeated in the presidential elections, and Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the proindependence Democratic Progressive party, was



elected president of Taiwan. Despite the conciliatory statements made by President Chen in his inaugural address and in speeches delivered since his election, especially his pledge not to declare independence unless the PRC uses force, the PRC views Chen with great mistrust. The predominant view on the mainland is that Chen is softening his stand on independence only as a tactical move designed to help him consolidate his power and that he will take bolder steps toward independence if he is elected to a second term in 2004.

Recent developments in the military sphere have also inflamed the atmosphere. China has deployed an increasing number of short-range missiles designed to intimidate—or, if necessary, attack—Taiwan. For its part, Taiwan is discussing whether to increase its military budget and purchase missile defense technology from the United States. And in the United States a discussion is taking place about the possible deployment in Asia of ballistic missile defenses that might include Taiwan.

Finally, a political impasse between Taiwan and China has existed since the election of President Chen. The mainland says there can be no official dialogue unless Chen accepts the "one China" principle, and Chen says he is willing to begin a dialogue that will include discussion of "one China" but that he is not willing to accept any precondition for discussion.

All of these developments are the stuff of crises.

* This section is based partly on A. Doak Barnett, "Dangerous Dilemmas: The Unresolved Problem of Taiwan's Future," August 1996. See also Brent Scowcroft, "How Can the United States Keep Peace Between China and Taiwan," Boston Globe, February 28, 2000.

Is There an American National Consensus on the U.S. Role in the China-Taiwan Relationship?*

During the course of the past three years and especially in recent Roundtables and in other meetings, the NCAFP has been seeking to determine whether there is an American consensus on Cross-Strait issues that could serve as the basis for a bipartisan U.S. approach to the problem. The NCAFP has concluded that despite many disagreements over particular issues, there does exist a bipartisan consensus on some crucial issues. The consensus consists of the following.

1. Few Americans want either to side with China at the expense of Taiwan or to side with Taiwan "at all costs." Through six American administrations there has been an effort to improve relations with a China that is increasingly important in regional and global affairs while maintaining friendly and faithful relations with Taiwan.
2. The United States should maintain a strong military presence in East Asia, carefully tend its alliances, and maintain its forward military deployments in order to continue its role as a major power in the region.
3. The United States should adhere to the three communiqués issued with the PRC and to the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress while recognizing the tension that exists between them. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which was watered down by the House of Representatives and has not yet been passed by the Senate, should not be passed now but should be used as a "sword of Damocles" to deter China from any aggressive military action toward Taiwan.



4. The relatively new element in President Clinton's statements about Cross-Strait relations, that is, that any solution to the issue must involve the assent of the people of Taiwan, is positive. Although this is not entirely new, it puts into sharper focus the new reality of democracy in Taiwan.
5. Arms sales to Taiwan should be "defensive" and while conducted carefully, they should continue without any Chinese veto.
6. No decision should be taken by the Clinton administration on National Missile Defense or Theater Missile Defense (TMD) for Taiwan. We should discuss these issues with the PRC to whom the most provocative kind of missile defense would be an integrated system that included Taiwan. Such decisions should be left to the next administration.
7. Taiwan should be able to join any international organization that does not require statehood and to participate in some capacity in those that do, and China needs to demonstrate greater flexibility on this issue. There is also agreement that both China and Taiwan should enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) as soon as possible without any complications and that other forms of economic and functional interaction, for example, the "three links," should be pursued.
8. The overall policy toward the PRC should be a "clear-eyed engagement" that rules out either "containment" or a kind of "feckless friendship." China is neither an ally nor an enemy of the United States. It should further integrate itself into the international community. Moreover, there are a number of areas for U.S.-PRC cooperation, including the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, the environment, terrorism, drugs, and strategic dialogue.
9. The United States should maintain its commitments, including its commitment to the "one-China" policy, although the definition of that concept should be kept vague. And the United States should not support either Taiwan's independence or any use of force by Beijing to resolve the issue.
10. The United States should impress on China that Taiwan is a democracy and that China needs to offer Taiwan more incentives and fewer threats.
11. The United States should maintain strong unofficial relations with Taiwan, maintain the Taiwan Relations Act, continue to deter any use of force against Taiwan from the mainland, and urge the new president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, to continue a conciliatory course toward the mainland.
12. The United States should try to be a balancer and a facilitator, not a mediator or a negotiator, on Cross-Strait issues. The two sides should be encouraged to resume their dialogue. In addition, unofficial track-two efforts are also helpful. It is up to the two sides to determine the outcome of the Cross-Strait dialogue. The United States will agree to any outcome that the two sides can agree to peacefully. Some U.S. assurances, however, would be likely once a final deal is made.
13. The Cross-Strait issue is so important and so complex that it demands presidential leadership. Early in the next administration, the President should make a foreign policy speech on Asia in which U.S. relations with China are prominent. That speech should lay out a broad approach to China. The President should also seek bipartisan agreement with Congress on China policy, the goal of which should be to move away from polarization and toward "hard-headed engagement."

* This section is based on an oral presentation to the eighth Roundtable in August 2000 made by former U.S. Ambassador to China Winston Lord. Ambassador Lord made a similar presentation to a conference on Cross-Strait issues sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in July 2000.



The Current Impasse in China-Taiwan Relations: Dangers and Opportunities

Overview

The inauguration of Democratic Progressive party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian as the Republic of China's new president on May 20, 2000, has accelerated a process of political change in Taiwan that could lead to important changes in U.S.-PRC, Taiwan-PRC, and U.S.-Taiwan relations. These changes could heighten tensions across the Taiwan Strait and in U.S.-PRC relations and accelerate the remilitarization of the Taiwan Strait area. Or they could lead to a process of Cross-Strait accommodation. It is still too early to say which of these possibilities is more likely. But the United States has a strong national interest in avoiding the former scenario.

Currently the main problem is the existence of a political impasse heightened by no sign of compromise. China insists that Taiwanese authorities must accept the principle of "one China" before official talks can be resumed. Taiwan asserts that although "one China" can be on the agenda for discussion, no prior conditions for dialogue should be set. Meanwhile, China has recently stated another rationale for resorting to force in addition to that relating to a declaration of independence by Taiwan, namely, if Taiwan attempts to drag out negotiations on reunification "indefinitely."

The absence of trust may be the most critical issue. Although Beijing's leaders assert that they are prepared to listen to Chen's words and watch his actions, they have very little confidence either in Chen or in the Democratic Progressive party that he heads. The DPP's history as an independence party is well known in the PRC, and despite recent shifts away from earlier policies calling for independence, such reversals are viewed by Beijing as tactical, not fundamental. The recent fierce attacks on Vice President Annette Lu for her public statements implying Taiwanese nationhood are indicative of Beijing's doubts.

Similarly, Taiwan's new leaders, despite their soft and conciliatory language, have not altered their suspicions of basic PRC policies. They believe that accepting the "one-China" principle would trap Taiwan and undercut its leverage in future talks. And given the nature of the PRC regime, Taiwan has no interest in any variation of the PRC's "one-country, two-systems" approach.

The more serious risks are probably not in the short term. Both sides must make substantial efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement if they hope to gain some international understanding and support. Moreover, because both sides have daunting domestic challenges, conflict or serious tension would have a highly detrimental effect on their capacity to deal with such challenges. Also, Beijing is unlikely to abandon its "wait-and-see" policy in favor of more militant steps until it has given up all hope of some kind of a compromise with Chen on the "one-China" issue.

But if the impasse drags on, Beijing's threat to act if Taiwan rejects its overtures "indefinitely" will put pressure on the PRC to take more militant steps. Chinese nationalism, now substituting for Marxism-Leninism as the main force used to seek loyalty and support for the government, will underwrite the demand for the "unification of the motherland."

Moreover, unless some way is found to stop the Cross-Strait arms buildup, it will continue to fuel tensions across the Strait and in U.S.-PRC relations. Currently that buildup is being advanced by those in China who view military force as the only means to bring about reunification and those on the other side of the Strait (and in the United States) who declare that more weapons are urgently needed to defend Taiwan against PRC attack. The PRC increases its military budget, buys more sophisticated arms and military technology from Russia, and targets more missiles on Taiwan. The Taiwan military is seeking more advanced weapons from the United States while the U.S. Congress



is considering whether the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act will improve Taiwan's military defense and the capability of the U.S. military to cooperate in the defense of Taiwan.

Currently a vicious circle is developing. Hard-liners in the PRC contend that military threat is the only effective counter to Taiwan's perceived drift toward independence, thus strengthening hard-liners in Taiwan and the United States who see military strength as the only response to Beijing's threats. The end result of this vicious circle could be a war in which all three parties would be heavy losers.

The principal danger of the next year would be missing the best opportunity for resuming dialogue that would exist in several years. Beijing insists that before a dialogue can be resumed, Taiwan must accept the "one-China" principle. In Taiwan, on the other hand, there is much frustration with the PRC because of the perception that Chen Shui-bian has been conciliatory and moderate so far but that China has not reciprocated Taiwan's goodwill. Also under the surface is the feeling that Taiwan has made enough concessions to the PRC, for example, by dropping several previous formulations that angered Beijing and agreeing to discuss the "one-China principle," and that it should not make any further concessions just to get a resumption of the dialogue. A debate is going on within the DPP between those who want negotiations with China as soon as possible, especially before legislative elections next year, and others who want to maintain a strong bargaining position and hold the line on the grounds that they can eventually get more favorable terms.

Domestic politics in Taiwan have also become a critical factor in Cross-Strait interactions. The political shakeout in Taiwan following the humiliating defeat of the Kuomintang by the DPP continues. Much political maneuvering lies ahead. Its results will have important consequences for Cross-Strait dialogue.

Leadership politics in Beijing are also an important factor. The Taiwan issue is highly emotional for all PRC leaders. They see it in the context of 150 years of Chinese humiliation by imperialist powers. Now that Hong Kong and Macao have been returned to China, they insist that Taiwan should also return to the fold. Moreover, this issue has now become involved in succession politics. Jiang Zemin may seek to continue in a leadership role for several more years, and he cannot appear too soft on the Taiwan issue or be perceived as the leader who "lost" Taiwan to the "separatists." Indeed, no Chinese leader can afford to be charged with such a loss. This gives PRC leaders little room for maneuver. Also, the Chinese domestic scene is volatile and fragile, and there is considerable social unrest associated with unemployment, corruption, the Falun Gong, labor demonstrations, and various forms of dissent. Chinese leaders are prompted to use nationalism, including the Taiwan issue, to distract the people from such issues.

In sum, the principal danger in the short run is the likelihood that positions on both sides will harden if the current political impasse over "one China" cannot be broken soon. Then an opportunity to resume the dialogue would be lost.

PRC Perspectives

At the last meeting of the Roundtable in August 2000, one PRC analyst summed up the PRC's current perspectives on CrossStrait issues in the following manner. Despite the fact that the PRC was unprepared for the election of Chen Shui-bian on March 18, 2000, and that it was the last thing it had hoped for, the mainland understands the need to live with reality. Moreover, the PRC wants "stability" over everything else, and this means stable relations across the Taiwan Strait. Also, he continued, Chen Shui-bian deserves credit for stating the "Five No's": no declaration of independence, no change of national title, no inclusion of the "two state theory" in the constitution,



no holding of a referendum on reunification or independence, and no abolition of the National Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council. If Chen had stated "Five Yes's," the situation would be explosive. In sum, by moving away from the issue of Taiwan's independence, Chen has moved a "half-step" closer to what the PRC hoped for. Now Chen needs to take the other half-step by accepting the principle of "one China." He can do that simply by returning to the 1992 "consensus" that both sides accept the principle of "one China" while not defining its political meaning.

The same analyst went on to say that he believed that PRC policy toward Taiwan in the near future would be a two-track policy of "sticks" and "carrots." On the one hand, the PRC is determined to safeguard the territorial integrity of China "at any cost." Therefore the military factor will remain. On the other hand, he saw some encouraging developments. The PRC is now offering Taiwan a more flexible definition of "one China." Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen told visiting Taiwanese journalists that "one China" is not an "either-or" choice—either the PRC or the Republic of China (ROC)—as long as both adhere to "one China." This suggests, he said, that the PRC has a broad and "generous" definition of "one China." Also, in July the mayor of Xiaman, a city on the mainland, invited the mayor of Kao-hsiung in southern Taiwan to visit Xiaman. Although the visit did not materialize, the invitation indicates that the mainland is now prepared for mayoral visits in the context of "one China." Also, there have been visits to the mainland by KMT and New party delegations from Taiwan—the first party-to-party visits since 1949. Finally, there has been a reshuffling of the Taiwan office in the PRC State Council.

In sum, although it is still too early to predict a fundamental change in China's policy toward Taiwan, "there is already evidence indicating some significant review and modifications." The PRC would adhere to the "one-China" principle while "showing flexibility to reach compromises" on the implementation of that principle. In the meantime, the PRC would step up its diplomatic activities with the United States and other countries to ensure the international community's continued support for the "one-China" policy.

The same PRC analyst suggested that the PRC is developing a longer run strategy for dealing with Chen Shui-bian. He said that Chen's first term can be divided roughly into two phases. The first phase runs through to the parliamentary elections in December 2001. The second phase covers the last two years of Chen's term in office. The PRC analyst said that in the first phase, Chen and his administration would focus on consolidating power, and in the second phase, they would prepare for reelection. The suggestion was that Chen would not wish to rock the boat during his first four-year term in office. But, the PRC analyst continued, "it is generally believed on the mainland that if and when he is reelected in 2004, Chen Shui-bian will gear up to make more drastic moves away from the one-China idea." His analysis suggests that the PRC is not eager to see Chen's administration have a second term.

On the other hand, another PRC analyst noted that Chen would need to consolidate his domestic position before he could afford to take a significant step forward on the "one-China" principle. The implication of this comment is that Chen may yet be willing to come to terms.

The subtle differences between these two positions suggest that the analysts are divided over whether Chen Shui-bian, once he consolidates his power, will or will not seek an accommodation with the mainland.

Another PRC participant at the August Roundtable said that the Cross-Strait issue is not a dispute over sovereignty but over the "integrity of sovereignty." He said the key to resuming the dialogue is to return to the 1992 compromise that can "still serve as a basis for breaking the deadlock." The PRC



participant then went on to say that the mainland is prepared to agree to a very broad and ambiguous definition of "one China" that is "not in the past, in the present, or in the future tense." It can be just two words in Chinese and in English—one China—and the political meaning of that term can be "left to the future."

Another PRC participant at the August Roundtable warned that the present stalemate on Cross-Strait issues cannot last indefinitely. Taiwan is somewhere between *de facto* and *de jure* independence. Taiwan has departed from the "one-China" principle but has not yet quite announced that it is an independent state. This situation cannot last. Domestic pressures on the mainland are building up.

Taiwan Perspectives

Although there were a number of differences among the participants from Taiwan at the August Roundtable, there was general agreement on the following points. First, the PRC needs to recognize that the majority of the people on Taiwan do not want to move to reunification now but do want to maintain the status quo. The majority recognizes that a move toward *de jure* independence would promote a crisis. Second, President Chen's "Five No's" indicate that he has moved a considerable distance away from his earlier position supporting independence. Third, unification should be one option for the Taiwanese people, but it should not be the only option. Fourth, for President Chen to move further in the direction of the "one-China" principle, he would need some incentives from the PRC, particularly on the question of greater international representation for Taiwan and some assurances from the PRC that it would not resort to force. Fifth, a Cross-Strait agreement would be more likely if the PRC would officially endorse the more flexible definitions of "one China" stated privately to visitors from Taiwan by Qian Qichen and Wang Daohan. On specific issues, however, there were important differences among the participants from Taiwan that will be outlined in the following paragraphs.

A Taiwan participant argued that the DPP has long challenged the "one-China" principle for two reasons. First, the DPP had nothing to do with the Chinese civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist party (CCP) and, therefore, it rejects the legacy of "one China." The DPP "seeks to redefine Taiwan's political identity away from China." Second, "based on a new conception of Taiwan's identity," the DPP is eager to "break away from the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué orthodoxy in which the United States and the PRC asserted that Taiwan is a part of China." The DPP is in fact "strongly against" the principle of "one China," at least "one China" in the present tense.

The same participant said that the DPP understands that its long-held position on Taiwan's independence will inevitably trigger suspicion and distrust on the part of the PRC and that it wants to avoid Cross-Strait confrontation. This is why President Chen has advanced the "Five No's" and has tried in many ways to soften the DPP's independence position while seeking to open new ways for building mutual trust since his presidential victory. He said, however, that the PRC has remained "rigid" in its "one-China orthodoxy" and has failed to adjust itself to the new political situation in Taiwan.

The same participant also observed that although President Chen is ready to resume bilateral talks via formal channels as soon as possible, the PRC is deliberately bypassing the Chen administration and "beginning to develop an anti-Chen united front" through contacts with Taiwan's opposition parties, pronification forces, business groups, and even some of the DPP's own elites—a statement denied by PRC participants who said Beijing is merely trying to pressure Chen to accept "one China." Finally, he observed, the PRC's "relentless dogmatism" on the "one China myth" remains the most difficult barrier for Cross-Strait normalization.



Another Roundtable participant from Taiwan argued that there is a consensus in Taiwan among all the major political parties on three points regarding Cross-Strait relations. First, Taiwan needs more international space. Second, Taiwan needs security guarantees. Third, Taiwan needs to be able to continue its way of life and to have a free choice about its future. In particular, it needs the right to "say no to unification" if that is the choice of the people.

With regard to the so-called 1992 consensus, this participant said that it would be difficult for President Chen to take a large step forward on the core issue of one China "given the political circumstances in Taiwan." Moreover, it would be very difficult to agree to a "vague" and ambiguous formula on "one China" because the Taiwanese people demand more clarity. Does "one China" mean the PRC? Does "one China" mean a future "one China" or an existing "one China"?

The only way to clear up these matters, said the participant, is through dialogue. But the PRC has a precondition for dialogue that is unacceptable to the Taiwan government. The same participant said that President Chen's policies on Cross-Strait relations have a 70 percent favorable poll rating in Taiwan. Finally, the participant said that the basic issue is not one of "one China" but rather of mutual trust. And no matter what President Chen says or does, the PRC will not trust him.

In contrast, another participant from Taiwan urged a return to the 1992 consensus on "one China" with respective interpretations. He said that it was important to do this before the end of the year. He suggested that President Chen's "Five No's" would be a good starting point for mutual pledges by Taiwan and the PRC. Taiwan should pledge that as long as the PRC does not use force it will maintain the "Five No's." The PRC should pledge that as long as Taiwan continues the "Five No's," it will not use force.

The same participant also urged the PRC to be more generous to Taiwan on the question of international space. Taiwan is now barred from many important international organizations such as the World Health Organization and other specialized agencies of the United Nations from which it was expelled when Taiwan was expelled from the UN. Taiwan should now be brought back into those specialized agencies in a format to be discussed with the PRC.

The participant also suggested that the PRC should make an important symbolic gesture toward Taiwan by allowing Taiwan to enter the WTO first.

Concerning the mainland's fear that Taiwan under President Chen Shui-bian is moving toward separatism and two states, the participant said that it was constitutionally impossible for any leader in Taiwan to do this because the ROC constitution is a "one-China constitution." Even today the ROC constitution covers the mainland. Thus no matter which party is in power in Taiwan, it would have to respect the status quo on "one China."

Another participant from Taiwan urged Taipei and Beijing to bypass the controversial question of whether or not there was a 1992 consensus on "one China" by agreeing to return to the "spirit of the 1992 consultation" and to resume Cross-Strait dialogue thereafter. He then proposed that Taiwan and the mainland agree that the two "are equal, autonomous, and distinct parts of a complete China." But the "complete China" today is neither the PRC nor the ROC. It is historical and cultural China. "Realities today" dictate that Taiwan and the PRC are "political entities" that have "jurisdiction over distinct and mutually exclusive parts of a complete China." How and when the two constituent parts of a complete China will evolve—they could possibly turn into a single unified country or stay separated—needs to be determined by future generations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The "one-China" principle, therefore, should refer to the possibility of a complete China "in the future"—not at the present time or visible on the immediate horizon.



The same participant also urged the PRC to reconsider its "one-country, two-systems" formula, which, he said, is insensitive to Taiwan's history in the judgment of many Taiwanese. In its place he proposed a formula of "one union, multiple systems."

Economic Relations

Despite the Political impasse, investment on the Chinese mainland by Taiwanese firms continued to grow during the first half of 2000. Two-way trade reached more than 25 billion dollars in 1999. The two complementary economies were becoming increasingly interdependent. In the information industry a three way interdependence was growing rapidly between American firms and Taiwanese firms that had built factories in mainland China. In 1999 four American firms bought 15 billion dollars' worth of information industry products from Taiwanese companies, about one-third of which came from their plants on the mainland.

The impending entry of the PRC and Taiwan into the WTO is likely to lead to a further substantial increase in Cross-Strait trade. The PRC benefits from the infusion of Taiwanese capital technology, and managerial and marketing skills, whereas Taiwanese firms depend increasingly on access to the mainland as a market and production base. Although economic interdependence will not in itself resolve the political impasse, it is creating—on both sides of the Strait—growing constituencies that need Cross-Strait stability.

U.S. Policy Options*

Based on the fact that a new U.S. administration will take office in 2001, what possibilities regarding U.S. policy toward Taiwan are likely? One approach would be the continuation of the current policy, which has various aspects.

1. promoting a peaceful resolution of the China-Taiwan relationship by urging both parties to reopen a dialogue, but not attempting to give advice to either party about how to resolve differences or offering to serve as a mediator;
2. emphasizing U.S. interests in maintaining a relationship with the PRC that is positive, but continuing unofficial ties with Taiwan, including medium-level visits, as well as promoting economic and cultural relations;
3. making clear U.S. opposition to any declaration of independence on Taiwan's part, but also making clear that the United States would respond should the PRC use force in any form as long as Taiwan refrains from issuing a declaration of independence;
4. continuing to furnish defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with needs that have been determined by the United States, while keeping such assistance within bounds and not involving Taiwan directly in missile defense programs;
5. pursuing a policy of "conscious ambiguity" with respect to identifying action that the United States would take should the PRC use force against Taiwan under present circumstances; refusing to state what the United States would do while stating that there would be "grave concern" should the peaceful route be abandoned.

It should be noted that the current policy has been in place for most of the past thirty years under six American presidents and that it has served all three sides well. Taiwan has become a prosperous



democracy. The PRC has increased the standard of living of hundreds of millions of its citizens while enjoying the greatest level of security that any Chinese regime has had in the past 150 years. And the United States has enjoyed the fruits of relative peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Such a policy should not be tampered with lightly. There are, however, a number of minor alternatives that are currently under discussion.

One alternative would be to modify current policy by making clearer what U.S. kinds of actions would be taken in the event that the PRC used force after declaring Taiwan unwilling to negotiate on its terms. Without stipulating the extent or the nature of that assistance, the United States would state that it would provide assistance to Taiwan when it came under military attack, assuming it had not sought to declare independence.

Another change would involve promoting a compromise that would enable the two parties to reopen a political dialogue, for example, by suggesting that the two sides agree to reopen dialogue on the basis of "the spirit of 1992," or the "one-China without further definition" formula. Another idea would be to promote a long-term settlement in the form of an interim agreement or the formation of a commonwealth or a confederation.

It has also been argued that in light of the controversy created by President Clinton's "Three No's" statement in Shanghai in 1998—no U.S. support for an independent Taiwan; no U.S. support for "two Chinas" or "one China-one Taiwan"; and no U.S. support for Taiwan's membership in any organization that requires statehood—the United States should make clear that it has no position with respect to the future of Taiwan. That is a matter to be determined by the two parties directly concerned. It must be a decision not reached by coercion but one concluded in a manner acceptable to the people of Taiwan.

In reality, there can be no U.S. policy that would be free of problems and uncertainties. For decades the United States has sought to advance simultaneously along two incongruous paths: It has sought to improve its relations with the PRC by combining a policy involving the balance of power with that of a concert of powers, working with China on a widening range of issues from Korea to the containment of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, it has treated Taiwan as a de facto state that is advancing both economically and politically, warranting support up to a point, with the hope that the further evolution of the PRC toward a freer society will make some form of union increasingly possible.

There is a general consensus among the majority of American specialists that while the United States seeks to advance relations with the PRC for reasons outlined above, it must continue not only to interact positively with Taiwan but also to urge Taiwanese authorities to pursue policies of moderation in words and deeds designed to seek some form of rapprochement with the mainland. At the same time it should warn against words or actions that would create adverse international reactions. Similar advice should be given privately to Beijing.

Further consideration could be given to making a clearer statement of what the United States would do should the PRC use force against Taiwan after some deadline has been imposed, but several risks exist: first, that such a pledge would encourage hard-liners on both sides to experiment with tougher policies and consequently make more difficult the chance of a Cross-Strait accommodation; second, that it would exacerbate divisions in the United States. Perhaps even more important, it is impossible to make precise promises with respect to U.S. actions when the full circumstances cannot be known in advance.



American specialists also agree that the United States should not be an active mediator in the Cross-Strait issue. The two sides have to work out their future by themselves. But the United States can and should seek to foster an environment in which the two sides increase their forms of interchange across the Strait.

A minimal U.S. objective should be to move Cross-Strait relations away from the current drift toward militarization and in the direction of the long-term political process of dialogue, practical confidence-building measures, and eventual accommodation. In support of this objective, the United States should

- encourage Taipei and Beijing to revive the political dialogue they began in 1993; the most promising approach would be some reinvoking of the 1992 agreement, probably best worked out in private talks;
- facilitate practical confidence-building measures, including dual membership in the WTO, the development of direct postal, shipping, and air links, and the resolution of such practical issues as illegal immigration, smuggling, and so on;
- encourage track-two contacts across the Strait to improve prospects for resuming track-one dialogue;
- encourage a period of restraint by all sides on military actions and acquisitions or deployments in order to give a political process between Taipei and Beijing time to take hold. If it fails to do so, U.S. options regarding Taiwan's defense should remain open;
- Publicize and applaud growing economic cooperation across the Taiwan Strait, including the increasing triangular interdependence in the information industry.

A more ambitious goal would be to encourage the two sides to work out a peace framework or interim agreement while the two sides gradually reduce mistrust and increase contacts and trade. An essential component of such an interim agreement would be a pledge by China not to use force in return for a pledge by Taiwan not to declare independence. A similar agreement has already been suggested by Governor James Soong, runner-up to Chen Shui-bian in the recent Taiwan presidential elections and leader of the People First party. Moreover, in his inaugural address Chen Shui-bian pledged not to declare independence as long as China refrained from using force. Thus the ingredients of such a mutual pledge are already in place. This interim agreement could then be reviewed after a suitable period.

Over the longer run the two sides could eventually consider a commonwealth or a confederation. There has already been a good deal of discussion of this issue in Taiwan.

The more immediate goal should be increasing economic and cultural ties via the "three direct links": trade, transportation, and communications. An important first step would be to establish direct shipping routes between Taiwan's coastal city of Kao-hsiung and Amoy, the capital of Fukien Province on the mainland. Another important step would be to establish direct air flights between Taipei and Shanghai.

Another immediate goal should be the resumption of the official dialogue that has been suspended since 1998. There are a number of ways in which the two sides could try to reach common ground on the difficult issue of "one China." First, Chen Shui-bian could preside over a meeting of Taiwan's National Unification Council, of which the president is the chairman, and pledge that he does not intend to alter the National Unification Guidelines that have been in place during the past two decades. In return, the mainland government could agree to resume the dialogue. The two sides could agree alternatively to return to the 1992 formula on "one China" and work out how they would handle the question of defining "one China."



Pursuing strategies along these lines should not only improve stability but should also reduce pressure on both sides for continuing to pursue an arms buildup. The resulting atmosphere could be conducive to a long-range search for innovative solutions such as a confederation or a commonwealth.

The possibility of progress will also depend on the ability of the next U.S. President to work out with the U.S. Congress a cooperative strategy on China and Taiwan. If the President and Congress find themselves at odds, as they have been for the past decade since Tiananmen, their positions will encourage both Beijing and Taiwan to play one off against the other rather than to reach a genuine accommodation.

In sum, the potential for progress in China-Taiwan relations is visible, but it will require creative efforts of statesmanship on all three sides. If some progress on this issue is not made in the next several years, the drift toward catastrophe could accelerate.

* This section draws on the paper written for the eighth Roundtable by Robert A. Scalapino, "Cross-Strait Relations and the United States."

NCAFP Policy Recommendations

As a result of distilling the central themes and key issues of the Roundtable process and identifying the U.S. policy options set forth above, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy makes the following recommendations consistent with American foreign policy interests.

a. The new U.S. administration should recognize that China and Taiwan are now on a collision course that threatens U.S. national security interests. It is in the U.S. interest to see some kind of accommodation between the two sides. To bring about such an accommodation will require immediate and then continued presidential involvement and leadership and strong efforts to forge a bipartisan consensus around a coherent, consistent, and well-articulated policy. The elements of that consensus are listed in Part III above.

b. Such policy should be founded on the bedrock of the "current policy" whose five aspects are set forth in Part VI above.

c. Because the danger of miscalculation and miscommunication is so great, especially in the absence of official dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan, every effort should be made to encourage Taipei and Beijing to revive the political dialogue they began in 1993 and to work out a peace framework that would permit the two sides to reduce mistrust and increase contacts and trade. The core of such a framework would be a PRC renunciation of force in exchange for Taiwan's pledge not to seek formal, *de jure* independence. There would also have to be some agreement on the controversial "one-China" idea—perhaps an agreement to accept one China with each side free to offer its own interpretation. Alternatively, there could be an agreement on the desirability of working toward a future one China.

d. Since continual economic interdependence between China and Taiwan and the consequences of globalization in general probably offer the most hopeful long-term prospects for a peaceful *modus vivendi* between China and Taiwan, the NCAFP recommends that U.S. policy encourage not only the prompt contemporaneous WTO entry by both China and Taiwan but also, within the WTO context, the prompt resolution of trade barriers and impediments to direct air travel, shipping, and postal communication.



Appendix

Participants

The following individuals participated in one or more of the Roundtables held since 1996 at 320 Park Avenue, New York City. We are grateful to all of them.

Professor A. Doak Barnett*
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Ms. Jan Berris
Vice President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

Mr. Richard C. Bush
Managing Director, American Institute in Taiwan

Dr. Kurt M. Campbell
Center for Strategic and International Studies, (formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs)

Professor Pochih Chen
Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei

Dr. T J. Cheng
Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei

Professor Hungdah Chiu
University of Maryland Law School

Mr. Chu Shulong
Senior Fellow, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing

Professor Ralph N. Clough
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Jerome A. Cohen, Esq.
Council on Foreign Relations

Brigadier General Karl W. Eikenberry, USA
Defense Attaché, U. S. Embassy, Beijing

Mr. Michael Finegan
First Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Beijing

Mr. William J. Flynn
Chairman, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Ms. Bonnie S. Glaser
Consultant on Asian Affairs



Dr. Gerrit W. Gong
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Guo Changlin
Director, Foreign Affairs Department, *Economic Daily*, Beijing (formerly with CICIR and UN Mission (NYC)

Mr. John Holden
President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

Ms. Bi-khim Hsiao
Adviser, Office of the President, Republic of China, Taipei

Professor Gary H. Jefferson
Graduate School of International Economics and Finance, Brandeis University

Professor Jia Qingguo
Associate Dean, Peking University School of International Studies, Beijing

Professor Ying-mao Kau
Department of Political Science, Brown University (currently Senior Adviser to the President, National Security Council, ROC)

Dr. Julian Jengliang Kuo
Director, DPP Policy Council, Taipei

Dr. David M. Lampton
Director, China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan

Professor Cheng-yi Lin
Academica Sinica, Taipei

Ms. Liu Guofen
Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing

Dr. Chih-cheng Lo
Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei

The Honorable Winston Lord
(formerly Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)

Professor Lu Jianren
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing

The Honorable Dr. Ying-jeou Ma
Mayor of Taipei, Taipei



Ms. Emily T. Metzgar
U.S. Institute of Peace

Professor Andrew J. Nathan
Department of Political Science, Columbia University

Professor Ni Shixiong
Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai

The Honorable Douglas H. Paal
President, Asia Pacific Policy Center

Samantha Ravich, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow, Asian Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Donald S. Rice, Esq.
Senior Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Ms. Rebecca Rittgers
Second Chance Foundation

Mr. Alan D. Romberg
Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center (formerly Deputy Director of Policy Planning, DOS)

Mr. William M. Rudolf
Executive Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Professor Robert A. Scalapino
Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California-Berkeley

Mr. Stephen A. Schlaikjer
Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Department of State

Dr. George D. Schwab
President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Dr. Marin Strmecki
Vice President, Smith Richardson Foundation

Professor Su Ge
Assistant President, Foreign Affairs College, Beijing

Hung-mao Tien, Ph.D.
President, Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei (currently Foreign Minister of the ROQ)

Professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
Department of History, Georgetown University and Georgetown School of Foreign Service

Professor Ezra Vogel
Fairbank Center for Asian Research, Harvard University



Dr. Yung Wei
Chairman, Board of Directors, Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies, Taipei

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz
Dean, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Mr. Wu Hsin-hsing
Deputy Secretary General, Straits Exchange Foundation, Taipei

Raymond R. Wu, JD, Ph.D.
Special Assistant to the Chairman, People First Party, Taipei

Dr. Rong-I Wu
President, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, Taipei

Professor Wu Xinbo
Brookings Institute and Fudan University, Shanghai

Mr. Xu Shiquan
President, Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing

Mr. Jiemian Yang
Director, Department of American Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Shanghai

Professor Donald S. Zagoria
Project Director, U.S.-China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations, and Trustee, National Committee on American Foreign Policy

* deceased

Speakers

The following individuals were speakers at one or more of the Roundtables.

The Honorable Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U. S. Department of State

The Honorable Kenneth Lieberthal
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia, National Security Council

The Honorable Kurt M. Campbell
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U. S. Department of Defense

The Honorable Darryl N. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U. S. Department of State

The Honorable Dr. Susan L. Shirk
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U. S. Department of State



Mr. Richard C. Bush
Managing Director, American Institute in Taiwan

Mr. Robert Sutter
Congressional Research Service

Hosts: PRC and Taiwan

The NCAFP expresses special thanks to our host organizations in the PRC and Taiwan. In the PRC, we are grateful to the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs under President Liu Shuqing and Vice President Zhang Wenpu; the Taiwan Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and President Xu Shiquan; the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and Mr. Jiemian Yang; and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in Beijing. For assistance in organizing our trips to Taiwan, we give particular thanks to H. E. Ambassador Charles Teng, Director-General, Taipei Office of Economic and Cultural Affairs (NYC), and his assistant, Ms. Corinna Hu, as well as staff in the Foreign Ministry in Taiwan.

Consultations**

We are also grateful to the high-level officials in the United States and and Taiwan who took the time to discuss these issues with us as a group or individually

The PRC

H. E. Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China
H. E. Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier
H. E. Li Lanqing, Vice-Premier
H. E. Tang Jiaxuan, Foreign Minister
Mr. Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief, General Staff of the PLA
Mr. Sun Yafu, Vice President, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
Mr. Tang Shubei, Deputy Minister, Taiwan Affairs Office, State Council
Mr. Wang Daohan, President, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait; former Mayor of Shanghai

Taiwan

H. E. Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China
H. E. Hsiu-lien Annette Lu, Vice President of the Republic of China
H. E. Tang Fei, Premier
H. E. Dr. Hung-mao Tien, Foreign Minister
H. E. Shih-wen Wu, Defense Minister
The Honorable Ming-yao Chuang, Secretary General, National Security Council
The Honorable Dr. Ying-jeou Ma, Mayor of Taipei
The Honorable Lien Chan, Chairman, KMT
The Honorable Chen-fu Koo, Chairman, Straits Exchange Foundation
Dr. Yuan-tseh Lee, President, Academia Sinica
The Honorable James C. Y Soong, Chairman, People First Party
Dr. Ing-wen Tsai, Chairperson, Mainland Affairs Council
H. E. Lee Teng-hui, President of the Republic of China,
H. E. C. J Chen, Foreign Minister



H. E. Jason Hu, Foreign Minister
H. E. John Chang, Foreign Minister

The United States

Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.)
U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China

The Honorable James R. Sasser
U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China

The Honorable Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Kenneth Lieberthal
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia, National Security Council

The Honorable Kurt M. Campbell
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense

The Honorable Darryl N. Johnson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Susan L. Shirk,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Mr. Jeffrey A. Bader,
Director, Asian Affairs, National Security Council

Mr. Raymond Burghardt,
Director, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei

Mr. Richard C. Bush,
Managing Director, American institute in Taiwan, Taipei

**** Changes in office have taken place since the NCAFP Roundtables began in 1996. In citations showing the same office, the current officeholder is listed first, followed by the name of the person or persons who held that office (from most recent to first).**

